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ABSTRACT

PHYSICAL GEOMETRY
MAY 2016
JAMES BINKOSKI
B.A., BOSTON COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Bradford Skow

All physical theories, from classical Newtonian mechanics to relativistic quantum field theory, entail propositions concerning the geometric structure of spacetime. To give an example, the general theory of relativity entails that spacetime
is curved, smooth, and four-dimensional. In this dissertation, I take the structural
commitments of our theories seriously and ask: how is such structure instantiated
in the physical world? Mathematically, a property like ‘being curved’ is perfectly
well-defined—we know what it means for a mathematical space to be curved. But
what could it mean to say that the physical world is curved? Call this the problem
of physical geometry.
The problem of physical geometry is a plea for foundations—a request for fundamental truth conditions for physical-geometric propositions. My chief claim is
that only a substantival theory of spacetime—a theory according to which space-

vi

time is an entity in its own right, existing over and above the material content of
the world—can supply the necessary truth conditions.
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INTRODUCTION

All physical theories—from classical Newtonian mechanics to relativistic quantum field theory—entail propositions concerning the geometric structure of spacetime. This dissertation concerns the ultimate truth conditions for such propositions, and it defends a substantival theory of spacetime according to which spacetime is a part of the fundamental ontology of the physical world.
To start, consider some of the structural commitments of classical Newtonian
mechanics. There are, of course, multiple ways of formulating Newton’s theory.
But if your aim is to get clear on what the theory has to say about the spacetime structure of the physical world, then you can do no better than the approach
taken below. On this approach, the details of which are spelled out in chapter
1, classical Newtonian mechanics is identifiable with its set of spacetime models,
each of which is a mathematical structure of the form (M, tab , hab , ∇). Each such
model assumes as its basic object a smooth, differentiable manifold M with the local smoothness structure of R4 . Spatiotemporal structure is then added by means
of the introduction of smooth tensor fields. In the case of classical Newtonian mechanics, the added structure induces a division of the manifold into space and
time, where space and time are distinct to the point that each demands representation by its own tensor field. Consequently, the theory posits one tensor field, the
field tab , to represent the structure of time and another, the field hab , to represent
the structure of space. Beyond this, the theory assumes an affine connection ∇, the
function of which is to ground a distinction between those spacetime curves which
are straight and those which are not.

1

As a second example, consider the general theory of relativity (GR), which carries its own set of structural commitments. Its models are mathematical structures
of the form (M, gab , Tab ). As in classical Newtonian mechanics, the theory assumes
as its basic object a smooth, differentiable manifold. But whereas classical Newtonian mechanics posits three different fields on M , each representing a different
layer of spatiotemporal structure, the general theory of relativity posits a single
metric tensor field gab . Moreover, the metric tensor field in GR is a dynamical element of the theory insofar as it can vary with changes in the distribution of mass
and energy in spacetime. That distribution is represented mathematically by the
stress-energy tensor field Tab , and its relation to the metric tensor field is captured
by the Einstein Field Equation.
I take this kind of talk of structure seriously. I take it that the physical world is
structured in a determinate, mind-independent way. I take it that the aim of science
is to produce truth-conditioned descriptions of the physical world. And I take
it that elucidation of the world’s spacetime structure is an important part of the
scientific enterprise. A basic assumption behind the work that follows, then, is that
the physical world is a geometrically structured object—that it has a determinate
spacetime geometry. My question is: How is such structure instantiated in the
physical world?
Without question, our best guide to the physical world is through physical theory. Consequently, the project undertaken in this dissertation is one concerning the
interpretation of physical theory. The aim is to engage with the details of a handful
of physical theories with the aim of understanding what the world must be like in
order for those theories to be true. On this approach, interpretation is the simple
task of attempting to spell out what a theory says about the world; in the case
of fundamental physics, what it says concerning the world’s most basic objects,
properties, and relations. But don’t confuse ‘simple’ with ‘easy’. For example,
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consider some of the well-known difficulties involved in interpreting quantum
mechanics. With quantum mechanics, we have a well-developed mathematical
formalism which can used to set up experiments and to make predictions. Moreover, the degree of accuracy with which we can do so suggests that the formalism
has something deep and interesting and important to tell us about the nature of the
world. But here the formalism is silent. On one interpretation, quantum mechanics says that the physical world is a world in which systems evolve in accordance
with Schrödinger’s equation until measurements are made, at which point they
instantaneously and probabilistically “snap” into determinate form. On another
interpretation, the theory tells us that the physical world is a multiverse which
branches whenever quantum systems come into contact with one another. On yet
another interpretation, the theory is a theory about epistemic states, one according
to which quantum probabilities are subjective degrees of confidence and superposition states represent states of partial ignorance. Each of these is an attempt at
interpreting the quantum formalism—an attempt at saying what the world must
like in order for the theory to be true. Similarly, this dissertation is an attempt at
saying what the world must be like in order for a certain class of physical theories
to be true. That class will include classical Newtonian mechanics and the special
and general theories of relativity. And my focus will be on trying to spell out what
the world must be like in order for what these theories have to say with respect to
the spacetime structure of the physical world to be true.
My primary claim is that the only viable account of the spacetime structure of
the physical world is one which adopts a substantival conception of spacetime—that
is to say, a conception according to which spacetime is an entity in its own right,
part of the fundamental ontology of the physical world. According to the substantivalist, the physical world is such that there exists, over and above whatever
physical events and processes happen to exist, a substratum of spacetime points.
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On this view, substantival spacetime constitutes a veritable fabric of the cosmos,
the background against which physical events take place and physical processes
unfold. More precisely, I take substantivalism to be the conjunction of the following theses:
S1 Spacetime is a fundamental “beable,” part of the fundamental ontology of
the world. It follows that spacetime is a “non-emergent” feature of the world,
and, in particular, that it is something metaphysically distinct from whatever
physical events and processes happen to exist.
S2 Spacetime is composed of smaller parts, each constituting a region of spacetime. In what follows, I assume that spacetime is composed, ultimately, of
atomic, point-sized parts.
S3 Spatiotemporal relations are relations first and foremost among points of
spacetime. Physical events can enter into spatiotemporal relations, but only
in a derivative way in virtue of occupying regions of spacetime.
Thesis S1, which expresses the claim that spacetime is an entity in its own right,
represents the heart of the matter, and I call a view anti-substantivalist just in case
it rejects S1. Theses S2 and S3 are supplementary and help to fill in the picture in
important ways.
What are the arguments for substantival spacetime? The chief argument goes
back to Newton and the theory of absolute space which he put at the foundation of
his mechanics of motion. For Newton, the motivation for positing absolute space
lie in the fact that his laws deal in absolute quantities of motion, where a quantity
of motion is absolute just in case it cannot be analyzed in terms of the relative
motions of bodies. Indeed, the whole of Newton’s theory is predicated upon an
absolute distinction between two fundamentally distinct kinds of motion: inertial
motion and accelerated motion. The distinction is written into Newton’s first law,
4

according to which a motion is inertial just in case it is both uniform and rectilinear;
otherwise, the motion is accelerated. What Newton realized, much to his credit,
was that such a distinction carries with it certain structural commitments.1 Thus,
one of Newton’s first tasks in the Principia (1687) is to ensure that the structure necessary for a comprehensive mechanics of motion is in place. The way he does this
is to posit the existence of absolute space: a fixed spatial background, structurally
isomorphic to three-dimensional Euclidean space, which persists over time and in
terms of which the motion of a body is ultimately to be understood. With such a
framework in place, Newton could analyze motion in terms of change of location
in space, and, more to the point, he could support the distinction between inertial and accelerated motion: the Euclidean structure of absolute space ensures a
well-defined notion of rectilinear motion and the persistence of space over time (in
conjunction with Newton’s theory of absolute time) ensures a well-defined notion
of uniform motion.
The argument for absolute space, then, rests upon the claim that absolute space
is necessary in order to support the structure implicit in the laws. From Newton’s perspective, if you were to throw out absolute space then you would lose
the ability to draw an absolute distinction between accelerated motion and inertial
motion; lose that and you lose the ability to formulate empirically adequate laws
of motion. Thus, as Tim Maudlin remarks, “The role of absolute space in Newton’s
theory is so deep and pervasive that it seems impossible to make sense of anything
he writes without accepting its existence” (Maudlin [2012], 5).
Of course, it only seems impossible. From the modern perspective, we can
see perfectly well how to secure Newton’s laws without having to posit absolute
1

This is especially clear in the unpublished manuscript De Gravitatione (1664-1685), where Newton explicitly criticizes Descartes, who was the first to accurately state the law of ineritia, for endorsing theories of space and time that fail to support the geometric structures implicit in his law.
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space—from the modern perspective, we can see that Newton was simply mistaken about the structure implicit in his laws. What is needed is just the notion
of a spacetime geodesic, and it is possible to get the notion of a geodesic without
having to invoke absolute space. All that is needed is an affine connection. Once
such structure is in place, one can understand inertial motion as motion along a
timelike geodesic and non-inertial, accelerated motion in terms of the deviation
of a worldline from its tangent geodesic. Thus, the first law can be interpreted as
saying that inertial bodies move along timelike geodesics, and the second law as
saying that the degree to which a body curves away from its tangent geodesic is
proportional to the net force on that body.2
But this requires that we be able to talk about and quantify over tangent geodesics.
And here we have our first argument for substantival spacetime. Call it the argument from absolute motion. The argument is that an adequate mechanics of motion
requires an absolute distinction between inertial and accelerated motion, that such
a distinction requires an affine structure on spacetime, and that only a substantival
account of spacetime can support the requisite structure. In short, and in parallel
to what was said two paragraphs back with respect to absolute space, the argument is that substantival spacetime is necessary in order to support the structure
implicit in the laws. The power of the argument extends from the fact that despite
all of the changes that have taken place in physics from Newton’s time to our own,
the existence of an absolute distinction between accelerated motion and inertial
motion remains a foundational part of mechanics. In particular, the special and
general theories of relativity, every bit as much as classical Newtonian mechanics,
both assume an affine connection on spacetime, and so both support an absolute
notion of acceleration.
2

For details, see section 1.3.
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A second argument for substantival spacetime, the argument from handedness,
focuses attention on the difference between left and right-handed objects and processes.3 The difference is of relevance to modern physics insofar the laws of elementary particle physics in general, and of the weak force in particular, are antisymmetric under parity, where a parity operation is an operation of mirror reflection mapping left-to-right and right-to-left. The failure of parity to be a symmetry
of the laws seems to imply that nature has a preferred handedness. And here, some
have argued, we have the makings of a second argument for substantival spacetime. On one way of filling out the argument, talk of the failure of parity to be a
symmetry of the laws makes sense only if space (which we take to be a subspace
of spacetime) is structured in a certain way. Non-orientable spaces are incapable
of supporting a global left-right distinction. Consequently, the fact that the laws of
nature are handed seems to require, at a minimum, that space be orientable. One
way of making sense of what it means for a space to be orientable is in terms of
transport along closed paths. Thus, one can say that an n-dimensional space is orientable just in case, for all closed paths C , the result of transporting a group g1 of n
linearly independent vectors (which can be used to represent a handed object) will
be a group g2 of n linearly independent vectors such that g1 = ϕ(g2 ), where ϕ is
a smooth, rigid transformation. Of course, this way of thinking requires quantification over spatial paths, and quantification over paths assumes that such paths
exist. But only a substantival theory of spacetime, the argument concludes, can
guarantee the required existence of paths.
3
Kant was the first to see something of philosophical interest in left and right-handed objects.
The classic discussion is Kant’s paper “Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Differentiation
of Regions in Space.” The question whether parity is a symmetry of the laws of elementary particle
physics was first raised by Lee and Yang in 1956. The classic experiment was carried out by Wu and
colleagues in 1957 with Cobolt atoms. See (Griffiths [2008]) for discussion. Recent, important discussions of the argument from handedness include (Brighouse [1999]), (Nerilich [1994]), (Earman
[1989]), (Pooley [2003]), (Huggett [2000]), and (Hoefer [2000]).
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Another way to get at the orientation of space is to think in terms of the fields
that it admits: an n-dimensional manifold is orientable just in case it admits a
globally defined smooth, non-vanishing n-form field (Malament [2012], 113). This
brings us to a third argument for substantival spacetime, the argument from fields.4
This third argument focuses attention to the structure that is implicit in the modern
notion of a field. On the modern, geometric approach, a vector field (for example)
is a function ξ(p) that assigns a vector ξ|p to each point p of a smooth manifold
M . The vector ξ|p is thought to “live” in a tangent vector space V|p associated with
the point p. Typically, one insists that such tangent spaces be “built up” out of
resources that are intrinsic to the manifold. One way to do this is in terms of curves
in M .5 Let γ : I → M be a smooth curve in M , where s0 ∈ I and γ(s0 ) = p. Let S(p)
be the set of all smooth maps f : U → R, where U is an open set of M containing
p. And finally, for all f ∈ S(p), set ξ|p (f ) =

d
(f
ds

◦ γ)(s0 ). Then the vector ξ|p is a

tangent vector to the curve γ at the point p. For every such γ there exists a ξ|p , and
vice versa. In this way, the tangent vector space can be built up out of curves in the
manifold.
Of course, when we talk like this we are talking about the mathematical properties of mathematical models. But such models, I take it, are intended to represent
the spacetime structure of the physical world, and there is simply no better guide
to the structural commitments of a theory than through the math. Taking the math
seriously, it is clear that, as John Earman observes, “the standard characterization
of a field uses the full manifold structure: the points, the topology, and the differentiable structure” ([1989], 159). It is difficult to see, then, how one can dispense
with substantival spacetime and yet still support the notion of a field.
4

See (Field [1985]) and (Earman [1989]).

5

See chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion. Here, I follow (Malament [2012], 10-11).
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So we have at least three arguments for substantival spacetime: the argument
from absolute motion, the argument from handedness, and the argument from
fields. I consider each a particular instance of a more general argument. Call this
the argument from physical geometry:
1. The physical world is a geometrically structured object (as the case may
be, it has affine structure, differential structure, topological structure,
metric structure, an orientation field,. . . ).
2. (1) only if spacetime substantivalism is true.
3. Therefore, spacetime substantivalism is true.
The argument from physical geometry is the chief argument in favor of a substantival conception of spacetime. The idea is that spatiotemporal geometry is an
indispensible part of physics, that such indispensibility gives us reason to believe
that the physical world is a geometrically structured object, and that the only way
of making real, physical sense of spacetime structure is in terms of an ontology of
substantival points.
As the arguments above make clear, spatiotemporal structure is often implicit
in the laws of nature so that physical laws almost always carry with them geometric entailments. Indeed, there is structure implicit even in the fact that most laws
in physics are expressed using partial differential equations (the implication being,
in this case, that the physical world has the structure of a differentiable manifold).
The argument from physical geometry expresses the demand that such structure
be put on firm ontological ground—that some account be given for how spacetime
structure finds its way into the world. Absent such an account, the laws can be
said to lack foundation. In a nutshell, our slogan is that “. . . [the] laws of motion
cannot be written on thin air alone but require the support of various space-time
structures” (Earman [1989], 46).
9

The first premise of the argument from physical geometry says that the physical world is a geometrically structured object. This should be interpreted in such
a way that the spatiotemporal structure of the world is a determinate, intrinsic
property of the world. So interpreted, conventionalists reject premise one. Conventionalism is the thesis that the spatiotemporal structure of the world is a matter
of conventional choice.6 According to the conventionalist, a spacetime geometry
is something that we choose during the process of constructing a physical theory
in much the same way that a unit of measure is something that we choose during
the process of measurement. And just as there is nothing seriously wrong with the
choice of one unit of measure versus another, so, says the conventionalist, there
is nothing seriously wrong with the choice of one spacetime geometry versus another. One choice may be more convenient than all others, but so long as one is
willing to make adjustments elsewhere in one’s theory, the choice of a spacetime
geometry is a free and open choice.
In the chapters that follow, I will not engage with conventionalist views nor
with any other view that rejects premise 1 of the argument from physical geometry. The focus will be on premise 2, the claim that only a substantival theory of
spacetime can support an account of the physical geometry of the physical world.
Read this as a challenge, so that it is incumbant upon anyone who rejects premise 2
to provide an alternative account for how spatiotemporal structures find their way
into the world. This dissertation consists in an analysis of attempts at answering
this challenge.
What are the options available for rejecting premise 2? In the context of classical
point particle theory, most of those who reject substantival spacetime do so in favor
of a relational theory of spacetime. Relationalists deny the existence of a substratum
6

See (Reichenbach [1957]) for a defense of conventionalism about physical geometry. For a response, see (Sklar [1974]), (Friedman [1983]) and (Norton [1994]).
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of spacetime points underlying the physical events and process which populate
the world. What exists, says the relationalist, are just these events and processes.
Spatiotemporal relations, on this view, are relations among physical events, not
points of spacetime. More precisely, call a point along the worldline of a material
object a stage point. Then a relational theory of spacetime is a theory according to
which the structure of spacetime is faithfully represented by a set of models of the
form hD, {Ri }i, where D is a set of stage points and {Ri } is a set of spatiotemporal
relations on D. It falls to these relations to determine the geometry of the physical
world.
Chapters 1 through 4 examine attempts at constructing a relational theory of
spacetime with sufficient structure for classical Newtonian mechanics. To set things
up, in chapter 1, I introduce a pair of classical spacetime structures, Leibnizian
spacetime and Galilean spacetime. Both are formulated in terms of tensor fields
on a manifold. The first, however, suggests an alternative formulation in terms of
relations on a set of stage points. Thus, we have the structure hD, t(x, y), r(x, y)i,
where t(x, y) is a relation of temporal distance and r(x, y) is a relation of spatial distance defined for pairs of simultaneous stage points. Call this structure Leibnizian
relational spacetime. One of my goals in chapter 1 will be to review some of the traditional problems facing the Leibnizian relationalist—problems that arise out of a
lack of structure. This will help to motivate much of the work that follows.
If the problem with Leibnizian relationalism comes down to a lack of structure, then a natural response is to help oneself to more relations. In chapter 2, I
ask whether supplementing the Leibnizian framework with a relation of spacetime
collinearity will yield a framework with a sufficient amount of structure for classical
Newtonian mechanics. I argue that it will not. My argument is organized around
a formal result, which I prove midway through the chapter, according to which a
two-body system moving under an inverse cube law, if set up a certain way, will
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fail to instantiate the collinearity relation. Given this, all of the traditional problems
facing the Leibnizian relationalist are shown to resurface.
The purpose of the collinearity relation is to provide a relational grounding for
the affine structure implict in the distinction between inertial motion and accelerated motion. Given that it is not up to the task, one wonders what other sorts of
options are available. In chapter 3, I discuss two distinct proposals, each aimed
at providing a relationally kosher account of absolute acceleration. The first is
Sklar’s maneuver. The second is a novel brand of relationalism that I call quantitative Galilean relationalism. Although quantitative Galilean relationalism enjoys a
clear advantage over Sklar’s maneuver, both views ultimately run up against the
same problem. As (Skow [2007]) has shown, a dynamical theory of motion based
upon Sklar’s maneuver that aims to capture the content of Newtonian gravity will
lack a well-posed initial value problem. I show that the same problem affects quantitative Galilean relationalism.
The upshot of chapter 3 is that classical mechanics requires inertial structure—weaker
substitutes simply will not do. Chapter 4, then, looks at a novel strategy developed
by Nick Huggett for getting inertial structure into the world. Instead of grounding
inertial structure in some structural property of a substratum of spacetime points,
Huggett has argued for grounding it in the laws of nature. Huggett claims grand
things for his view. In particular, he claims, against the standard view (see section
1.2.3), that no more structure is required for classical mechanics than the structure
of Leibnizian relational spacetime. In chapter 4, I present a number of problems
for Huggett’s proposal.
In chapter 5, I discuss a more thorough-going attempt at grounding the geometry of the physical world in the laws of nature. This is the view of Harvey Brown
and colleagues, a view that I call dynamic foundationalism. I survey some of the
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arguments for the view and raise a problem concerning the lack of constraints it
places on the laws of nature.
Whereas the focus in chapters 1 through 5 is on finite particle theories, chapter
6 deals explicitly with field theories. Relationalists who wish to include fields in
their ontology typically assume that a field is an extended material object (rather
than a distribution of properties over points of spacetime). I argue that this commits them, to whatever degree the substantivalist is committed, to the denial of
what Earman and Norton ([1987]) have called ‘Leibniz equivalence’. The upshot is
that to whatever degree the substantivalist is committed to counting diffeomorphic
spacetime models as representing distinct physical possibilities, so is the relationalist. Consequences concerning determinism and the development of a quantum
theory of gravity are discussed.
As a final note, let me mention two topics that, though relevant, are not covered
in this dissertation. One is a “no-object” structuralist approach that claims to make
sense of spatiotemporal structure without having to suppose the existence of objects charged with instantiating that structure. One of the attractions behind such
a view is that it claims to do a better job making sense of the general covariance
of modern spacetime theories than the kind of substantivalist view that I advocate here. The other is the issue of background independence and the notion of
emergent spacetime that are common in the literature on quantum gravity. Both
topics pose interesting challenges to the brand of substantivalism defended in this
dissertation, challenges which I plan to take up in future work.7

7

On spacetime structuralism, see (Bain [2006]), (Bain [2011]), (Greaves [2011]), (Pooley [2006]),
(Wüthrich [2009]), and (Wüthrich & Lam, [2014]). On emergence, see the papers in (Callender
& Huggett [2001]) as well as (Knox [2011]). See also Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics 44/3 (2013), which was a special issue dealing with the emergence of spacetime in quantum
gravity. On background independence, see (Smolin [2008]) and (Belot [2011b]).
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CHAPTER 1
CLASSICAL SPACETIMES

In this chapter, I introduce two classical spacetime geometries that will figure in
the discussion below. The first is Leibnizian spacetime and the second is Galilean
spacetime. Each will be formulated in a generally covariant fashion in terms of
tensor fields on a manifold.
The purpose of a spacetime geometry is to provide a framework for dynamical
laws of motion. Consequently, a spacetime geometry ought to be evaluated in
terms of the resources that it makes available for an analysis of motion. One of
my goals in this chapter will be to explain why Galilean spacetime provides a
sufficient amount of structure for classical Newtonian mechanics and to clarify the
respects in which Leibnizian spacetime falls short. Doing so will help to clarify the
requirements facing anyone hoping to develop a relational theory of spacetime in
the context of classical mechanics.
Much of the technical material in this chapter can be found elsewhere, notably
in (Friedman [1983]) and (Earman [1989]). The most thorough and most modern
treatment is (Malament [2012]), which I have used as my primary resource. I have
made an effort to separate the mathematics from the philosophy so that readers
can more easily focus where they like.

1.1

Leibnizian Spacetime

Leibnizian spacetime is the structure (M, tab , hab ) where tab and hab satisfy the
field equation
14

tab hbc = 0.

(1.1)

We can think of equation (1.1) as an “orthogonality” condition, though this stretches
our usual use of the term. Under normal usage, orthogonality is a condition instantiated by pairs of vectors; two vectors are orthogonal just in case their inner
product equals zero. Alternatively, we can think in terms of a map which takes
vector-vector pairs to zero. In contrast, equation (1.1) says that at each point p ∈ M
there exists a map tab hbc = ta hc : V a × Vc → R which takes vector-covector pairs to
zero.1
Like all spacetime theories, Leibnizian spacetime takes as its basic element a
four-dimensional differentiable manifold M which acquires additional structure
through the introduction of smooth tensor fields. In this case, the resulting structure is somewhat sparse. Leibnizian spacetime includes a notion of absolute time,
so that it makes sense to ask of any two points how far apart they are in time. This
in turn induces a unique division of the manifold into a stack of hyperplanes of
simultaneity, each of which is locally isomorphic to E 3 . And that’s it. My goal in
this section will be to explain how exactly such structure comes about.
Start with the notion of a differentiable manifold. A differentiable manifold is
a point set M to which has been added the local smoothness structure of Rn . To
see how such structure gets added, we introduce the notion of a chart, which we
define to be a pair (U, ϕ), where U is a subset of M and ϕ : U → Rn is an injective
map with the property that ϕ[U ], the image of U under ϕ, is open in Rn . Note that
1

I am using the abstract index notation introduced by Roger Penrose in (Penrose [1973]). See
(Wald [1984], 23-26) and (Malament [2012], 24-35) for discussion. On this approach, indices are
not counting indices. Instead, they indicate where objects “live.” For example, the index a on the
letter µ in the raised position indicates a vector µa in the vector space V a , while the index b on the
letter ν in the raised position indicates a vector ν b in the vector space V b . The tensor tab can then
be construed as a map tab : V a × V b → R which takes the pair (µa , ν b ) into R. Similarly, the outer
product tab µb can be construed as the covector νa (sometimes called a one-form, sometimes called
a linear functional) which maps vectors into R. Since our vector spaces are isomorphic, relabeling
is permitted. So if you wanted to act on the vector µc with the tensor tab you can relabel c → b and
write tab µb = νa
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the notion of an open set in Rn is well-defined insofar as Rn is a topological space.
In particular, we assume that Rn has its standard metric-based topology so that
an open set in Rn is a union of open balls, where an open ball is a set of points
{p | dist(c, p) < } where c is the center of the open ball, dist(x, y) is the standard
Euclidean distance function in Rn , and  is a positive real number.
Though it usually passes without comment, it is worth mentioning that our
definition of a chart puts cardinality constraints on M . If ϕ[U ] is open in Rn , and
if Rn has its standard metric-based topology, then U must contain infinitely many
elements—in fact, continuum many. This just follows from the fact that (i) ϕ is
injective and (ii) the image of U under ϕ contains infinitely many elements. Since
U is a subset of M , it follows that M must also contain infinitely many elements.
Next, we define what it means for two charts to be compatible. Consider charts
(U, ϕ) and (V, ψ). Let W = U ∩ V . Then (U, ϕ) and (V, ψ) are compatible just in case
either W is empty or
1. ϕ[W ] and ψ[W ] are both open, and
2. ϕ ◦ ψ −1 : ψ[W ] → Rn and ψ ◦ ϕ−1 : ϕ[W ] → Rn are both smooth.
Note that the composite maps ϕ ◦ ψ −1 and ψ ◦ ϕ−1 are functions from Rn to Rn . Because Rn is a space with differential structure, what it means for such a function to
be smooth is already well-defined. In particular, a function f : Rn → Rm is smooth
just in case its mixed partial derivatives (to all orders) exist and are continuous at
every point in the domain.
Having defined the notion of a chart and having said what it means for two
charts to be compatible, we have everything that we need for our definition. Let
M be a point set and let C be a set of charts satisfying the following two conditions:
1. The Compatibility Condition. For all (U, ϕ), (V, ψ) ∈ C, (U, ϕ) and (V, ψ) are
compatible.
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2. The Cover Condition. For every p in M there exists a chart (U, ϕ) ∈ C such that
p ∈ U.
Then the pair (M, C) is a smooth, n-dimensional manifold. To simplify the notation,
I will usually represent a manifold with the letter M , obscuring the fact that a
manifold is really a pair (M, C).2
Leibnizian spacetime posits two fields on M . The first is a smooth tensor field
tab with signature (1, 0, 0, 0, ). The signature requirement entails that if µa and ν a
are vectors, then
00

tab µa ν b = µν ∈ R
where superscripts above Greek letters are counting indices ranging over the set
{0, 1, 2, 3} and indicating components.3 One consequence of this is that the tensor
tab at the point p functions to divide the tangent vector space at the point p into
disjoints sets of timelike and spacelike vectors. To see how, let ξ a be a vector at p.
Then
(tab ξ a ξ b )1/2 ≥ 0
can be thought of as the temporal length of ξ a . We say that ξ a is timelike if its
temporal length is non-zero. Otherwise, it is spacelike.
In some treatments (e.g. (Freidman [1983])), absolute time is represented by a
covector field ta , rather than as I have it here by a tensor field of the form tab . My
approach, which follows (Malament [2012]), is more general and connects up with
Friedman in the following way. It turns out that at each point p ∈ M , one can
2

Sometimes, further conditions are imposed. Sometimes one requires that a manifold be Hausdorff, where a manifold is Hausdorff if there exist distinct charts for distinct points; in other words,
if for all p, q ∈ M there exist (U, ϕ) and (V, ψ) in C such that p ∈ U , q ∈ V , and U ∩ V is empty.
Sometimes one requires that the atlas C be maximal so that any chart compatible with each and
every member of C is itself a member of C. Sometimes one requires satisfaction of the countable
cover condition which requires the existence of a countable subset of C which itself covers M .
3

As far as I know, the convention was first introduced by (Malament [2012], 24-35).
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always find a covector ta such that tab = ta tb . And in some cases, one can cover
the entire manifold with a continuous, globally defined field ta such that at each
point tab = ta tb . In such a case, the manifold is temporally orientable, distinguishing
between past and future. Given such a field, we say that a vector ξ a is future directed
just in case ta ξ a > 0. Since most spacetime models are temporally orientable, we
can, if we like, follow Friedman in representing time with ta rather than tab .
So far, we have defined the temporal length of a timelike vector. Having done
so, we can define the temporal length of a timelike curve in the usual way by
summing tangent vectors along the curve. Let γ : [s1 , s2 ] → M be a timelike curve
in M with tangent field ξ a . Let t : M → R be a smooth function such that ta ξ a =
d(t ◦ γ)/ds.4 Then the temporal length of γ is equal to
Z

s2
a

Z

s2

ta ξ ds =
s1

s1

d(t ◦ γ)
ds = t(γ(s2 )) − t(γ(s1 )).
ds

Consider what we have here. We have that the temporal length of a curve γ is
equal to the difference between the t-values of its endpoints, where t is a function
that assigns real numbers to points in spacetime (subject to the constraint stated
just above). Such a function is fit to play the role of absolute time. Given such a
function we can divide M into a stack of hyperplanes of simultaneity.
In addition to tab , Leibnizian spacetime assumes a smooth, symmetric tensor
field hab with signature (0, 1, 1, 1). The signature requirement here functions in a
way similar to the signature requirement on tab , so that given covectors µa and νa ,
11

22

33

hab µa νb = µν + µν + µν ∈ R.
4

It is worth reflecting on this a little. On the left, we have the covector (the one-form) ta acting
on the vector ξ a . Since covectors map vectors to real numbers, the left side is a real number. On the
right, we have γ : [s1 , s2 ] → M composed with t : M → R. So t◦γ : R → R. Since R comes equipped
with differential structure, we are safe talking about d(t ◦ γ)/ds, and this, too, when evaluated at a
point in [s1 , s2 ], will be a real number. So our choice for t is subject to the constraint that the real
number d(t ◦ γ)/ds at the point s0 is equal to the real number ta ξ a at the point γ(s0 ) = p ∈ M .
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The tensor hab functions as a spatial metric, though it itself is not a metric tensor.
A metric tensor is a symmetric, invertible tensor of the form gab . Our hab is not
like this. Most obviously, its indices are raised. Consequently, hab acts on pairs of
covectors rather than pairs of vectors. But more to the point, hab is not invertible.
Consequently, there is no field hab such that hab hbc = δac .
So how does hab work? It is possible to show (Malament [2012], prop 4.1.1) that
for any spacelike vector ξ a there exists a covector σb such that hab σb = ξ a . This
allows us to assign a spatial length to ξ a indirectly via σb : we say that the spacelike
vector ξ a has spatial length (hab σa σb )1/2 , where hab σb = ξ a . If ξ a is timelike, then
there exists no such σa . Consequently, we are guaranteed a well-defined notion
of spatial length for spacelike vectors only. And this is a good thing since a welldefined notion of spatial length for timelike vectors would entail the existence of a
notion of absolute rest.
Finally, we note that given the signature of hab , the length (hab σa σb )1/2 is Euclidean. This is how Leibnizian spacetime secures its locally Euclidean spatial
structure.

1.2

Comments

There are two points that I want to make about Leibnizian spacetime. The
first is that the only way to support the full structure of Leibnizian spacetime is
to endorse a substantival conception of spacetime. The second is that Leibnizian
spacetime lacks sufficient structure for classical Newtonian mechanics. I take up
each point in turn.

1.2.1

Modal Relationalism

Suppose that the geometry of the physical world is Leibnizian. How might
such structure be instantiated in the physical world? If we take seriously the struc19

ture of Leibnizian spacetime, including its manifold structure, then the only viable
account of its physical instantiation is by way of substantival spacetime; of the
options available, it is the only viable way of securing the local smoothness structure of Rn . Of course, a sound defense of this claim will require an examination
of the different options available. But as a first step, suppose that relationalism
is true and that there exist a finite number of point-sized material bodies. On the
spacetime approach, this amounts to supposing that there exist a finite number of
smooth worldlines, each composed of a string of stage points. The relationalist
claims that spatiotemporal relations are relations among stage points, and so that
the spacetime structure of the physical world is faithfully represented by a relational structure of the form hD, {Ri }i. The problem is that so long as we assume
some spatial distance between particles, no such structure can instantiate the local smoothness structure of Rn . Though each worldline will have the structure
of a smooth, one-dimensional manifold, the physical world will lack the smooth,
four-dimensional manifold structure characteristic of Leibnizian spacetime.
Of course, this argument assumes the existence of a finite number of bodies.
One response, then, is for the relationalist to argue that the physical world is full
of matter, much as physicists do when they imagine the existence of a perfect fluid
or a dust field. I will examine this response in chapter 6.
Another strategy for responding to the above argument is for the relationalist
to help himself to a set of primitive modal facts concerning what is geometrically
possible. Let’s take this in steps. First, note that it is possible to extract a relational
structure from Leibnizian spacetime. In section 1.1, I explained that if you assume
the existence of a function t : M → R such that ta ξ a = d(t◦γ)/ds, then the temporal
length of a curve γ : [s1 , s2 ] → M in Leibnizian spacetime is given by the difference
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t(γ(s2 )) − t(γ(s1 )). Because of this, we can replace the field tab with a two-place
relation t(x, y) defined for pairs of points in D such that t(x, y) = t(γ(s2 ))−t(γ(s1 )).5
Similarly, we can replace hab with a Euclidean spatial metric function r(x, y)
defined for pairs of points in D that are simultaneous, where x and y are simultaneous just in case t(x, y) = 0. I say ‘replace’ though strictly speaking this isn’t an
even trade. The metric function r(x, y) is actually stronger than the “metric” field
hab in the following sense: r(x, y) suffices to fix a global spatial topology whereas
hab does not. The field hab is a purely local object: it determines a local Euclidean
spatial structure. But it puts extremely weak constraints on the global structure
of space and is in fact compatible with multiple different global structures. For
example, if we suppress a spatial dimension and imagine for a moment that space
is two-dimensional, then our field hab is compatible with space having the global
topological structure of the cylinder S1 × R1 just as well as it is with space having the global topological structure of the plane R2 . One consequence of this is
that because hab fails to determine a unique global spatial structure, it also fails
to determine a unique metric spatial function r(x, y). Rather, it is only the conjunction consisting of hab plus a specified global spatial topology that determines a
unique metric spatial structure. Forgetting spacetime for a moment and speaking
in general terms: fixing the global topology of a space determines a set of spatial paths, putting a (positive-definite) metric field on the space then fixes a length
for each path, and fixing a length for each path induces a metric structure on the
space.6 But the metric field by itself, absent any consideration of the manifold’s
path structure, will underdetermine the global structure of the space. In a certain
respect, then, a classical spacetime’s manifold structure is prior to and indepen5

Don’t confuse t(x, y) with t : M → R. One is a relation on D, the other a function on M .

6
One can take dist(p, q) to be the greatest lower bound ofRthe set of lengths {|γ|}, where γ :
s
[s1 , s2 ] → M is a curve in M , γ(s1 ) = p, γ(s2 ) = q, and |γ| = s12 gab ξ a ξ b ds. In this case, ξ a is the
tangent vector field to the curve γ and gab is a postive-definite metric tensor field.
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dent of its fields—indeed, the global structure of the manifold is typically written
in by hand, as it were.
That said, going ahead with our replacements gives us the relational structure
hD, t(x, y), r(x, y)i. Call this Leibnizian relational spacetime. As I explained above, if
there exist a finite number of material objects (a finite number of particle worldlines), then Leibnizian relational spacetime will fail to instantiate the structure of a
smooth, n-dimensional manifold. But we can fix this by “going modal.” Typically,
a classical spacetime is assumed to be homeomorphic to R3 × R1 . Here is how the
Leibnizian can secure this bit of structure. Let dist be the usual Euclidean distance
function in R3 . Then for every pair of points p1 , p2 ∈ R3 such that dist(p1 , p2 ) = ,
the Leibnizian can say:
A. For all t, possibly, there exist points q1 , q2 ∈ D such that t(q1 , q2 ) =
0 and r(q1 , q2 ) = .
And for every pair of points in p1 , p2 ∈ R1 such that dist(p1 , p2 ) = δ, the Leibnizian
can say:
B. Possibly, there are points q1 , q2 ∈ D such that t(q1 , q2 ) = δ.
Call this brand of relationalism, which grounds the geometry of the physical world
in a set of primitive modal facts, modal relationalism.
Another way to be a modal relationalist is to replace the modal operators in
A. and B. with quantifiers ranging over models. Let a Leibnizian relational theory of
spacetime be a set RT of models of the form hD, t(x, y), r(x, y)i. Each member of the
set RT is to be interpreted as representing a kinematic, or geometric, possibility. Now
we can replace A. with the following:
C. For all t, there exists a model m ∈ RT with domain Dm and
stage points q1 , q2 ∈ Dm such that t(q1 , q2 ) = 0 and r(q1 , q2 ) = .
Likewise, we can replace B. with the following:
D. There exists m ∈ RT with q1 , q2 ∈ Dm such that t(q1 , q2 ) = δ.
22

One worry about modal relationalism as I have presented it here is that the fundamental relations charged with the instantiation of the geometry of the physical
world are mixed, or impure, or nonqualitative, in this case expressing relations between pairs of stage points and numbers. This is problematic insofar as one has a
sense that numbers ought not play a role in the “construction” of the world—that
is, one has a sense that the world is built up soley out of physical objects and the
external relations that bind them together. Abstract objects like numbers ought not
enter into the process in an essential way. But this is a problem that can be fixed.
Among others, Tarski ([1959]) presents an axiomatization of Euclidean geometry
in terms of a pair of pure or qualitative relations, in this case a three-place relation of
betweeness and a four-place relation of congruence.7 More recently, (Mundy, [1992])
has shown that the same relations, suitably reinterpreted, can be used to axiomatize any finite dimensional Riemannian geometry of any signature.8
A more serious worry, perhaps, is that modal relationalism seems to require a
novel brand of modality. I, for one, have a sense that what is geometrically possible
does not reduce to what is physically possible. It may, for example, be physically
impossible for bodies to separate by any great distance (if, for example, they are
strongly attracted to one another) even while it may be geometrically possible for
them to separate by a very great distance (if space is infinite in extent). But not
everyone agrees that what is geometrically possible and what is physically possible
come apart like this. In chapter 5, for example, I discuss a view that attempts to
ground the geometry of spacetime in the laws of nature. On this approach, it makes
no sense to talk about geometric possibility and physical possibilty coming apart.
But among those sharing the intuition that geometric possibility does not reduce,
7

See also (Borsuk and Szmielew, [1960]).

8
Still, some work is required. Leibnizian spacetime is not a Riemannian geometry: its manifold
is not covered with a Riemannian metric tensor field. See (Field [1980]) for a “qualitative” axiomatization of Newtonian Gravity and (Field [1985]) for an axiomatization of Newtonian spacetime.
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the fact that modal relationalism requires a novel brand of modality will be seen
as a cost.9
But what is most problematic about modal relationalism is the fact that it works
through the brute postulation of primitive modal facts. This is objectionable for
two reasons. First, those attracted to relationalism are typically motivated by concerns of a broadly empiricist nature. But these same concerns have historically
worked against primitive modality as well, so that there is something at least prima
facie odd about a relationalist invoking primitive modality in their account of space
and time.10 Second, because it works by brute postulation, the account of physical
geometry offered by the modal relationalist does not run very deep. The difference
between an infinite space and finite space, says the modal relationalist, is a modal
difference: with respect to the first but not the second it is possible to separate
bodies by arbitrarily large distances. But from whence this modal difference? The
substantivalist can ground the modal difference in a difference in relations between
points. But the relationalist can offer no such grounding. The modal relationalist
proposes to ground the difference between distinct geometries in a difference in
modal facts, but then takes those modal facts, and hence their difference, as primitive. In effect, the modal relationalist helps himself to geometric structure without
paying any ontological cost. One has a sense that the modal relationalist’s account
of the geometry of the physical world isn’t much of an account at all.
One question, then, is whether the relationalist can do better. For the most part,
subsequent chapters will focus on the viability of relationalist accounts of physical
geometry that reject primitive modality.
9

See (Belot [2011]) for a relationalist who accepts that geometric possibility does not reduce to
physical possibility.
10
For example, this is one of the motivations behind the regularity approach that Nick Huggett
develops in (Huggett [2006]). See (Huggett [2003]) and chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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1.2.2

Completeness

In the introduction, I explained that classical Newtonian mechanics is predicated
upon an absolute, non-relative distinction between inertial motion and accelerated
motion, that such a distinction requires the notion of a spacetime geodesic, and
that the way to build such structure into spacetime is through the introduction of
an affine connection on spacetime. Because such structure is missing from Leibnizian spacetime, it follows that Leibnizian spacetime is too weak of a spacetime
geometry for classical mechanics.
In order to further bring out the inadequacies of Leibnizian spacetime, it is
important to ask what we require of a relational framework if it is to serve as a
framework for classical Newtonian mechanics. I claim that, at a minimum, the
framework must be complete insofar as it must capture the content of Newton’s
theory. My aim in this subsection will be to make this notion of completeness precise. I will define the term twice, first for theories of motion, and then for theories
of spacetime. My first definition will be primary, my second derivative.
To start, we distinguish between relational theories of motion and relational
theories of spacetime. Call the path of a point-sized material object in spacetime
a ‘worldline’. Call a point along the worldline of a material object a ‘stage point’.
Then a relational theory of spacetime is a theory according to which the structure
of spacetime is represented by a set of models of the form hD, {Ri }i, where D is a
set of stage points and {Ri } is a set of spatiotemporal relations on D. This set of
models constitutes a set of kinematically, or geometrically, possible models.11 A relational theory of motion, then, is a theory of motion whose laws are expressible in
terms of the relations {Ri }, including nth-order derivatives of Ri (where these are
well-defined). The function of the laws is to pick out a subset of dynamically pos11

It is an interesting question how the relationalist ought to understand this modality. See (Belot
[2012]) for a discussion of the issue as it arises in connection with the geometry of space.
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sible models from within the theory’s set of kinematically possible models. Each
dynamically possible model, then, is understood to represent a nomologically possible state of affairs.
Intuitively, a relational theory of motion is complete with respect to some particular Newtonian dynamical theory of motion just in case it captures the content
of that theory, where the content of a dynamical theory of motion is understood
to be identifiable with its set of dynamically possible models. Thus, a relational
theory of motion RT will capture the content of a Newtonian theory of motion NT
just in case RT’s laws determine a set of dynamical models that ‘matches up’ with
the set of dynamical models of NT. Matching up can then be understood in terms
of the existence of a bijective function between sets of models that preserves physically relevant properties and relations, so that models that we might intuitively
recognize as having the same physical content get paired up.12 Here, then, is my
first definition of completeness.13
Completeness (Relational Theories of Motion): Let RT be a relational theory
of motion. Let R be the set of dynamical models determined by the laws
of RT. Let NT be some particular Newtonian dynamical theory of motion
(e.g. Newtonian gravity). Let N be the set of dynamical models determined
by the laws of NT. Assume that members of N are characterized up to diffeo12

There is an interesting question whether spacetime models related by a diffeomorphism represent the same possibility or not. Nothing in this paper will hinge on this question. We can say
either, so let’s pick one: all models in this paper will be characterized up to diffeomorphism. In
particular, Newtonian models that differ by a symmetry of the laws will be identified. This will
allow us to think in terms of bijective maps between sets of models. Note that this is out of step
with the more usual approach according to which the relation between Newtonian models and
relational models is many-one.
13

A similar notion can be found in (Huggett [1999]) and in (Skow [2007]), as well as in Oliver
Pooley’s remark that, for a particular kind of relational theory, ‘the relationalist succeeds so long
as they can identify, in a relationally respectable manner, a set of relational DPMs that correspond
to the full set of Newtonian DPMs’ ([2013], 547). I thank an anonymous referee for suggestions
leading to improvements in the final formulation of this definition.
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morphism. Then RT is ‘complete’ with respect to NT just in case there exists
a bijective function ϕ : R → N such that,
(i) for each model m ∈ R, m and ϕ(m) represent the same number of material objects, and
(ii) ϕ preserves the masses and charges of those objects, as well as the spatiotemporal relations between them.14
There are a couple of points here worth emphasizing. First, my definition requires that R be a set of models of some relational theory, which I take to mean
that R is determined by some set of relational laws. It would be uninteresting if
one could prove the existence of some miscellaneous set of models that matches
up with the models of NT. In many cases, it is trivial that such a set exists—simply
start with NT and use ϕ to build R. The interesting question is whether there exists
a relational theory capable of doing the work of NT. My definition speaks to this.
Second, given the constraints that I have put on ϕ, each element m ∈ R represents
a ‘dynamically possible relational history’. Indeed, doubly so—each element of R
is dynamically possible with respect to the laws of NT as well as with respect to
the laws of RT. Finally, although I require that R be determined by some set of relational laws, I do not require that those laws look anything like their Newtonian
counterparts. Of course, one way to capture the content of a Newtonian theory
would be to capture that theory’s laws—in other words, to provide something like
a relational foundation for its laws (or a relational interpretation of its laws, or a
relational understanding of its laws). But my definition requires nothing like this;
14

Let a and b be (representations of) material objects in model m. Then ϕ preserves masses,
charges, and relations just in case for each pair of models hm, ϕ(m)i there exists a bijective function
f from the set of material objects in m to the set of material objects in ϕ(m) such that (i) a and f (a)
have the same mass and charge and (ii) if Rab then Rf (a)f (b).
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it is at least open to the possibility of a relational theory whose laws differ from the
laws with which we are familiar from Newtonian mechanics.
A relational theory of motion needn’t be complete to be interesting. Julian Barbour and Bruno Bertotti have developed relational theories of motion which are
incomplete but which are just as empirically adequate as their Newtonian counterparts.15 Of course, this makes their theory extremely interesting. My main interest,
however, is in whether classical mechanics admits a relational interpretation, and
the theory developed by Barbour and Bertotti does not constitute a relational interpretation of classical mechanics—theirs is a rival theory representing new physics.
Fans of their approach are welcome to take my arguments against Galilean relationalism as further, indirect evidence for the need for new physics.
So far, I have defined completeness for relational theories of motion. Having
done so, a definition for relational theories of spacetime is not far off. The purpose
of a relational theory of spacetime is to provide a framework for relational theories of motion. One can always ask, then, whether a proposed framework is rich
enough for its intended purpose. And in particular, one can ask whether a proposed framework is rich enough to support relational theories of motion that are
complete with respect to their Newtonian counterparts. If it is, then we will say
that the theory is complete with respect to classical Newtonian mechanics.
Completeness (Relational Theories of Spacetime): Let S be a relational theory
of spacetime according to which the structure of spacetime is faithfully represented by a set of models of the form hD, {Ri }i. Then S is ‘complete’ with
respect to classical Newtonian mechanics just in case for any Newtonian dynamical theory of motion NT, there exists some relational theory of motion
RT such that,
15

See (Barbour & Bertotti [1982]). See also (Barbour [2001]).
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(i) RT’s laws are expressed entirely in terms of the relations {Ri }, and
(ii) RT is complete with respect to NT.
Since my main focus is on relational theories of spacetime, it is this second
definition that I will typically have in mind.

1.2.3

Traditional Problems

The chief problem with Leibnizian relationalism is that it lacks sufficient structure to support an absolute distinction between accelerated motion and inertial
motion. The problem can be brought out in a couple of different ways. Ultimately,
though, the source of the problem centers around the physics of rotation.
1. Unaligned symmetry groups. The purpose of a spacetime geometry is to provide a framework for dynamical laws of motion. How ought one’s framework line
up with one’s laws? The standard response to this question, defended by John Earman in (Earman, [1989]), is that the symmetry group associated with one’s spacetime structure ought to match the symmetry group associated with one’s dynamical
laws. Call this Earman’s Principle. The arguments for Earman’s Principle suggest
that Earman intends it as a methodological principle. Thus, Earman argues that
if the group associated with one’s framework is narrower than the group associated with one’s laws, then this suggests that one’s framework is assuming too
much structure. In this case, Earman’s Principle counsels us to eliminate the excess structure. Going the other way, if the group associated with one’s framework
is broader than the group associated with one’s laws, then this is evidence that
one is not assuming enough structure to support the laws. In this case, Earman’s
Principle counsels us to add more spacetime structure.
One worry about Leibnizian spacetime, then, is that it violates Earman’s Principle: its characteristic symmetry group is broader than the Galilean group associ-
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ated with Newton’s laws.16 This is perhaps easiest to see with respect to Leibnizian
relational spacetime, the structure hD, r(x, y), t(x, y)i. The relations that characterize Leibnizian relational spacetime are preserved under a time-dependent rotation. But Newton’s laws are not. It follows then, by Earman’s principle, that Leibnizian spacetime is ill-fit for Newton’s laws. More precisely, the Leibnizian group
is broader than the Galilean group. To restore parity, then, we need a spacetime
framework with more structure.
2. No explanation for inertial effects. Rotating systems exhibit inertial effects insofar as there exists a tendency among the parts of a rotating system to “endeavor
to recede from the axis of rotation.” In a case of rigid body rotation, such inertial effects will manifest themselves as tensions among the parts of the body. The
standard example here is that of a pair of rigid globes strung together with a rigid
cord. Newton’s theory recognizes many distinct dynamic possibilities for such a
system. In particular, the system may be uniformly rotating about its center of
mass, with each rate of rotation corresponding to a unique amount of tension in
the cord. But the Leibnizian cannot distinguish between these different states of rotation—each such system will instantiate the same history of Leibnizian relations.
Consequently, the Leibnizian lacks the tools to explain the presence and amount
of tension in the cord.17
It is not always clear how seriously to take this argument. It might be felt,
for example, that rigid systems are ‘unphysical’, mere idealized representations
16
See (Saunders [2013]) for a defense of the claim that the proper symmetry group for Newton’s
laws is the Maxwell group (which includes a standard of absolute rotation, but not a standard for
absolute linear acceleration), not the Galilean group as is traditionally thought.
17
See (Maudlin [1993]), (Huggett [1999]), and (Huggett [2006]). Huggett, in particular, takes this
to be an especially serious argument against Leibnizian relationalism, and he devotes a good part
of (Huggett [2006]) to formulating a response. In (Huggett [1999]), he attributes the argument to
Newton himself, who discusses a rigid globes systems in Principia Mathematica. See (Rynasiewicz
[1995]) for a more historically accurate reading of this part of P M .
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of more physical systems. In defense of the argument, one can point to the fact
that the laws of classical mechanics permit such systems. This is because classical
mechanics assumes a notion of absolute time. The situation changes with the move
to special relativity.
3. No well-posed initial value problem. Consider a two-body system with bodies of mass m1 = m2 . Suppose that the system moves under Newtonian gravity.
Among this theory’s dynamically possible models we have (i) a model in which
m1 and m2 move along a closed circular path about their common center of mass
at a relative distance , and (ii) a model in which m1 and m2 move along parabolic
paths, slingshoting about their common center of mass with a relative distance
of closest approach . A Leibnizian theory that is complete with respect to classical Newtonian mechanics will include versions of these models. But these are
models that agree at a time with respect to their Leibnizian data: at the time of
closest approach, our models agree that r(x, y) =  and dr/dt = 0. Consequently,
any Leibnizian theory that is complete with respect to Newton’s theory will lack a
well-posed initial value problem.18
The Newtonian explains the difference between (i) and (ii) in terms of a difference in total angular momentum. If a relational theory of motion is going to
capture the content of Newton’s theory, then it looks like it is going to need to
make angular momentum relationally tractable. In chapter 3, we will look at a
view that tries (but surprisingly fails) to do just this.
18
See (Barbour [2001]) for a nice discussion. Barbour names Poincaré as the first to see the problem.
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1.3

Galilean Spacetime

Galilean spacetime is the structure (M, tab , hab , ∇), where tab and hab are as
above and ∇ is an affine connection, or covariant derivative operator. Formally,
our connection is an indexed operator that maps smooth tensor fields to smooth
a
tensor fields—more carefully, it is an operator ∇c that maps the tensor field αbd
to
a
a
a
the tensor field ∇c αbd
= βcbd
, where αbd
is a representative tensor field and where c

is an index distinct from the indices on α.
Of course, not just any map taking tensor fields to tensor fields qualifies as a
covariant derivator operator. To narrow in on the kind of map we are looking for,
we require that ∇ “act like a derivative operator.” In particular, we require (1) that
it satisfy the Leibniz rule with respect to tensor multiplication, and (2) that for all
smooth scalar fields α and all smooth vector fields ξ n , ξ n ∇n α = ξ(α).19
(Here is how to read condition (2). The right hand side is the expression ξ(α),
where ξ is a vector at p and α : U → R is a smooth scalar field assigning real
numbers to points in the open set U , which, we assume, contains the point p. In
the introduction, I said that a tangent vector can be construed as a function which
maps smooth scalar fields to real numbers. So the right hand side of condition (2)
is a real number. More specifically, it is the real number

d
(α
ds

◦ γ), where γ : I ⊂

R → M is the smooth curve to which ξ is tangent. On the left we have the vector
ξ n acting on the tensor ∇n α = βn , which is really a covector. And since vectors
map covectors to real numbers, condition (2) is just the requirement that the real
number to which ξ n maps the covector ∇n α equal the real number ξ(α) =

d
(α ◦ γ).
ds

Now, in Rn , the quantity ξ(α) = ξ · ∇α is the ordinary directional derivative of α in
the direction ξ. So what condition (2) is doing is establishing a connection between
19

See (Malament [2012], 49) for further requirements.
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our covariant derivative and the ordinary directional derivative familiar from real
analysis.)
How does ∇ interact with tab and hab ? We require that the following field equations (in addition to equation (1.1)) are satisfied:

∇a tbc = 0

(1.2)

∇a hbc = 0

(1.3)

Equation (1.2) and (1.3) each states a compatibility condition, though as with equation (1.1) this stretches the standard use of the term. Usually, one speaks of a compatibility between a covariant derivative operator and a Riemannian metric field
and says that they are compatible if they determine the same set of geodesics—formally,
if ∇a gbc = 0.20 But neither tab nor hab is a Riemannian metric. So talk of “compatibility” here is a bit loose.
The addition of ∇ constitutes the addition of a new layer of spacetime structure.
Why the additional structure? What does it do? What does it give us? Like all
good derivative operators, our covariant derivative operator measures constancy
and change. More specifically, since it acts on tensor fields, it measures the amount
a
of change in a tensor field from point to point. Thus, let αbd
be a tensor at a point p
a
and let ξ a be a vector at p. Then ξ c ∇c αbd
measures the “instantaneous” amount of
a
a
change in αbd
in the direction ξ a . Going along with this, we say that αbd
is constant
a
in the direction ξ a if ξ c ∇c αbd
= 0.

Of special interest is the case where ∇ acts on a vector field that is defined along
a smooth curve. Since the function of ∇ is to record changes in tensors in general,
and so in vectors in particular, we can think of ∇ as establishing a notion of vector
identity among nearby tangent vector spaces. This is desirable in part because it
20

See (Malament [2012], lemma 1.9.1).
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gives us a notion of “parallel transport.” Thus, let γ : I → M be a smooth curve
with tangent vector field ξ a , and let ρa be a vector field defined along γ. Then ρa is
constant along γ (or parallel transported along γ) if ξ b ∇b ρa = 0 for all s ∈ I.
Finally, then, applying this notion of vector constancy to the tangent vector field
itself gives us the notion of a spacetime geodesic, or “straightest possible curve.” In
general, there are at least two different ways to think about a straight line. On
the one hand, you can think about a straight line as the shortest distance between
two points. The problem with this is that the “distance” between two points in
a space is not always well-defined—in particular, it is not generally well-defined
in Galilean spacetime insofar as Galilean spacetime lacks a (positive-definite) Riemannian metric field. On the other hand, you can think about a straight line as
one that deviates neither to the left nor right, but that at each point continues in
the direction that it is headed.21 It is this second notion that is supported by our
covariant derivative operator. Thus, let γ : I → M be a smooth curve with tangent
vector field ξ a . Then γ is a geodesic just in case ξ b ∇b ξ a = 0.

1.4

Comments

The additional structure that Galilean spacetime carries over Leibnizian spacetime, then, is affine structure. In Galilean spacetime, the question whether γ is a
geodesic has a determinate answer; in Leibnizian spacetime, it does not. This, it
turns out, is precisely the structure required by Newton’s laws.22 In terms of the
structure of Galilean spacetime, Newton’s first law says that a force-free body is
one that moves along a spacetime geodesic, so that its worldline satisfies the equation
21

See (Friedman [1983], appendix).

22

See (Saunders [2012]) for an alternative view on the structure required by Newton’s laws.
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ξ b ∇b ξ a = 0.

(1.4)

Newton’s second law then says that a body subject to a net force F a will curve
away from its tangent geodesic, with the amount of curvature coming out proportional to the net force:
F a = mξ b ∇b ξ a

(1.5)

This, of course, implies that the curvature C a of a worldline at a point is given
by the quantity ξ b ∇b ξ a . And since the most natural physical interpretation of this
quantity is that it measures a particle’s instantaneous acceleration, we have that a
particle’s acceleration at a point in spacetime is equal to the curvature of its worldline at that point.23
I have said that the function of ∇ is to determine a class of geodesics in the manifold M . It turns out that the opposite is true as well: a covariant derivative operator is uniquely determined by its associated geodesics (Malament [2012], prop
1.7.8). This gives the substantivalist a strategy for providing an account of how
such structure is instantiated in the physical world. Consider a substantivalist
who subscribes to the reality of the spacetime manifold: he says that in addition
to whatever physical events and processes that happen to exist there exists a manifold of spacetime points. If we allow our substantivalist a three-place collinearity
relation col(p, q, r), then he will be able to determine, for any curve γ in M , whether
γ is a geodesic or not: γ is a geodesic just in case col(p, q, r) for any triple of points
p, q, r along γ. In this way, the substantivalist can provide an account of the instantiation of the affine structure of Galilean spacetime. In the next chapter, we’ll ask
whether a relational theory of spacetime employing the same relation can produce
a relational interpretation of classical Newtonian mechanics.

23

See (Malament [2012], 142-143) or (Geroch [1972], sections 8 & 9).
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CHAPTER 2
GALILEAN RELATIONALISM

There a natural way of capturing the structure of Leibnizian spacetime in terms
of relations on a set of stage points. Is it possible to similarly capture the structure
of Galilean spacetime? In particular, is it possible to capture the affine structure of
Galilean spacetime with a relation on a set of stage points?
Galilean Relationalists aim to do just this. But their efforts don’t amount to much.
In this chapter I prove, somewhat surprisingly, that Galilean relational spacetime
is too weak of a structure for classical Newtonian mechanics.

2.1

The View

Since the problem with Leibnizian relationalism comes down to a lack of structure, a natural response is to help oneself to more relations.1 This is the strategy
behind the move to Galilean relationalism. Since the structure that we need is
affine structure, and since the function of an affine connection is to pick out a class
of geodesics, a natural relation to try is a three-place collinearity relation (Maudlin
[1993], pp. 193-4). Thus, the Galilean relationalist accepts all of the same relations
that the Leibnizian accepts, plus one more: a three-place relation col(x, y, z) that
holds for stage points x, y, and z just in case x, y, and z lie along a spacetime
geodesic.2 The hope is that this expanded set of resources will provide a spacetime
1

See (Huggett, [1999]) and (Pooley, [2013]) for discussion of other strategies.

2

I assume that x, y, and z are ordered so that col(x, y, z) entails that y is between x and z. When
Maudlin introduces the relation, he restricts its domain to non-simultaneous points. But you can
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framework rich enough for classical mechanics by allowing the relationalist to pick
out a class of inertial trajectories so that accelerations in general, and rotations in
particular, are well-defined—an acceleration being, roughly, a departure from an
inertial trajectory. In this respect, the collinearity relation is meant to mimic, as far
as possible, the affine structure of a classical spacetime. In keeping with her ontological commitments, however, the relationalist is forced to limit the domain of col
to the set of stage points at a world.
Certainly, the collinearity relation allows the Galilean relationalist to draw distinctions that the Leibnizian cannot. For starters, for any model containing an inertial body α, the Galilean relationalist will have no trouble identifying it as such—α
is inertial iff for any triple of points x, y, and z along its worldline, col(x, y, z). If
enough such bodies exist, then the Galilean relationalist will be able to construct
an inertial frame of reference. And if spacetime is full of matter, then the Galilean
relationalist will have access to a spacetime structure that is every bit as strong as
the structure of Galilean spacetime (or even Newton-Cartan spacetime).3
Things get more complicated when we start considering models in which there
exist no inertial bodies. Consider, for example, a pair of particles in circular orbit about their common center of mass. Suppose that the system rotates at a rate
of one revolution per second. On the one hand, the system’s rate of rotation is
uniquely determined by its Galilean relations. In this case, we have that for every
point x there exist points y and z such that col(x, y, z) with t(x, z) = 1, and that
there exist no u and v such that col(x, u, v) with t(x, v) < 1. On the other hand,
as Tim Maudlin ([1993], p. 194) has pointed out, the Galilean relations instantiated
by a system such as this will fail to determine a unique embedding into Galilean

shed the restriction: if x, y, and z are simultaneous, then col(x, y, z) iff r(x, y) + r(y, z) = r(x, z). See
(Pooley [2013], note 52).
3
This follows from the fact that the class of geodesics in a manifold determines a unique connection on the manifold. See (Malament [2012], prop. 1.7.8).
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spacetime. The problem is that there are myriad different ways for a system to
rotate at a rate of one revolution per second—from simple, uniform rotation to any
one of many different complex, non-uniform rotations—and no two of these will
be distinguishable in terms of their Galilean relations.
On its face, this looks like an analog of the globes argument: it looks like the
dynamical properties of Newtonian systems fail to supervene on their Galilean
relations. But as Nick Huggett ([1999], p. 22) has stressed, of the many different
ways in which a system can rotate, in the case of an isolated system only uniform
rotation is dynamically possible. Models representing non-uniform rotation may
be kinematically possible, but such models will run foul of the law of conservation
of angular momentum. Consequently, though the Galilean relations associated
with our two-particle system will fail to pick out a unique model from among a
set of kinematically possible models, they will succeed in picking out a unique
model from among a set of dynamically possible models (assuming, as we are
throughout, that Newtonian models are characterized up to diffeomorphism).
All this prompts Huggett to ask a more focused question: do the dynamical
properties of dynamically possible Newtonian systems supervene on their Galilean
relations? Ultimately, he leaves the question open, adding that ‘I have been able
neither to prove that they do, nor find models which demonstrate a failure of supervenience. . . ’ ([1999], p. 25). But despite this, he is mildly optimistic about the
view, and his final assessment is that ‘. . . Galilean relationalism still seems a viable
option. . . ’ ([1999], p. 26).4
I will answer Huggett’s question in section 6: the dynamical properties of dynamically possible Newtonian systems do not supervene on their Galilean relations. Before I do though, I want to comment quickly on Huggett’s question.
4

Not that Huggett endorses the view. His preferred response to the argument from physical
geometry is presented in his ([2006]).
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Huggett’s question might give the impression that the chief issue at stake in the
substantival-relational debate is an issue of supervenience. But I do not think that
this is the right way to frame the debate. Really, what we want are relational laws
of motion, and establishing that the dynamical properties of Newtonian systems
supervene (in this case) on their Galilean relations does not guarantee Galilean
laws.5 That said, Huggett’s question is still worth pursuing: though establishing
supervenience might not convince us of the possibility of Galilean laws, establishing a failure of supervenience might convince us of the impossibility of Galilean
laws. After all, if the dynamical properties of Newtonian systems fail to supervene on their Galilean relations—if the dynamical properties of Newtonian systems can vary independent of their Galilean relations—then it is difficult to see
that the Galilean is in any position to provide a lawful treatment of those properties. Or at least, this is how I will argue in section 7. But first, we need to see how
supervenience fails.

2.2

Inverse Cube Force Laws

The point in introducing the collinearity relation is that it is supposed to enable
an analysis of absolute acceleration in general, and absolute rotation in particular.
But I doubt that any such analysis is possible. The problem is that there exist dynamically possible models of Newtonian mechanics in which collinearity is simply
uninstantiated. In this section, I prove that a two-body system moving under an
inverse cube law will, if set up a certain way, fail to instantiate collinearity. I prove
it first for systems with zero angular momentum and then for systems with non5

Compare, for example, (Skow [2007]), where it is argued that although the dynamical properties of Newtonian systems may supervene on their Leibnizian relations plus a distribution of ‘sklarations’ (primitive, intrinsic properties of bodies which are supposed to correspond to Newtonian
absolute accelerations), there can be no relational dynamical laws of motion involving sklarations.
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zero angular momentum. Later, in section 6, I prove that this same class of models
witnesses a failure of supervenience.

2.2.1

Warm-up

Let me start with a rough, qualitative description of the kinds of models that I
want to talk about. Model 1 will consist of a pair of point-sized particles of equal
mass and equal charge in four-dimensional Galilean spacetime. In the center of
mass frame, the setup is as follows:
Initial Positions. At t = −∞, draw a spacelike line l. Place both particles on
the line l, one at +∞ and the other at −∞.
Initial Velocities. At t = −∞, put the particles in motion so that they have
the same initial speed, move along the line l, move in directions opposite one
another, and move in such a way that the distance between them is initially
decreasing.
Dynamics. Suppose that the system moves under an inverse cube law with
potential
U (r) =

kq1 q2
r2

where q1 is the charge on particle 1, q2 is the charge on particle 2, r is the
relative distance between the particles, and k is a positive constant. Since we
are supposing particles of equal charge, U (r) indicates a repulsive force.
At this point, I am allowing myself certain liberties. Technically, it makes no
sense to talk about initial conditions at infinity. But the goal right now is just a
qualitative description, and it simplifies things to imagine the particles approaching from infinity. In the next section, I will make it all precise. For now, it is enough
to observe that the particles in model 1 will start off moving in an approximately
inertial fashion. As they draw near one another, the repulsive force between them
40

will build. Eventually, the particles will slow, stop, and turn, before moving back
out to spatial infinity. Given our setup, all motion will take place along the line l.
Consequently, there is no angular momentum in model 1.
Model 2 is similar to model 1. The basic setup is the same: a pair of point-sized
particles of equal mass and equal charge in four-dimensional Galilean spacetime.
The dynamics, too, are the same. The initial conditions, however, are slightly different.
Initial Positions. At t = −∞, draw three parallel, spacelike, coplanar lines,
l, m, and n, with l in the middle and m and n equidistant from l. Place one
particle at +∞ on m and the other at −∞ on n. See Figure 1.
Initial Velocities. At t = −∞, put the particles in motion so that they have
the same initial speed, move along lines parallel to l, move in directions opposite one another, and move in such a way that the distance between them
is initially decreasing.
Here, too, the particles will start off moving in an approximately inertial fashion. Here, too, as they draw close the force between them will build. In this case,
however, the particles will ‘scatter’ one another. Since the system’s motion in this
case is not along a fixed line, there is angular momentum in model 2.

p

Figure 2.1: The initial conditions of model 2.

My claim is that neither model 1 nor model 2 instantiates collinearity. To prove
it, I need to recast each model in more formal terms.
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2.2.2

Model 1: zero angular momentum

Model 1 is a two-body system in four-dimensional Galilean spacetime. The
physics here is familiar, and my analysis will follow standard presentations.6 What
will be unique in my discussion is just the fact that I am working with an inverse
cube force law.
Consider, then, a two-body system consisting of particles 1 and 2 with masses
m1 and m2 and charges q1 and q2 . Suppose that m1 = m2 , that q1 = q2 , and that
their interaction is via a central force depending only upon the relative distance r
between the particles. In the center of mass frame all motion will take place in a
plane and the Lagrangian can be written
1
L = m(ṙ2 + r2 θ̇2 ) − U (r)
2
where
m=

m1 m2
.
m1 + m2

Here we have reduced our two-body problem to an equivalent one-body problem:
remarkably, everything that we wish to know about the motion of 1 and 2 can
be worked out by studying the motion of a fictitious particle with mass m in a
potential U (r), where r is now the distance from the center of the potential to m.
Running L through the Euler-Lagrange equations for r gives us the equation
of motion
mr̈ −

∂U
l2
+
=0
3
mr
∂r

where we have used the fact that mr2 θ̇ = l to write everything in terms of r. Here
l represents the angular momentum of the system, a constant of motion.
6

See, for example, (Goldstein [2001]) or (Thornton and Marion [2003]).
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The relative motion of a system such as this is described by the equation
Z

dr

t=

q

2
(E
m

− U (r) −

l2
)
2mr2

where E is the system’s total energy. Where there is no angular momentum, this
reduces to
Z
t=

dr
q

2
(E
m

.

− U (r))

Of course, we are supposing that our particles repel one another via an inversecube law with potential U (r) = kq1 q2 r−2 . Thus,
Z
t=

dr
q

2
(E
m

−

.
kq1 q2
)
r2

There are several constants of motion packed into this equation: E, k, q, and m. To
simplify, we set E and k equal to one. We set the individual masses of the particles
equal to one, from which it follows that m equals one-half. And we set the charge
of each particle equal to the square root of two. This leaves us with
Z
t=

dr
q
4−

8
r2

from which it follows that
r
t(r) =

r2 1
− .
4
2

This tells us how the relative distance between the particles changes with time. To
get the actual worldlines of the particles, we need two lines whose separation at
each time is given by t(r). Given the symmetry of the problem, this is easy enough
to do—the worldlines will be given by the function t(2x). See figure 2.
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t

x

Figure 2.2: The worldlines of the particles in model 1.

To prove, now, that collinearity is uninstantiated, we need only note that
r
t(2x) =

(2x)2 1
−
4
2

is equivalent to
2x2 − 2t2 = 1.
This, it will be recognized, is the equation of a hyperbola. Since no line intersects
a hyperbola more than twice, it follows that collinearity is uninstantiated in model
1.

2.2.3

Model 2: non-zero angular momentum

Model 2 is similar to model 1 except that there is angular momentum in model
2. This makes it more difficult to prove that collinearity is uninstantiated since the
particle worldlines are multivariable functions t(r, θ). Fortunately, it turns out that
there is no need to look at the particle worldlines—we can prove that collinearity
is uninstantiated through an analysis of the spatial paths of the particles.
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It is well-established, if not well-known, that the spatial motion of a particle
under an inverse cube law will be along a curve known as a ‘Cotes spiral’.7 There
are three different such spirals: the epispiral, the Poinsot spiral, and the hyperbolic spiral. Given our setup, the spatial motion of the particles will be along an
epispiral, which is given by the equation
r0
r = sec
2



θ − θ0
µ



where r0 is the distance of closest approach, θ0 is the angle of closest approach, and
µ = (1 − mkl−2 )1/2 . Once again, we set m equal to one-half and k equal to one. This
gives us
r
µ=

1−

1
.
2l2

As we dial up the angular momentum in our system, µ will go to 1, ϕ = 180/µ will
go to 180◦ , and the equation of the epispiral will approach the equation of a line.
(In polar coordinates, r = a sec(θ − θ0 ) is the equation of a line). Conversely, as
we lower the amount of angular momentum in the system (being careful not to go
√
below mk, at which point we get a negative under the radical), ϕ will go to 0 and
we will approach the case of one-dimensional spatial motion. For the special case
p
in which l = 2k/3, we get the paths in figure 3. Here we can imagine particle 1
moving along the path in quadrant 1 (the upper right-hand quadrant of the plane)
and particle 2 moving along the path in quadrant 3 (the lower left-hand quadrant
of the plane).
Now that we know what the spatial motion of 1 and 2 look like, we can see
that collinearity is uninstantiated in model 2. Here is a nice way to see it. Let
c denote the spatial path of particle 1. Let d denote the spatial path of particle
2. Let S denote the set of lines that intersect c. First observation: no line in S
7

See, for example, either (Whittaker [1944]) or (Danby [1988]).
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Spatial path of
particle 1 (c)
ϕ

r0

Spatial path of
particle 2 (d)
Figure 2.3: The spatial paths of the particles in model 2.

intersects c more than twice.8 This, in conjunction with the fact that c does not
cross itself, entails that the worldline of particle 1 fails to instantiate collinearity.
By symmetry, then, the worldline of particle 2 also fails to instantiate collinearity.
Second observation: no line in S intersects d.9 But then no line containing two
points along the worldline of particle 1 will intersect the worldline of particle 2
(and vice versa). This is a straightforward consequence of the fact that you cannot
intersect a worldline without passing through a spatial point along that line. But
then neither the worldline of 1, nor the worldline of 2, nor the worldlines of 1 and
8

Proof. The parametric form of an epispiral is [x(t), y(t)] = [n cos t csc at, n csc at sin t] where the
parameter t is an angular measure. The curve c is defined over the interval 0 < t < 90. It is possible
to show that the second derivatives x00 (t) and y 00 (t) are both positive on 0 < t < 90. This entails
that c is everywhere concave up, and from this it follows that no line in S intersects c more than
twice.
√
√
9
Proof. The curve√
c is bound by asymptotes
at x = 2/4 and y = 2/4. The curve d is bound by
√
asymptotes at x = − 2/4 and y = − 2/4. This, in conjunction with the fact that c is everywhere
concave up and d is everywhere concave down entails that no line in S intersects d.
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2 together instantiate collinearity. It follows that collinearity is uninstantiated in
model 2.10
Let’s take stock. We have proven that a two-body system moving under an
inverse cube law, if set up in the way described, will fail to instantiate collinearity.
This is true both in the case where the system rotates as well as in the case where
it does not. If the purpose of the collinearity relation was to provide a standard of
inertia and to support a distinction between systems with angular momentum and
systems without, then here is a class of models in which we are missing precisely
the tool that we are alleged to need.

2.3

Supervenience

Nick Huggett has asked ([1999], p. 25) whether the dynamical properties of dynamically possible Newtonian systems supervene on their Galilean relations. They
do not. In this section, I prove the existence of a class of dynamically possible models that differ in angular momentum but that agree with respect to their Galilean
relations.
In order to prove a failure of supervenience, we need two dynamically possible
models that agree with respect to their Galilean relations. To start, let’s first build
a pair of models that agree with respect to their Leibnizian relations. Go back to
the equation of motion
mr̈ −

l2
∂U
+
= 0.
mr3
∂r

It turns out that there is an especially nice way to read this equation. If we let

U 0 (r) =

10

l2
+ U (r)
2mr2

It is worth adding that this proof holds for all allowed values of l, not just l =
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p
2k/3.

then we can write
mr̈ +

∂U 0
= 0,
∂r

and this will allow us to treat the motion of the fictitious particle m as if it were
determined by a potential U 0 (r). This is the system’s ‘effective potential’. In our
case, the effective potential is

U 0 (r) =

l2
kq1 q2
+ 2 .
2
2mr
r

Here is why this is relevant: in the case of a two-body system, the relative motion of the system is completely determined by the system’s effective potential.
That is to say, the effective potential of a two-body system will completely determine its history of Leibnizian relations. Consequently, if our aim is to build a pair
of models with the same history of Leibnizian relations, then what we need is a
pair of models with the same effective potential.
Start, then, with model 1. Let p1 and p2 denote the charges of the particles in
model 1. Since there is no angular momentum in model 1, the effective potential
for model 1 is U10 = kp1 p2 /r2 . Now model 2. Let q1 and q2 denote the charges of the
particles in model 2. Since there is angular momentum in model 2, the effective
potential for model 2 is U20 = l2 /2mr2 + kq1 q2 /r2 . Now set
r
p1 = p2 =

l2
+ q 1 q2 .
2mk

Doing so will ensure that U10 = U20 and that the relative spatial separations of the
particles in model 1 are, at each time, identical to the relative spatial separations of
the particles in model 2.
Our trick, then, is to build the angular momentum of model 2, which is just a
constant value, into the charges of the particles in model 1. That this is possible

48

to do is highly nontrivial. In fact, it is possible only with an inverse cube force
law—the same trick will not work, for example, with an inverse square law. To see
why, consider a two-body system with angular momentum l 6= 0 moving under
an inverse-square law with potential kq1 q2 r−1 . In this case, the effective potential
is U10 = l2 /2mr2 + kq1 q2 r−1 . Consider now a second, similar system where l = 0.
In this second case, the effective potential is U20 = kp1 p2 r−1 . If, now, we set U10 =
U20 and solve for p1 , we get that p1 = (l2 /2mkr + q1 q2 )1/2 . And now we have a
problem—the r on the right hand side of this last equation tells us that in order to
get the relational histories of these two models to match, the charge on 1 (and by
symmetry the charge on 2) will have to vary with changes in r. But this will violate
charge conservation, and so such models will fail to represent genuine dynamic
possibilities.
I claim that the class of models described in this section confirms that the dynamical properties of Newtonian systems fail to supervene on their Galilean relations. To be concrete, consider the following pair of models.11
Model 1. Set l = 0 and p1 = p2 =

√
2

Model 2. Set l = 1 and q1 = q2 = 1
First, models 1 and 2 agree with respect to their t-relations: for any pair of stage
points x and y in model 1 there exist stage points u and v in model 2 such that
t1 (x, y) = t2 (u, v). Second, models 1 and 2 agree with respect to their r-relations: by
construction, U10 = U20 and so r1 (t) = r2 (t). Third, models 1 and 2 agree with respect
to their col-relations: because these are inverse cube models, col is uninstantiated.
It follows that models 1 and 2 agree with respect to their Galilean relations. But, of
course, models 1 and 2 disagree with respect to their dynamical properties insofar
as there is angular momentum in one but not the other. It follows, then, that the
11

Just to be clear, here and throughout I am assuming that the total energy E is equal to one.
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dynamical properties of Newtonian systems fail to supervene on their Galilean
relations.
Does it follow straightaway that Galilean relationalism is incomplete with respect to classical Newtonian mechanics? No—not without further argument. The
argument in this section does not present us with a perfect analog to the globes
argument. A perfect analog would show that the dynamical properties of Newtonian systems fail to supervene on their relational histories, where such histories
include information concerning relations plus information concerning the intrinsic
properties of the bodies in the system. The argument in this section does not show
this—it shows a failure of supervenience on relations alone: though models 1 and
2 agree with respect to their Galilean relations, they differ with respect to their
charge values. Consequently, the Galilean is able to mark a distinction between
models 1 and 2. In the next section, I argue that this is of no help: the distinction
marked is the wrong kind of distinction.

2.4

Incompleteness

Earlier, I claimed that anyone hoping to push Galilean relationalism as an alternative spacetime framework must show that their view is complete with respect
to classical Newtonian mechanics. So let’s ask: Is Galilean relationalism complete
with respect to classical Newtonian mechanics?
There are at least two different ways to argue for incompleteness. The first is to
argue for the nonexistence of a bijection of the sort required by our first definition
of completeness. This is the respect in which Barbour and Bertotti’s theory is incomplete. But one can argue like this only if the theory under consideration posits
a set of relational laws of motion. If it doesn’t, then it makes no sense to ask about
the set of histories permitted by the laws and whether they match up with the set
of dynamical models of Newtonian mechanics.
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The second way to argue for incompleteness is to assume the existence of a bijection and then argue that the resulting set of models is too miscellaneous to cover
under a set of laws. This style of argument works best in situations like the one
here, where what we have is a relational theory of spacetime but no relational laws
of motion. In other words, we need something like the following approach. Start
with a Newtonian dynamical theory of motion NT and consider the set N of its
dynamical models. Next, assume the existence of a set of relational models R that
matches up with N in the way required by our first definition of completeness.
This set R comprises the relational histories allowed by NT. Now ask: do the elements of R instantiate sufficient law-like patterns and regularities so that the set
can be covered under Galilean laws?
The reference here to patterns and regularities is important. Unless restrictions are put in place, covering a set of models with a set of laws is a trivial
task—especially if, for example, disjunctive laws are permitted. But such laws
hardly merit the title. Generally, we expect that physical laws will track natural
patterns and regularities so that a broad set of phenomena are covered under a
few simple rules. Consequently, when judging the viability of Galilean relationalism as a framework for dynamical laws of motion, what we ought to be looking
for in R are robust and somewhat natural patterns or regularities.
I think that an argument of this second sort can be made against Galilean relationalism. Consider again the pair of models that I used to argue for a failure of
supervenience:
Model 1. Set l = 0 and q1 = q2 =

√

2

Model 2. Set l = 1 and q1 = q2 = 1
Despite the fact that the particles in models 1 and 2 disagree with respect to charge,
they instantiate the same Galilean relations. Consequently, the relative motions of

51

the particles in model 1 are the same as the relative motions of the particles in
model 2—in each case, the relative motion is just the motion depicted in figure 2.
What is odd about such models is that they give the impression that charge is a
dynamically idle quantity, having no influence upon the evolution of the system,
√
for we have, in effect, dialed up the charge on the bodies from 1 to 2 with no effect
on the particles’ relative motion. And of course there are many more models that
seem to confirm the same thing. Assuming that m = 1/2, k = 1, and that q1 = q2 ,
any triple satisfying the equation l2 + q1 q2 = 2 will produce a model relationally
isomorphic to models 1 and 2. This means that if we assume the existence of a
set R of relational histories matching up with the set N of dynamically possible
models of our Newtonian theory, then within R will be an infinitely large subset of
models suggesting that charge has no effect whatsoever upon the relative motion
of the bodies in the system.
A natural response might be to deny that models 1 and 2 really differ with
respect to charge. Empirically, we come to know the charge on a body by observing
its motion. If models 1 and 2 agree on motion, then perhaps we ought to say that
they agree on charge. The problem with this response is that it means giving up
completeness; if we identify models 1 and 2 then we lose the bijection between N
and R.
A more interesting possibility might be for the Galilean to simply deny that
charge exists. The Galilean can say that charge is something that Newtonians invoke in an effort to understand the motions of bodies, but that really there is no
such property. This kind of response is not without precedent. There are other
dynamically relevant variables that show up in Newtonian equations that relationalists sometimes ignore. Julian Barbour, for example, has argued that there is
no property of global angular momentum. Of course, Newtonians talk about systems with global angular momentum, and they invoke the angular momentum of
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Model 6
Model 7
Model 8

t

x

Figure 2.4: The worldlines of the particles in models 3-5.

such systems to explain the motions of their parts, but really, says Barbour, there
is no such thing. Perhaps Galilean relationalists ought to say something similar
about charge.
The problem with this response is that within R is an infinitely large subset
of models that suggest just the opposite—that charge does have an effect on the
relative motions of bodies. Thus, consider the following group of models:
Model 3. Set l = 0 and q1 = q2 = 1
Model 4. Set l = 0 and q1 = q2 = 2
Model 5. Set l = 0 and q1 = q2 = 3
As figure 4 makes clear, this set of models points to a clear connection between
charge and relative motion. Indeed, the connection in this case is describable in
terms of U (r) = kq1 q2 r−2 .
So assuming the existence of a set R of relational histories matching up with
the set N of Newtonian models of our electro-dynamical theory, we have that (i)
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R contains infinitely many models in which charge has no influence on motion,
and (ii) R contains infinitely many models in which charge has a regular, lawlike influence on motion. Taken together, we have a case for the claim that there
exist no regular, law-like patterns among the models in R. The problem is that the
intrinsic properties of the bodies in these models have effectively been ‘screened
off’ from their relative motions. This is why I say that the distinction that the
Galilean is able to mark between, for example, models 1 and 2, is the wrong kind
of difference. What she needs is to mark a spatiotemporal difference. It doesn’t
help her any that she is able to mark a difference in intrinsic properties.
It is pretty clear what is going on here. When working with an inverse cube
law, we have an extra variable to play with that the Galilean relationalist cannot “see”—namely, total angular momentum. Part of the point in introducing the
collinearity relation was that it was supposed to allow the relationalist to get a handle on angular momentum. What is interesting about the models that I have been
discussing here, however, is that, once again, we are missing precisely the tool that
we are alleged to need.

2.5

Conclusion

I have argued that the collinearity relation cannot be used to provide a standard
of inertia; that it cannot be used to support an absolute distinction between accelerated motion and inertial motion. The problem is that there exist dynamically
possible models of Newtonian mechanics in which the relation is simply uninstantiated. This is true, in particular, for a pair of charged particles moving under an
inverse cube law. Of course, actual charged bodies move under an inverse square
law. Why care, then, that Galilean relationalism founders on a non-actual theory?
I can think of at least two different ways to parse the worry expressed here.
First, the worry might be that because we are working with a non-actual law, our
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models fail to represent genuine dynamic possibilities. The problem with this is
that it misunderstands what it means to say that a state of affairs is dynamically
possible. In Newtonian mechanics, a dynamically possible state of affairs is one
that evolves in accordance with Newton’s laws (and all that follow from them,
including the conservation laws). My models do this. In particular, they evolve
in accordance with F~ = m~a. Of course, my models assume a non-actual force
law. But here there are no grounds for objection: the class of Newtonian worlds is
wider than the class of worlds whose force laws match those of the actual world
(assuming for the moment that the actual world is Newtonian). And included
within this class are worlds with all manner of force laws.
Second, the worry might be not that my models fail to represent genuine possibilities, but that the possibilities represented are remote, and so therefore uninteresting. You might think this if, for example, you thought that Galilean relationalism was a thesis about the structure of the actual world alone (again, assuming
for the moment that the actual world is Newtonian). Were this the case, then it
would do no good to show that the view founders on some non-actual theory.
The problem with this worry, however, is that it misunderstands either Galilean
relationalism or Newtonian mechanics or both. Galilean relationalism has been
put forth as an alternative spacetime framework for Newtonian mechanics. Newtonian mechanics, in turn, is a meta-theory describing the relation between force
and motion, but saying nothing about how forces arise between bodies. Galilean
relationalism, then, ought to be judged, in part, according to whether it can capture
the meta-theoretical character of Newton’s theory. Of course, this is all built into
my second definition of completeness, which requires that for every Newtonian
theory there exist a proper relational counterpart.
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CHAPTER 3
ABSOLUTE ACCELERATION

In finite particle classical Newtonian mechanics, the chief argument for substantival spacetime is that it is needed in order to support the affine structure of
physical spacetime, which, it is argued, is required in order to support an absolute distinction between inertial motion and accelerated motion. But why ground
the distinction in some structural property of spacetime? Why not just take the
distinction as primitive?
(Sklar [1974]) suggests a move along these lines. He argues that one can block
the inference from absolute motion to substantival spacetime by refusing to provide an account of the distinction between accelerated and inertial motion in terms
of some structural property of spacetime. Instead, as Sklar observes, the relationalist can just take the distinction to be fundamental. In particular, his suggestion
is that the relationalist should say that acceleration properties like accelerating at a
rate of two meters per second squared are primitive, intrinsic properties of bodies, in
the same way that mass properties like having a mass of two grams are primitive,
intrinsic properties of bodies.
Sklar’s proposal is often criticized as a cheat on account of the fact that it takes
as primitive what everyone else considers in need of grounding.1 But as Bradford
Skow has shown, the problem with Sklar’s proposal is more serious than this. The
problem is that a relational theory of motion which avails itself of Sklar’s maneuver
1

See (Earman [1989]).
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and which, at the same time, aims to capture the content of Newtonian gravity, will
lack a well-posed initial value problem.
In this chapter, I recast Skow’s argument in terms of the four-dimensional mathematics that was introduced in chapter 2 and the Langrangian two-body problem
that was described in chapter 3. I then introduce a novel brand of relationalism
that represents a marked improvement over Sklar’s proposal. This novel brand of
relationalism—call it quantitative Galilean relationalism—is structurally rich enough
to support a relationally grounded notion of absolute acceleration. The view accomplishes everything that Sklar’s proposal aims to accomplish while avoiding
the charge of cheat. It does not, however, avoid the more serious problem that
Skow has identified. As I explain in section 4.3, quantitative Galilean relationalism
also lacks a well-posed initial value problem.
The upshot is a clarification of the role of ineritial structure in classical mechanics. Inertial structure is needed not only to ground the distinction between inerital
and accelerated motion, but also to support frame-dependent notions of energy
and angular momentum, each of which plays an important role in particle dynamics. Consequently, it is of no help to simply supplement one’s framework with a
notion of absolute acceleration. It is inertial structure that is needed.

3.1

No Well-Posed Initial Value Problem

(Skow [2007]) argues that there can be no relational dynamical laws of motion
which (i) avail themselves of Sklar’s maneuver, (ii) capture the content of Newton’s
theory, and (iii) have a well-posed initial value problem. The basic structure of the
argument is to assume the existence of a theory satisfying (i) and (ii) and then show
that it cannot also satisfy (iii).
Let’s start with (i). What kind of resources are available to a theory availing
itself of Sklar’s maneuver? First, we assume the structure of Leibnizian relational
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spacetime. This brings with it a stock of relations, including a t-relation which allows us to talk about distances in time and an r-relation which allows us to talk
about distances in space.2 In addition, we allow ourselves nth order time derivatives of r. And finally, we allow ourselves a stock of primitive, intrinsic properties
including mass, charge, and, on Sklar’s suggestion, acceleration.
Now (ii). Following Skow, let’s say that the relational state of the world at a time
is a specification of the intrinsic properties of bodies plus the value of r(p, q) for
each pair of bodies. A relational history, then, is a history of relational states. And
a relational theory of motion can be said to capture the content of a Newtonian
dynamical theory of motion just in case for each relational model there exists a
corresponding Newtonian model, and vice versa, where corresponding models
agree with respect to their relational histories.
Skow’s argument, then, runs as follows. Among the dynamically possible models of Newtonian gravity are the following:
1. A pair of point-sized particles of equal mass m orbit about their common
center of mass in a closed circular orbit with diameter r.
2. A pair of point-sized particles of equal mass m approach one another from
spatial infinity, slingshot past one another, and move back out to spatial infinity. Each moves along a parabolic path in space, with a distance of closest
approach equal to r.
Consider, now, the state of each model at the time t of closest approach. First,
models (1) and (2) agree with respect to the mass properties of the particles. Second, they agree with respect to r and ṙ. (Since model (1) executes circular motion,
dr/dt = 0; since at time t the particles in model (2) are at their point of closest approach, dr/dt = 0). Finally, and this is the important point, models (1) and (2) at
2

That is, distances in space among stage points satisfying the condition t(p, q) = 0.
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time t agree with respect to the absolute acceleration of each particle. Supposing
that our particles move under Newtonian gravity, each particle in each model has
a magnitude of acceleration a = Gm/r2 .
So models (1) and (2) are relationally indiscernible at time t, agreeing even with
respect to the absolute accelerations of particles. It follows that such models witness a failure of determinism: there can be no dynamical laws of temporal evolution that take the relational state of the world at the time of closest approach
and evolves it forward into a unique future state. If your aim is to produce dynamical laws of motion that are compatible with the structure of Leibnizian relational spacetime and which capture the full content of Newtonian gravity, then
supplementing that structure with primitive, intrinsic acceleration properties is of
no help.
Does Skow’s argument survive the transition from space and time to spacetime? It does. On the spacetime-geometric approach, particle acceleration Aa is
worldline curvature C a , which relates to force F a as

Aa = C a = ξ b ∇b ξ b = F a /m

Since the force on a particle is a function of relative distance, worldline curvature
is likewise a function of relative distance. Consequently, the worldlines of the
particles in the models described above are all equally curved at their point of
closest approach.

3.2

Curvature

In this section, I connect up Skow’s argument with the Lagrangian two-body
problem, confirming again that worldline curvature is a function of relative spatial
separation. Seeing how the argument works in Langrangian mechanics is interest-
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ing, in part, because it helps to clarify the connection between angular momentum
and worldline curvature.
From the previous section (and also section 2.4), we have that the curvature C a
of a worldline γ at a point is given by the quantity ξ b ∇b ξ a at that point, where ξ is
the vector tangent to γ. In terms of a coordinate system xµ , this becomes
Cµ =

ρ
ν
d 2 xµ
µ dx dx
.
+
Γ
νρ
dt2
dt dt

If xµ is an inertial system, then Γ = 0 and this last equation simplifies to
Cµ =

d2 xµ
.
dt2

In other words, in an inertial coordinate system, the curvature vector is just the
vector with components
µ

C =



d2 x1 d2 x2 d2 x3
0, 2 , 2 , 2
dt
dt
dt


.

In a three-dimensional Galilean spacetime whose spatial hypersurfaces are marked
in polar coordinates, the curvature vector is the vector with components


C µ = 0, r̈ − rθ̇2 , 2ṙθ̇ + rθ̈ .

Since Newtonian gravity is a central force, there is no acceleration in the θ direction.
Consequently, the third component of the curvature vector is equal to zero. As a
final step, then, we use the fact that θ̇ = l/mr2 to arrive at

C µ = 0, r̈ − l2 /m2 r3 , 0

(3.1)

At this point, it is not at all clear that our models are going to come out having
the same curvature. A quick look at equation (4.1) shows that worldline curvature
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depends, at least in part, on angular momentum l. But our models differ in angular
momentum. For them to come out agreeing with respect to curvature, it is going to
have to be the case that l and r̈ play off of one another in just the right way (which,
it turns out, they do).
Switching gears, we have that the system’s Langrangian is
1
L = m(ṙ2 + r2 θ̇2 ) − U (r)
2
Running this through the Euler-Langrage equation for r, we get the equation of
motion
mr̈ − l2 /mr3 +

∂U
=0
∂r

where I have used θ̇ = l/mr2 to write everything in terms of r. Setting f (r) equal
to minus the gradient of the potential, we get

mr̈ − l2 /mr3 = f (r)

(3.2)

where f (r) is Newton’s law of gravitational attraction. A quick comparison, then,
of equations (4.1) and (4.2) shows that

C µ = (0, f (r)/m, 0)

This confirms again that in the case of a Newtonian two-body system, worldline curvature (and so absolute acceleration) is entirely a function of relative spatial
distance.

3.3

Quantitative Galilean Relationalism

At this point, I want to switch focus. In this section, I develop a novel brand of
relationalism. Call it quantitative Galilean relationalism. The view is attractive, on its
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face, for several reasons. First, it avoids the problem with Galilean relationalism
that I developed in chapter 3. Second, it provides a relationally kosher analysis
of worldline curvature, and so absolute acceleration. Third, it does so in such a
way as to avoid the charge of “cheat” which is typically leveled against Sklar’s
maneuver. However, unfortunately, quantitative Galilean relationalism is a nonstarter. It too lacks a well-posed initial value problem.
Galilean relational spacetime, recall, is the structure hD, t, r, coli, where D is a
set of stage points, t maps pairs of points to real numbers representing relative
distance in time, r maps pairs of points satisfying the condition t(p, q) = 0 to real
numbers representing relative distance in space, and col holds for triples of points
just in case those points lie along a geodesic. Among the relations that characterize Galilean relational spacetime, the collinearity relation sticks out. Each of the
relations t and r is a quantitative relation, mapping pairs of points to real numbers.
But the collinearity relation is nothing like this; it is a non-quantitative relation. One
wonders, then, whether there is a quantitative replacement for col. Here, the most
natural candidate is a relation α(p, q, r) which maps ordered triples of points to real
numbers in the closed interval [0, 180] in such a way that the output can be read
as measuring the size of the angle subtended by p, q, and r, where q is the angle’s
vertex. Replacing col with α gives us the structure hD, t, r, αi, which we can call
quantitative Galilean relational spacetime.
It is useful to consider how a similar relation α0 (p, q, r) might work in a flat,
two-dimensional Euclidean space E 2 , which we construe as a vector space with
the standard Euclidean inner product. Consider points p, q, and r in E 2 . Let v be
the vector qp
~ and u be the vector qr.
~ It is well-known that it is possible to define the
size of the angle subtended by two vectors in terms of their inner product. Thus,
we have that α0 (p, q, r) = cos−1 (v · u/|v||u|).
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The quantitative Galilean relationalist sets her α(p, q, r) equal to a corresponding α0 (p, q, r). But the relationalist’s α is not the same relation as this α0 . The relation α0 is definable in terms of the inner product structure of the space in which
it operates. The relationalist’s α is not definable in terms of anything; rather, it is
a primitive relation which the relationalist invokes in an effort to add structure to
her spacetime.
The relation α is much more powerful than col. For one thing, as we saw in
chapter three, there are models of Newtonian mechanics in which col is uninstantiated. Obviously, no such similar problem arises for α. But what really makes α
a powerful primitive is that it gives us a relationally kosher way of measuring the
curvature of a worldline. Let’s take this in steps.
• First, instead of working directly with α(p, q, r), we associate with each point
q along the worldline of a particle an indexed function αq (p, r) such that
αq (p, r) = α(p, q, r).
• Second, we restrict the domain of αq (p, r) to pairs of points satisfying the
condition that t(q, p) = t(q, r). Doing so allows us to write αq (t).
• Third, we observe that for all smooth curves C and all points q ∈ C ,

lim αq (t) = 180.
t→0

• Finally, we observe that as t → 0, the rate at which αq (t) approaches 180 will
depend upon the curvature of the curve at q. Curves which are nearly flat in
the neighborhood of q will approach 180 slowly. Curves which are radically
bent in the neighborhood of q will approach 180 more rapidly. This suggests,
then, that we can use dαq /dt to measure the curvature of a curve at a point.
See figure 4.1.
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Figure 3.1: Two curves which differ in curvature at q. As t → 0, both angles approach 180, with the speed of approach corresponding to the degree of curvature.

From here, there are a number of things that we can do to sharpen the view.
A more rigorous development, perhaps, would go on to show how precisely the
quantity dαq /dt connects up with the quantity ξ b ∇b ξ a . It might also attempt to
show that the symmetry group associated with the structure hD, t, r, αi is the Galilean
group. I won’t do this work here.
The recipe that I have laid out analyzes curvature entirely in terms of t and α.
So this is a relationally kosher treatment of curvature. And since on the spacetimegeometric approach curvature corresponds with absolute acceleration, we have
here a relationally kosher treatment of acceleration. But given the initial value
problem discussed above with respect to Sklar’s maneuver, this isn’t much a victory. The same problem described there will resurface here as well: there can be no
dynamical laws of temporal evolution which act upon quantitative Galilean relational data at a time to produce a unique set of future states. And the reason why
is the same: it is inertial structure that is needed.
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3.4

Inertial Structure

Neither Sklar’s maneuver nor quantitative Galilean relationalism can give us a
dynamical theory with a well-posed initial value problem. Why? What has gone
wrong? The problem is that deterministic dynamics (in classical mechanics, at
least) requires inertial frame-dependent notions of total energy and total angular
momentum. Since neither one of the two theories discussed in this chapter gives
us inertial structure, neither can give us deterministic dynamics.3
In chapter three, I explained that the relative motion of a two-body system can
be read off of its effective potential diagram. (See figure 3.5). Such a diagram
consists of two curves—one depicting the effective potential as a function of r and
the other the systems’s total energy (which is constant over r). Such a diagram
will depict not only the full set of values of r the system will take throughout the
course of its evolution, but also the relative velocities of the particles at different
values of r.
But total energy and angular momentum are velocity-dependent notions, and
therefore inertial frame-dependent notions. Any theory that aspires to be a relational interpretation of classical Newtonian mechanics, it seems, is going to have
to provide an account of inertial structure.

3

Skow makes this point in his ([2007]).
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CHAPTER 4
REGULARITY RELATIONALISM

In classical mechanics, spacetime has the structure of either Galilean spacetime or
Newton-Cartan spacetime. That is to say, spacetime models for classical mechanics
are models of the form (M, tab , hab , ∇), where M is a differentiable manifold, tab
plays the role of absolute time, hab determines the shape of space, and ∇ sets an
affine structure on spacetime, which, it turns out, may be either flat (as in Galilean
spacetime) or curved (as in Newton-Cartan spacetime). Our question has been
whether one could capture this structure in terms of a set of relations on a set of
physical events. Our preliminary conclusion is that one cannot.
Our method has been to try supplementing the Leibnizian relations t and r
with other relations. We first tried the qualitative relation col and then the quantitative relation α. In each case, the goal was to try to capture the affine structure
of a classical spacetime. But perhaps this is the wrong approach. In this chapter,
we look at a novel approach to the problem of physical geometry developed by
Nick Huggett, who has argued, somewhat surprisingly, that t and r are, in fact,
sufficient for classical mechanics. What we need, Huggett argues, is simply to get
our metaphysics straight.
In this chapter, I introduce Nick Huggett’s theory of physical geometry, a theory
according to which the spatiotemporal structure of a classical world supervenes on
its Leibnizian relational history. Since the view is closely allied with the regularity
account of natural law, Huggett calls his view the regularity account of relational
spacetime.
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4.1

Structure, Ontology, and Mechanics

First, let’s remind ourselves why the Leibnizian relations t and r are supposed
to be inadequate. To set things up, consider a system consisting of a finite number
of point-sized particles. Let rij (t) measure the relative spatial distance between
particles i and j at time t. Then we define the Leibnizian state of the world at time
t to be a specification of how many particles exist, their masses and charges (the
only dynamically relevant intrinsic properties in classical mechanics), and a specification of the values rij (t) for all i and j. The Leibnizian relational history of the
world, then, is an ordered set of Leibnizian states, with one state for each value of
t.
In chapter 1, I discussed three different worries about Leibnizian relationalism.
The worries are distinct, though related, in each case being rooted in a lack of
spacetime structure. The review in this section will be quick. For details, you can
refer back to section 2.2.3.
Symmetries and the Laws. The symmetry group associated with the Leibnizian
relations (that is to say, the symmetry group which preserves all and only the relations t and r) is the Leibniz group:
t0 = t + d

(Leibniz)

x0i = Rij (t)xj + ai (t)
where Rij is an orthogonal matrix implementing a time-dependent spatial rotation and ai (t) is a time-dependent translational spatial shift implementing either a
uniform spatial shift, a uniform velocity boost, or, perhaps, a time-varying translational acceleration.1 But the symmetry group associated with Newton’s laws is
the Galilean group:
1

Summation is intended over repeated indices.
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t0 = t + d

(Galilean)

x0i = Rij xj + vi t + c
where we have suppressed the time-dependence in the rotation matrix as well as
the possibility of a linear, translational acceleration (but where we have kept the
possibility of a uniform velocity boost (represented by vi t) and a uniform spatial
shift (represented by c)). Thus, we have a mismatch in symmetry groups, and so
a violation of Earman’s principle (which bids us to align our spacetime symmetry
group with our dynamical symmetry group).
Why, exactly, is the mismatch a problem? It is a problem because the mismatch
is evidence that our spacetime theory lacks sufficient structure to support the laws.
In the case of classical Newtonian mechanics, the laws include absolute quantities
of motion requiring the support of an affine structure—in the absence of affine
structure, such quantities simply do not exist. The fact that, in this case, the Leibniz
group is broader than the Galilean group is expressive of this lack of structure.
The Initial Value Problem. The Leibnizian state of the world at a time fails to
determine the Leibnizian state of the world at all future times—that is to say, the
Leibnizian relationalist lacks a well-posed initial value problem. In order to generate the problem, simply take any Leibnizian state that is compatible with the laws
and give that state a spin—that is to say, give that state some total angular momentum. Depending on the amount of angular momentum imparted, the system
will evolve in different ways. (Then, using the fact that the laws of Newtonian
mechanics are time-reversal invariant, one can work backwards to fill in the past
history of the state). In this case, the problem is rooted in the fact that the total an-
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gular momemtum of a system at a time cannot be analyzed in terms of the system’s
Leibnizian relations.2
Explanation and Inertial Effects. Consider a rigid system consisting of a pair of
lone, rigid spheres strung together with a rigid cord. (By ‘rigid’, I mean a system that is immune to deformation under the application of a force). According
to classical Newtonian mechanics, such a system can be rotating uniformly about
its center of mass at any rate whatsoever. But all such systems will instantiate the
same Leibnizian relational history. Consequently, the rotation of a Newtonian system—its total angular momentum—fails to supervene on its Leibnizian relational
history.
This might not be a problem were it not for the fact that angular momentum is
a dynamically significant quantity—that is to say, a quantity of relevance vis-á-vis
the evolution of a physical system over time. By making our system rigid, that
relevance gets turned into an inertial effect—in this case, a tension within the cord.
Thus, Newtonian mechanics tells us that for each rate of rotation, there will exist
a unique amount of tension in the cord. But no matter what the rate of rotation,
the Leibnizian relational will history remain unchanged. And so, consequently, we
have an explanatory problem: since the inertial effects of a rigid rotating system
fail to supervene on the system’s history of relations, they fail to depend upon its
history of relations; and since they fail to depend upon its history of relations, that
history is explanatorily irrelevant vis-a-vis such effects.3
2
The total angular momemtum of a system is a frame-dependent quantity. Given an inertial
coordinate system, one defines the angular momentum of each particle in terms of the cross product
of its position vector and its momentum vector. The system’s total angular momentum, then, is the
vector sum of these individual cross products. The entire process, however, is predicated upon the
existence of inertial frames of reference. And this is precisely the structure that the Leibnizian is
missing. The only resources available to the Leibnizian are relative spatial distances r and relative
velocities ṙ (and higher-order derivatives of r), and one cannot define total angular momemtum in
terms of such relational quantities.
3

See chapter 5 for more on the relation between explanation and dependence.
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One worry about the rigid globes argument is its reliance on rigidity. One might
object that rigid systems are idealizations, and so such systems are too ‘unphysical’ to take seriously. In response, one might point to the fact that rigid systems
are compatible with Newton’s laws, and then insist that the relationalist contend
with all systems compatible with Newton’s laws. (Contrast this with special theory of relativity—rigid bodies are incompatible with the laws (or the spacetime
structure) of the special theory of relativity insofar as rigid bodies are capable of
transmitting signals faster than light (Earman [1989], 98)). However, in response to
the objection, it ought to be enough to simply clarify the role that rigidity is playing in the argument. The appeal to rigidity is made in order to help make vivid the
explanatory problem that the relationalist is faced with. If we relax the rigidity of
the globes system, then the effect of the rotation will be observable in terms of the
relative motions of the bodies. So there will be a relational difference. But the fact
that there exists a relational difference doesn’t mean that the relationalist is off the
hook. What we want is a theoretical account of the resulting motion. By making
the system rigid and turning that difference in relative motion into a tension in the
rod, we sharpen the task confronting the relationalist.4
The three problems surveyed thus far are distinct, though related. Consider
a pair of point particles sitting at rest at some distance from one another. As explained above, it is possible to generate different relative motions from this state
by rotating it at different rates—the Leibnizian faces an initial value problem. If
the particles are linked by a rigid cord, then the differences in relative motion
get turned into differences in tension—the Leibnizian faces an explanatory prob4

Compare (Huggett [1999], note 3): “Earman (1989, p. 98) suggests that the substantivalist argument is tied to the possibility of rigid motions, presumably thinking that if, for instance, the globes
are not rigid then the Newtonian models will exhibit different deformations depending on their
angular velocity, distinguishing the models relationally after all. But this is surely mistaken; internal deformations are to be explained. . . Introducing rigidity and hence transforming deformations
into pure tensions makes clear that any explanation must depend on external relations.”
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lem. Finally, in each case, the ultimate source of the problem is lack of spacetime
structure—the Leibnizian faces a geometry problem. And one particularly precise
way of highlighting this lack of structure is in terms of a mismatch in symmetry
groups.5
The Shape of Space. One final problem: the spatial structure of the world is underdetermined by its Leibnizian relations. Since the relationalist thinks that rij (t)
exhausts everything there is to say about space at a time, one might expect that
rij (t) would suffice to determine the shape of space. But it doesn’t. Consider, for
example, an n-particles system whose evolution in time is such that, for all i, j,
and t, rij (t) ≤ δ for some finite real number δ. In this is a case, the particles in the
system never get too far from one another—perhaps because they are strongly attracted to one another—so that the entire history of the system is confined to within
a sphere S of diameter δ. Finally, let’s suppose that the history of the system will
embed into a three-dimensional Euclidean space. The problem, then, is that if the
history will embed into a three-dimensional space, then it will also embed into a
four-dimensional space: the history of relations fails to determine the dimensionality (and so the topology) of the space. Moreover, if the history will embed into a
Euclidean space, then it will also embed into a space that is Euclidean within S but
non-Euclidean outside of S: the history of relations fails to determine the metric
structure of the space.
The problem is generic. For any system of n particles, one can always find
multiple spaces into which the Leibnizian history of the system will faithfully embed. Thus, the relationalist is faced with a selection problem (Belot [2011], 43). Of
5

Though this approach has its limitations. Topological and differential structure is important
too, though such structure is not capturable in terms of symmetry groups. At least, not the kind of
symmetry groups considered here.
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the candidate embedding spaces, she must say which represents the structure of
space.

4.2

The Regularity Account of Relational Spacetime

One response to these problems is the regularity account of relational spacetime
developed by Nick Huggett in (Huggett [2006]).6 Despite the problems surveyed
above, Huggett claims that the world is, at bottom, nothing more than a Leibnizian
relational history. Everything else, he claims, supervenes on that history. And, in
particular, he claims that the full spatiotemporal structure of the world supervenes
on that history.
Let me first state the view in a brief, though hopefully organized and helpful
way. The remainder of this section and the next will then be spent clarifying the
different components of the view.
Regularity Relationalism. Let w be a world in which Newton’s
laws are the laws, but which is otherwise as similar as possible to the
actual world. Let ‘LRH’ denote the Leibnizian relational history at w.
Then the spatiotemporal structure of w supervenes on its LRH. More
precisely:
Thesis 1.1. The laws at w supervene on its LRH; in particular, the
laws at w are regularities entailed by that set of propositions achieving
the best balance of strength and simplicity.
Thesis 1.2. The inertial structure of w supervenes on its laws; in
particular, a frame of reference is inertial just in case Newton’s laws are
true in that frame.
Thesis 2. The spatial shape of w supervenes on its LRH; in particular, the spatial shape of w is the simplest Riemannian geometry into
which the LRH at w will faithfully embed.
The first thesis (which I have divided up into two parts) constitutes Huggett’s
account of inertial structure. The second constitutes his account of spatial structure. As stated, each is a supervenience thesis. The idea with supervenience is
6

See also (Huggett [2003]). For critical discussion, see (Belot [2011], chpt. 3) and (Pooley [2013],
sect. 6.3.1).

72

simple: to say that X supervenes on Y is to say that no two things can differ with
respect to X without also differing with respect to Y . In the case of theses 1 and
2, the supervenience is ‘global’. That is to say, the things being quantified over in
the phrase ‘no two things’ are possible worlds. Thus, theses 1 and 2 assert that
no two possible worlds can differ with respect to their inertial structure or spatial
structure without also differing with respect to their Leibnizian relational histories.
How strong are theses 1 and 2? When we say that ‘no two worlds can differ. . . ’,
what is the scope of quantification over worlds? As Huggett makes clear at different points, the domain of quantification consists of worlds that are (i) sufficiently
complex, and in which (ii) Newton’s laws are the laws. For the sake of clarity, I
have stated (i) and (ii) as separate conditions, though it may turn out that (i) is
eliminable. As thesis 1.1 makes clear, Huggett endorses a version of the regularity
account of natural laws according to which the laws are regularities entailed by
that deductive system achieving the best balance of strength and simplicity. If it
should turn out, assuming a regularity account of laws, that only a world of sufficient complexity could give rise to Newton’s laws, then condition (i) would be
eliminable.
I have stated the regularity account of relational spacetime in terms of supervenience because that is how Huggett presents the view. That said, I do not think
that supervenience is the right relation. What the relationalist wants is a reduction
of the structure of spacetime to facts about relations among material bodies. But
the fact that X supervenes on Y does not entail that X reduces to Y . Reduction
relations are asymmetic; supervenience relations are not. Thus, supervenience relations have been called ‘metaphysically lightweight’, entailing nothing more than
that X and Y covary with one another. But what we want (and what I believe that
Huggett intends) is an assertion of ontological dependence (or ontological ground-
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ing or ontological determination).7 My plan, then, is to allow myself on occasion
to use the language of dependence and grounding. When I do speak in terms of
supervenience, the accompanying dependence claim should be understood.
When read as a dependence claim, thesis 1 entails that the laws are more fundamental than at least some aspects of spatiotemporal structure—in this case, more
fundamental than the inertial structure of spacetime. This reverses what I take to
be the more natural approach to thinking about the relation between physical geometry and the laws. A running assumption throughout this dissertation has been
that the role of spacetime geometry is to support the laws of nature. But Huggett
turns this picture of things on its head. In this respect, regularity relationalism is
a version of what we might call dynamic foundationalism, asserting that certain aspects of spacetime geometry are grounded in the laws. See chapter 6 for a more
detailed discussion of dynamic foundationalism.

4.3

Inertial Structure

Let’s take a closer look at Huggett’s account of inertial structure, starting with
the second thesis, the claim that the inertial structure of a classical world supervenes on its laws.
Thesis 1.2. The inertial structure of w supervenes on its laws; in particular, a
frame of reference is inertial just in case Newton’s laws are true in that frame.
7

Compare (Hall, [MS], 4), where a similar point is made with respect to David Lewis’s formulation of the best systems theory of natural law. What the empiricist about laws wants, Hall claims,
is a Humean reduction of natural law. But a formulation of the best systems theory in terms of supervenience does not guarantee reduction. Compare also (Kim [1998], 9-15) where a similar point
is made with respect to the mind-body problem. What the physicalist wants, Kim claims, is a reduction of the mental to the physical, and a formulation of physicalism in terms of supervenience
does not guarantee reduction.
There is a large and recent literature on dependence and grounding. See, for example, (Schaffer
[2009]), (Fine [2014]), and (Rosen [2010])
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The idea here is to exploit the fact that Newton’s laws, as traditionally formulated, are true in only certain frames of references. These, of course, are the inertial
frames. Thus, it is only in an inertial frame of reference that force-free bodies move
along straight lines with constant speed; and it is only in an inertial frame of reference that the net force on a body is proportional to its acceleration. To illustrate,
let fin be an inertial frame of reference and let facc be a frame that is translationally
accelerated with respect to fin . Then the motion of a particle in fin will be given by
the familiar law
F i /m = ai ,
while the motion of the same particle in facc will be given by

F i /m = bi + ẍi ,

where bi is the acceleration of facc with respect to fin and xi is the location of the
particle in facc . Clearly, then, the acceleration ẍi of the particle in the frame facc
is not proportional to the net force. To restore proportionality, we need to add in
the acceleration bi of the frame itself (or, alternatively, subtract out a pseudo force
from the left hand side of the equation). In either case, it is only in fin that Newton’s
second law comes out true. And, moreover, that law will remain true across the
entire class of inertial frames.8
It is important that one refrain from giving thesis 1.2 an epistemological reading. The claim is not that one can figure out or come to know which frames are inertial
frames by figuring out in which frames Newton’s laws hold. Rather, the thesis is a
metaphysical thesis. It is the claim that what it is for a frame to be an inertial frame
8

Incidentally, if facc happens to be rotating (either about its own origin or about the origin of
fin ), then even more terms will have to be added in. The completely general law is F i /m = bi +
ẍi + 2ẋj u̇ji + xj üji , where bi is the absolute acceleration of facc , xi are the coordinates of the particle
in facc , and ~ui are the unit basis vectors in facc . The last two terms are associated with the rotation
of facc .
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consists entirely in the fact that Newton’s laws are true in that frame, so that the inertial structure of spacetime is grounded in the laws rather than in some structural
property of spacetime. Thus, Huggett writes that “The beauty of this position for
the relationalist is that it contains no implication that anything like absolute space
is required to determine which frames are inertial; it is not the structure of absolute space that makes certain frames privileged, just the truth of the laws in those
frames” (Huggett [2006], 45-46).
To complete the reductive project, then, Huggett needs an account of natural
law that will guarantee that everything finds ground in the relational base. Toward
that end, Huggett adopts a version of the regularity account of natural law. This is
thesis 1.1.
Thesis 1.1. The laws at w supervene on its LRH; in particular, the laws at w
are regularities entailed by that set of propositions achieving the best balance
of strength and simplicity.
The regularity account of laws a reductive account of laws, the basic idea of which
is that a law of nature to be nothing more than a pattern or regularity in a world’s
history of events. Of course, though, not just any pattern or regularity is to count
as a law of nature. Given enough flexibility in our language and in our conceptual
scheme, we can find all sorts of patterns in a given history. Thus, the regularity theorist faces a selection problem: how to separate out those patterns and regularities
which constitute laws of nature from those that do not? The most sophisticated
solution to this problem was provided by David Lewis.9 On Lewis’s version of
the theory, we start by supposing the existence a distinguished class of properties,
the perfectly natural properties, and a world-indexed language Lw with predicates
capable of picking them out. We then define a deductive system Swi to be a deduc9

See (Lewis [1973]), (Lewis [1983]), (Lewis [1986]), and (Lewis [1994]).
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tively closed, axiomatizable set of true sentences written in Lw . For any w, there
will exist many such systems, each indexed with an i. Some of these will be especially strong or informative, entailing many matters of particular fact. Some will
be especially simple, where one system is simpler than another just in case it is
simpler in its axiomatization. In general, these will trade off of one another, with
some systems achieving a nice balance of strength and simplicity. For Lewis, the
laws of nature at w are the regularities entailed by the system Swi achieving the best
balance of strength and simplicity.
The regularity account of natural laws, then, plays an indispensible role in
Huggett’s relationalism by providing the link between the supervening spacetime
structure and the relational base. To be clear, though, the version of the regularity
account that Huggett is working with isn’t exactly Lewis’s account. For Huggett,
acceleration is a non-fundamental property: a body’s rate of absolute acceleration
depends upon the inertial structure of spacetime; that structure depends upon the
laws; and the laws depend upon the relational history. Consequently, if F = ma
is a fundamental law, then Huggett’s version of the regularity account must be a
version flexible enough to allow non-fundamental quantities in the fundamental
laws. Lewis’s version of the theory is not so flexible. Lewis is clear on this point:
“Fundamental laws, those that the ideal system takes as axiomatic, must concern
perfectly natural properties” (Lewis [1984], 367-368). But come to think of it, a
property like absolute acceleration was never going to be a perfectly natural property in Lewis’s sense of the term. For Lewis, the perfectly natural properties are
one and all intrinsic, while acceleration is clearly an extrinsic property.10
10

See (Schaffer & Hicks [forthcoming]) for arguments for a more flexible regularity account of
laws that would allow derivative properties to feature in the fundamental laws. As discussed
in chapter 4, (Sklar [1974]) raises the possibility of treating absolute acceleration as an intrinsic,
monadic property of bodies. But Sklar’s proposal has, from the beginning, struck most commentators as a cheat. (Earman [1989], 13), for example, makes it a basic requirement that relational
theories of motion eschew primitive, monadic, spatiotemporal properties.
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4.3.1

Frames of Reference

Thesis 1.2 tacitly quantifies over frames of reference. It is worth asking, then,
how Huggett understands the domain of quantification.
Some care is required because there are different ways of thinking about frames
of reference, not all of which are available to the relationalist. For example, on
the approach favored in this dissertation, frames are characterizable, ultimately, in
terms of the intrinsic geometrical structure of spacetime. Here is one way to do
it.11 We define a frame of reference in a manifold M to be a set f of timelike curves in
M such that each p ∈ M lies along one and only one curve in the set. Such curves
are non-intersecting and fill all of spacetime. A frame is rigid, then, just in case any
two curves in the frame maintain fixed spatial separation over time. And, finally,
a rigid frame is inertial just in case each curve in the frame is straight.
Huggett’s notion of a frame is nothing at all like this. Instead, it is closer to what
we might otherwise call a coordinate system, an assignment of spatial coordinates
over time (Huggett [2006], 46). But here, too, care is required. The substantivalist
will say that a coordinate system is a map ϕ : M → R4 which assigns to each point
of spacetime a four-tuple of real numbers. (Or, in the case of a curved spacetime,
via a map from subsets of M into open subsets of R4 ). But relationalists reject the
existence of points, and so must deny that a coordinate system is an assignment
of numbers to points of spacetime. Instead, relationalists will assign coordinates
directly to the points along the worldlines of material objects. One consequence
of this is that in the case of finite particles theories (the case under consideration
here), many tuples of real numbers will simply go unassigned. So, for example, in
the case where there exist just three bodies A, B, and C, at time t = 0 we might
11

Here, I follow (Torretti [1996], 28). See also (Earman [1989], 29).
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have the assigment A = (0, 2, 6.125, 8), B = (0, 0, 0, 12), and C = (0, −4.38, 1, 1),
with all other tuples unassigned.
Now, not just any assignment of numbers will do. We require that coordinates
be assigned in such a way that they are adapted to whatever spatiotemporal structure the relationalist does recognize (Pooley [2013], 7-8). In Huggett’s case, these
will be the Leibnizian relations t and r. For example, numbers will have been assigned in such a way that the coordinates (t1 , x1 , y1 , z1 ) assigned to material event
p and the coordinates (t2 , x2 , y2 , z2 ) assigned to material event q be related in such
a way that if t1 = t2 , then r(p, q) = ((x1 − x2 )2 + (y1 − y2 )2 + (z1 − z2 )2 )1/2 . That
is to say, we require that coordinates be assigned in such a way that the distance
between any two bodies at t = 0 can be worked out by running coordinate differences through the Pythagorean theorem. More generally, coordinates ought to be
assigned in such a way that the following constraints are satisfied.
1. Spatial coordinates vary smoothly over time. That is to say, all nth order
derivatives of spatial coordinates with respect to time are well-defined.
2. Coordinate assignments are adapted to t. That is to say, for all material events
p and q, the time coordinate t1 of p and the time coordinate t2 of q are related
in such a way that |t1 − t2 | = t(p, q).
3. Coordinate assignments are adapated to r. That is to say, for all simultaneous
material events p and q, the spatial coordinates (x1 , y1 , z1 ) assigned to p and
the spatial coordinates (x2 , y2 , z2 ) assigned to q are related in such a way that
((x1 − x2 )2 + (y1 − y2 )2 + (z1 − z2 )2 )1/2 = r(p, q).
4. Different coordinate assignments are related by an element of the Leibniz
group. That is to say, if xµ is a coordinate assignment satisfying 1-3, then so
is x0µ where
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x00 = x0 + d

(Leibniz)

x0i = Rij (t)xj + ai (t)
Here, R(t) is an orthogonal matrix implementing a time-dependent rotation
and ai (t) is an arbitrary spatial translation (so that ~a(t) can represent a global
spatial shift, a uniform velocity boost, or an arbitrary spatial acceleration).
On this approach, some coordinate assignments may imply that a body is stationary, some that it moves inertially, and some that it accelerates. But the implication is only seeming. Nothing yet follows concerning the absolute motion of a
body from an assignment of coordinates. In order to determine the absolute motion of a body one must pick out the class of inertial frames. And here is where
Huggett turns to the dynamical laws. To determine whether a frame (an assignment of coordinates) is inertial or not, in each frame, and for each body, Huggett
tells us to formulate the sentence F~ = m · d2~x/dt2 and to ask whether that sentence
is true or not. If true, then the frame is inertial and the body’s absolute acceleration
is faithfully represented by the quantity d2~x/dt2 .
One worry about this approach is that it assigns a deep metaphysical role to coordinate systems, which we typically think of as something that we impose upon
the world, simply as a matter of pure convention. It is strange, then, to see a fundamental law like ‘Newton’s laws hold in some frame’ quantifying over coordinate
systems.
A second, related worry concerns what Hartry Field has called ‘heavy duty platonism’ (Field [1986]). Modern physics is mathematical through and through. But
for all of the math in physics, most of us think that the physical world is describable, ultimately, in purely physical terms, and that the decision to use numbers, and
the language of mathematics more generally, is a matter of convenience and convention. We might describe the distance between the Earth and the moon using the
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number 238900, but we could just as well use the number 384400, and the decision
will be a matter of convention depending upon whether we prefer to work in miles
or kilometers. And, indeed, ultimately, we needn’t use numbers at all. Numbers
and equations are useful, but ultimately eliminable.
The problem for Huggett is that there appears to be no way to eliminate numbers from his ontology. As stressed above, coordinate systems play a fundamental
role in his account of spacetime structure—they are what gets quantified over in
the “law” asserting that a frame is inertial just in case Newton’s laws are true in
that frame. Of course, no such worry arises for the substantivalist notion of a frame
described at the beginning of this section. On that approach, frames are built up
out of the intrinsic structure of spacetime, with coordinate systems playing a very
secondary role.
Is there a way of setting things up so that we are not relying on coordinate systems like this? In other words, is there an alternative notion of a frame of reference
that will serve Huggett’s purpose while at the same time avoiding the reliance
on coordinates? The most promising option lies with the operational definitions
developed by Neumann, Lange, Thomson, and Tait during the latter half of the
nineteenth century. On Lange’s approach, for example, a (rigid) frame is defined
in terms of a set of four non-coplanar point particles that maintain their relative
distance relations over time—you can imagine the four corners of a rigid tetrahedron. These particles function (essentially) as the points (0,0,0), (1,0,0), (0,1,0), and
(0,0,1). Lange then goes on to give an analysis of what it means for a frame to be
inertial, claiming that a frame is inertial just in case three freely moving particles
projected non-collinearly from a given point in the frame describe straight lines
in the space of the frame (Torretti [1996], 17). Of course, Huggett doesn’t need
Lange’s analysis of an inertial frame—has his own analysis of what it means for a
frame to be inertial. (Which, incidentally, is very close to the approach of (Thomson
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[1884])). But one might wonder whether Huggett can at least use Lange’s notion
of a frame in lieu of the coordinate-based notion that he in fact uses. The short answer, though, is that he cannot. Huggett’s aim is to provide a relational grounding
for the inertial structure of Galilean spacetime. That structure consists of a family
of continuum many inertial frames of reference in relative motion with respect to
one another. But in any physically plausible case, no such family of rigid tetrahedra
will exist.

4.4

First Problem: Laws and Inertial Structure

Let’s allow Huggett his notion of a frame and turn to a more serious problem.
Huggett’s aim is to use Newton’s laws to pick out the class of inertial frames. But
it is well-established, if not always borne in mind, that Newton’s laws, when set
in Galilean spacetime, simply do not suffice to determine a unique class of inertial
frames. In this section, I explain why.
The problem is that Newton’s laws are, in fact, invariant under a linear, translational acceleration provided that one at the same time transforms the gravitational potential field φ. Though neither transformation is a symmetry by itself, when combined
it becomes impossible to tell whether one is moving inertially in the gravitational
~ or accelerating in the gravitational field ∇φ
~ 0.
field ∇φ
There is a similarity between this last statement and the Einstein Equivalence
Principle, one the foundational principles of the general theory of relativity. On
one formulation, the Equivalence Principle asserts that it is impossible to tell whether
one is moving inertially in a homogeneous gravitational field or translationally accelerating in the absence of gravity. Thus, we are confronted with an epistemological problem: the flat spacetime structure of Minkowski spacetime supports a
quantity—gravitational acceleration—which it is impossible, even in principle, to
detect. Famously, Einstein solved the problem by dropping the flat, static structure
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of Minkowski spacetime for a variably curved, dynamic spacetime structure. On
this approach, gravity loses its status as a fundamental force and gets built into the
curvature of spacetime—gravity, that is, gets “geometrized away.”
Our Newtonian version of the Equivalence Principle gives rise to a similar epistemological problem, and, surprisingly, is open to a similar solution. In this case,
the solution is to trade the flat, static spacetime structure of Galilean spacetime for
the curved, dynamic structure of Newton-Cartan spacetime. The result is still a
classical, Newtonian theory of gravity, but one that bears a striking resemblence to
the general theory of relativity. In particular, as in GR, in Newton-Cartan theory
gravity loses its status as a fundamental force and gets built into the curvature of
a dynamic spacetime structure. One question for us a little further down will be
whether Huggett is in a position to make sense of the curved structure of NewtonCartan spacetime.

4.4.1

A Newtonian Equivalence Principle

In this section, I introduce the Newtonian Equivalence Principle. To start things
off, consider the class of frames related by a Maxwell coordinate transformation,
x00 = x0 + d

(Maxwell)

x0i = Rij xj − ai (t)
where Rij is an orthogonal matrix implementing a time-independent rotation and
ai (t) is a time-dependent spatial shift implementing either a uniform spatial shift, a
uniform velocity boost, or, perhaps, a time-varying linear acceleration. Given our
interests, there are two things to notice about the Maxwell transformation. First,
the Maxwell group is a subgroup of the Leibniz group. Where they differ is over
the nature of the rotation matrix—the Leibniz group includes a time-dependent
rotation, the Maxwell group a time-independent rotation. The second thing to
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notice is that because it includes a time-dependent linear spatial shift, the Maxwell
group will fail to preserve solutions to Newton’s laws, in some cases mapping
straight, inertial trajectories to curved, accelerated trajectories.
But! When the Maxwell coordinate transformation is combined with a transformation of the gravitational potential field, the combination, it turns out, is a symmetry, mapping solutions to solutions.
Before naming this other transformation, let’s first write down some laws. Our
problem is easiest to state in terms of the standard field-theoretic formulation of
Newtonian gravity in Galilean spacetime. On this formulation, we suppose the
existence of two different scalar fields: a mass-density scalar field ρ which represents the distribution of mass in spacetime and a gravitational potential field φ
in terms of which the gravitational field can be understood. These two fields are
related via Poisson’s equation
~ 2 φ = 4πGρ
∇
~ 2 is the spatial Laplacian and G is the gravitational constant. The gravitawhere ∇
tional force field F~ is then related to the gravitational potential field via
~
F~ = −m∇φ

~ is the spatial gradient operator.12 Finally, force relates to motion via Newwhere ∇
ton’s second law
F~ = m~x¨.
Consider now the following transformation of the gravitational potential field
φ0 = φ + xi äi + f (t)
~ with the covariant derivative operator ∇a . To
Don’t confuse the spatial gradient operator ∇
distinguish them, I will always use an arrow on top of the gradient operator and will usually use
an abstract index on the covariant derivative. That way you always know what you are looking at.
12
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where f (t) is a scalar field that is constant on hyperplanes of simultaneity though,
perhaps, varying over time.13 The claim is that the combination of a Maxwell coordinate transformation plus a transformation of the gravitational potential field
as described will preserve solutions to Newton’s laws—on one way of setting up
the problem, the combination will, for example, map straight line trajectories to
straight line trajectories. (Though we have to be careful about what ‘straight line’
means—see the discussion of spacetime models a few paragraphs down).
To prove it, we need to show that if the spacetime trajectory σ(t) satisfies Newton’s laws with respect to the coordinate system xµ and gravitational potential
field φ, then it will also satisfy Newton’s laws with respect to x0µ and φ0 . Toward
that end, suppose that σ(t) and φ satisfy the above laws. The first thing to note is
that our transformation of φ is not a mere gauge transformation in the sense that it
does not give rise to the same gravitational force field. Rather, we have

~ 0
F~ 0 = −m∇φ
¨) + ∇f
~ + ∇(~
~ x · ~a
~ (t))
= −m(∇φ
¨ + ~x · (∇
¨)) + ∇f
~ + ((∇~
~ x) · ~a
~ ~a
~ (t))
= −m(∇φ

~ (t) = 0. And since ~a(t) is spatially constant,
Now, since f (t) is spatially constant, ∇f
¨ = 0. It follows, then, that
~ ~a
∇

¨)
~ + ~a
F~ 0 = −m(∇φ

So a body in our transformed gravitational potential field φ0 will feel a different
amount force than it would in φ. We might expect, then, that the body’s motion
13

In his statement of the transformation, (Friedman [1983], 96) leaves out the gauge transformation f (t). (Pooley [2013]) includes it. It needn’t be included to generate the problem that I want to
discuss, but I include it for the sake of completeness.
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would change. And, of course, it would. But! When we combine our transformation of φ with a Maxwell transformation, we get
F~ 0 = m~x¨ 0
¨) = m(~x¨ − ~a
¨)
~ + ~a
−m(∇φ
¨ + m~a
¨
~
−m∇φ
= mẍ − m~a
F~ = mẍ
In other words, the equation of motion for the transformed system (x0µ , φ0 ) is the
same as for the original system (xµ , φ).
So here is what we have so far. We have proven that the motion of σ(t) in the
frame xµ under the potential φ is the same as in the frame x0µ under the potential
φ0 . That is to say, there is no measurable difference between being in xµ and feel~ 0 . The laws do not
~ and being in x0 and feeling a force −m∇φ
ing a force −m∇φ
µ
discriminate between these two cases. So, for example, if (xµ , φ), together with
the laws, judge that σ(t) is an inertial body, then so will (x0µ , φ0 ). But the Maxwell
transformation includes a linear, translational acceleration, so that xµ and x0µ may
be accelerating with respect to one another. In terms of the spacetime geometry:
the Maxwell transformation fails to preserve the property ‘being a geodesic’ with
respect to the background connection.
It is useful to restate the problem in terms of spacetime models. Doing so affords us two different perspectives on the problem.14 On the first, we leave the
background spacetime structure alone and translationally accelerate the matter
field ρ. Toward that end, let (M, tab , hab , ∇, ρ, φi be a model permitted by the laws
of Newton’s theory, and let d be a diffeomorphism cooresponding to a Maxwell
transformation. If we let d act on our mass-density field, the result will be a field
14

See (Friedman [1983], 96), (Pooley [2013], 32-33).
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d∗ ρ that we can informally think of as being translationally accelerated with respect to the original field ρ. In terms of our spacetime models, what the above
argument shows is that if M1 = (M, tab , hab , ∇, ρ, φi is a model, then so is M2 =
(M, tab , hab , ∇, d∗ ρ, φ0 i. But if M1 represents a given spacetime trajectory as inertial
with respect to ∇, then M2 will represent that same trajectory as accelerated with
respect to ∇.
On this first way of stating the problem, then, the inertial status of trajectories
with respect to the connection is underdetermined by the laws. But there is another way of stating the problem. Instead of our models disagreeing over whether
this or that trajectory is inertial, we can have them agreeing that the trajectory is
inertial, but disagreeing over the connection (as well as the potential field). On this
second formulation, we leave the mass-density field alone (alternatively, we leave
all occupied spacetime trajectories alone) and let d act on the spacetime structure
of our model, represented by tab , hab , and ∇a . When we do, we get that d∗ tab = tab ;
very roughly, the Maxwell transformation preserves t-relations. We also get that
d∗ hab = hab ; very roughly, the Maxwell transformation preserves r-relations. And
finally, we get that d∗ ∇a 6= ∇a ; very roughly, the Maxwell transformation fails to
preserve straight lines. Now let ∇0a = d∗ ∇a .15 Then it is possible to show that if
(M, tab , hab , ∇a , ρ, φ, i is a model then so is (M, tab , hab , ∇0a , ρ, φ0 , i. As Oliver Pooley
explains ([2013], 33), the upshot of this formulation is that “. . . the laws and a given
matter distribution ρ fix the temporal and spatial metric structures, but they leave
it underdetermined whether the combination of inertial structure and gravitational
force is that given by (∇a , φ) or by (∇0a , φ0 ).”
What exactly does this have to do with Huggett’s regularity relationalism? Let
spacetime have the structure of Galilean spacetime, let xµ be an inertial frame of
15

Pooley uses the inverse of d to write (d−1 )∗ ∇, though I can’t figure out why.
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reference, and let σ(t) be an inertial trajectory (according to both the laws and the
background connection). Huggett claims that the laws suffice to determine the
class of inertial frames of Galilean spacetime. Thus, in xµ the equation of motion
for the trajectory σ(t) is
d2 xi /dt2 = −∂i φ
So F = ma and Huggett concludes, correctly, that xµ is an inertial frame. Now consider x0µ , which is translationally accelerated with respect to xµ . In x0µ , the equation
of motion for the trajectory σ(t) is

d2 x0i /dt2 = −∂i φ − ä.

So F 6= ma and Huggett concludes, correctly, that x0µ is not an inertial frame. But
¨~x + f (t). If this were the potential, then the
now consider the potential φ0 = φ − ~a
equation of motion of σ(t) in x0µ would be given by the equation

d2 x0i /dt2 = −∂i φ0

in which case F would equal ma; in which case σ(t) and x0µ would be inertial according to the laws (despite being curved with respect to the background connection
∇a ). And now the problem is that there is simply no saying whether φ or φ0 represents the “true” potential. The lesson is that, armed just with the laws, one can
always play with the inertial status of a frame of reference, so that the laws do not,
by themselves, determine the class of inertial frames of a Galilean spacetime.
Before moving on, I can’t help but mention one more thing, namely that given
Huggett’s ontology and his notion of a frame, the spatial gradient ∂i φ is simply
not well-defined. The spatial gradient asks us to consider how the field φ changes
as we vary the spatial coordinate xi . But on Huggett’s approach, the spatial co-
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ordinate xi does not very smoothly. Rather, as I emphasized above, on Huggett’s
approach, many tuples of coordinate values will go unassigned.
A natural response for Huggett is to simply reject, or to at least not take very
seriously, the field-theoretic approach that we are assuming and for him to just
stick with the laws for point-particles, which doesn’t require that we talk about
gradients of scalar fields. After all, this is the context within which his view is developed. But I think that Huggett has a more interesting response available to him.
Huggett, of course, has an account of what it means for a space to have the structure of a Riemannian geometry. A space has the structure of, say, flat Euclidean
three-space just in case flat Euclidean three-space is the simplest Riemannian geometry into which the Leibnizian history of the world will faithfully embed. This
is ‘thesis 2’. Since the spatial gradient is well-defined in any Riemannian geometry,
perhaps Huggett can make sense of the spatial gradient after all.
Here, though, we seem to run up against a problem. Huggett has provided an
account of the truth conditions for a proposition like ‘space has the structure of
flat Euclidean three-space’, where those truth conditions do not require the literal
instantiation of such structure. But for the spatial gradient to be well-defined, we
require literal instantiation. One way to press the point is to think in terms of the
inferences that follow from a proposition asserting that space has this or that structure. Huggett can accept the truth of a proposition like P = ‘space has the structure
of flat Euclidean three-space’. Ordinarily, having accepted such a proposition, one
is in a position to draw certain inferences. For example, one can infer that the spatial gradient is well-defined. Or, to pick a simpler example, one can infer that if
point particles p and q are one meter apart, then there exists a point midway between them. But it is not at all clear that Huggett can draw either inference. The
second inference, for example, quantifies over a point midway between p and q,
and this point may not be occupied by any material body. Of course, the substan-
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tivalist has no trouble understanding quantification over unoccupied points. But
Huggett thinks that the world is fundamentally just a Leibnizian relational history.
He is a relationalist, and he denies that there exist unoccupied points—despite
thinking that it makes sense to assert propositions like P. So it is not clear to me
that he can draw these kinds of natural inferences.

4.4.2

Newton-Cartan Spacetime

I have shown that, given the laws and a distribution of matter, the class of
inertial frames of Galilean spacetime is underdetermined—it is always possible to
play with the status of either a trajectory or a frame as inertial or not. Or, more
precisely, it is always possible to get Newton’s laws to come out true in a Maxwell
frame despite the fact that, given the affine structure of Galilean spacetime, there
remains a fact of the matter whether a frame is inertial or not.
This is a problem for Huggett insofar as Huggett aims to ground the inertial
structure of Galilean spacetime in the laws. But it is just as much a problem for
Galilean spacetime itself. What we have done is exposed a rift between ‘inertial
according to the laws’ and ‘inertial according to the background connection’. In
other words, we have violated Earman’s principle, which bids us keep our dynamical and spacetime symmetry groups in line.
The situation is similar to the situation that we face when we try doing Newtonian mechanics in Newtonian spacetime. Newtonian spacetime is the structure
(M, tab , hab , ∇, Σi, which adds to Galilean spacetime the rest frame Σ. In Newtonian spacetime, the geometry entails that there is a fact of the matter concerning
whether or not a frame is at rest, despite the fact that the laws fail to determine for
any given frame whether that frame is at rest or moving. Consequently, in Newtonian spacetime we have a violation of Earman’s principle. And given the nature
of the violation (in this case, the spacetime symmetry group is narrower than the
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dynamical symmetry group) we have an epistemological problem: the spacetime
structure supports empirically inaccessible facts insofar as no experiment can settle
whether a particle is at rest or in motion.
The violation of Earman’s principle that arises when you take into consideration the combination of a Maxwell transformation and a potential transformation
is of the same kind: the spacetime symmetry group is narrower than the dynamical
symmetry group. Consequently, the result is an epistemological problem in the
form of empirically inaccessible quantities. This time, the empirically inaccessible
quantity concerns a body’s absolute gravitational acceleration.
In response, we would like to do the same thing that we have done with respect
to absolute rest. In that case, we have declared that there is no such thing as absolute rest, and that mathematical representations of a physcial system that describe
the system as either at rest or as moving with constant velocity are just mathematically distinct descriptions of the same underlying reality. Following suit, we
would like to say that there is no such thing as absolute gravitational acceleration,
and that (∇a , φ) and (∇0a , φ0 ) are just mathematically distinct descriptions of the
same underlying physical reality. But as Oliver Pooley ([2013], 33) has emphasized, it is not enough to just say this. One must also provide a description of the
physical reality behind (∇a , φ) and (∇0a , φ0 )—a gauge-invariant reality with respect
to which the choice between (∇a , φ) and (∇0a , φ0 ) can be justifiably said to count as
a bona fide free choice.
The spacetime structure that supports this sort of move is Newton-Cartan spacetime. In Newton-Cartan spacetime, we replace the flat, fixed connection ∇a with
˜ a . The result is the structure (M, t, h, ∇
˜ a ), where
the curved, dynamic connection ∇
˜ a links up with matter via an updated version of Poisson’s equation, which now
∇
reads
R̃ab = 4hGρtab
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˜ a ) to the mass density field
which links the Ricci tensor (definable in terms of ∇
ρ (Pooley [2013], 33). The effect is just this: gravitational acceleration has been
˜
banished; gravitational bodies follow geodesics of the curved connection ∇.
Some have seen Newton-Cartan spacetime as more hospitable to relationalism
than Galilean spacetime, the thought being that, having adopted a curved spacetime structure, we have thereby dropped the notion of an inertial frame of reference, such frames being undefinable in a curved spacetime. The thought then continues: having dropped the notion of an inertial frame, we have thereby dropped
the existence of absolute acceleration.16 But the thought goes wrong at the second
step. While it is true that global inertial frames do not existence in curved spacetime, local inertial frames still do. After all, Newton-Cartan spacetime still carries
an affine connection. Consequently, worldline curvature is still well-defined, and
so absolute acceleration is still well-defined (Friedman [1983], 97-99). What has
changed is just that we have done away with gravitational acceleration: gravity is
no longer a force, and so no longer has an effect upon worldline curvature. Rather,
the effect of gravity has been built into the curvature of spacetime.
Having identified the solution to the problem of gravitational acceleration, the
next question is whether there is an interpretation of the solution that would be
accessible to the regularity relationalist. That is to say, is there a version of regularity relationalism that will work in curved classical spacetime? Toward that end,
notice, first, that since there are no global inertial frames of reference in curved
spacetime, we will have to give up on the idea of using the laws to ground the
class of inertial frames. But there is a natural ammendment of the idea: namely,
use the laws to ground the inertial status of individual trajectories. This squares
with the fact that in a curved spacetime absolute acceleration is a purely local mat16

See (Norton [1995]) for an argument along these lines.
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ter. Thus, the regularity relationalist can say that a trajectory is inertial just in case,
for all points along the trajectory, (1) Newton’s laws are true, and (2) the net force
equals zero. Satisfaction of these two conditions will suffice to pick out all and
only those coordinatizations of the trajectory for which d2 xµ /dt2 = 0.
However, to settle now whether a trajectory is inertial or not, we need to know
whether the force along the trajectory is equal to zero, and this will require that we
rule on whether gravity is a force or not. Of course, in Newton-Cartan theory, gravity is not a force. But in Newton-Cartan theory, crucially, we have an explanation
of the appearance of forced motion. After all, if you study the Leibnizian relational
history of a system of n gravitating bodies, you will see that their relative distance
relations change over time in a non-linear fashion, suggesting the existence of a
force between the bodies. And since the explanation of the appearance of forced
motion goes by way of the curvature of spacetime, the question is whether the
regularity relationalist has a plausible account of the curvature of spacetime.
Toward this end, what the relationalist needs is an account of the curved con˜ a . Since Huggett’s notion of a frame is really what we might otherwise
nection ∇
call a coordinate system, in order to be as friendly as possible to the regularity relationalist we might ask whether he can provide an account of the coordinate-based
version of the connection, the object Γµρσ , which is just a collection of 64 numbers.
When we do this, interestingly, in some special cases, he can come close. One can
prove that, in a Maxwell frame, there will exist some φ such that Γi00 = ∂i φ, with all
other values of the connection equal to zero. In the special case, then, where particle p sits at rest at the origin of the coordinate system xµ , particle q sits at rest at the
origin of the coordinate system x0µ , and xµ and x0µ are translationally accelerating
with respect to one another at a rate äi (which is the same ai as in the Maxwell
transformation), it will work out that ∂i φ = äi . In this case, there seems to be a fine
relational interpretation of the coordinate values of the connection: the non-zero
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coordinate values of the connection are analyzable in terms of the relative acceleration of p and q with respect to one another. The problem, of course, is that this is
such a special case as to be of practically no interest.

4.5

Second Problem: General Covariance

We have been investigating Huggett’s attempt at grounding the inertial structure of spacetime in the truth of the laws. In Huggett’s words, the beauty of his
position is that “it contains no implication that anything like absolute space is
required to determine which frames are inertial; it is not the structure of absolute space that makes certain frames privileged, just the truth of the laws in those
frames” (Huggett [2006] 45-46). I have argued so far that the laws do not determine
the inertial structure of spacetime. But there is another worry about Huggett’s
use of the laws, namely, that it relies upon a particular formulation of the laws;
a formulation according to which the truth of a given law will vary from frame
to frame. But not all formulations have this feature. On the approach taken in
this dissertation, for example, the laws of nature get formulated in a generally covariant way—that is to say, in such a way that they come out true in all frames of
reference. Thus, consider, for example, our statement of the first law:

ξ a ∇a ξ b = 0.

Let f denote a frame of reference and let xµ denote a system of coordinates wellsuited to f . Then in the frame f , our generally covariant law becomes
ρ
σ
d2 xµ
µ dx dx
+
Γ
= 0.
ρσ
dt2
dt dt

(4.1)

This equation, it turns out, is true in all frames of reference. In the special case
where f is an inertial frame, the components of the connection Γ equal zero, and
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the above equation reduces to the more familiar looking equation
d2 xµ
= 0.
dt2

(4.2)

Of course, this last equation is the one that Huggett takes as his formulation of
the first law, and it is true in only a special subset of frames. But precisely for this
reason this last equation is not an entirely perspicuous formulation of the first law.
Parallel remarks hold for the second law. The generally covariant law

F a = mξ b ∇b ξ a

and its component form

µ

F =m



ρ
σ
d 2 xµ
µ dx dx
+
Γ
ρσ
dt2
dt dt



are true in all frames of reference. In the special case of an inertial frame, the law
takes the simpler form
Fµ = m

d 2 xµ
.
dt2

In generally covariant form, then, the truth of the laws does nothing to pick out a
special class of frames. On this approach, truth is no marker of a frame’s status.
One response is for Huggett to revise thesis 1.2 so that it asserts not that the
truth of the laws determine the class of the inertial frames, but rather the form of
the laws. Huggett should say that the inertial frames are those frames in which
the laws take on a particularly simple mathematical form.17 But this is a much
more suspect thesis. The problem is that there is a reason why the laws take a
17

In fact, this is how Oliver Pooley describes Huggett’s position (Pooley [2013], 47-52), which is
not how Huggett presents the view.
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special form in these frames, the reason being that they are well-adapated to the
intrinsic geometrical structure of spacetime. (For example, equation 5.1 reduces
to equation 5.2 precisely when ‘straight according to the coordinates’ agrees with
‘straight according to the background connection’).
Another response is for Huggett to simply deny that the laws are most perspicuously stated in generally covariant form. According to Huggett, what is fundamental at a world is just that world’s Leibnizian relational history. The laws, it is
claimed, are the axioms of the best systemization of this history. Perhaps, then,
he can deny that these axioms are most perspicuously written in general covariant form. But giving up on general covariance means giving up a lot. On the one
hand, it means giving up a versatile framework within which a broad class of theories can be formulated and compared. Thus, on the spacetime approach, we are
able to formulated a number of different classical spacetime structures as well as
spacetime structures for the special and general theories of relativity. This sort of
unified framework, then, facilitates more accurate comparisons among the different theories. (We learn, for instance, that spacetime curvature is not, per se, the
difference that sets Newtonian gravity apart from the general theory of relativity).
On the other hand, it means giving up a versatile set of coordinate-free tools, and
so a versatile escape from worries about heavy-duty platonism.

4.6

Third Problem: The Shape of Space

My focus, so far, has been on thesis 1. Let’s turn now to thesis 2, which constitutes Huggett’s account of the shape of space.
Thesis 2. The spatial shape of w supervenes on its LRH; in particular, the
spatial shape of w is the simplest Riemannian geometry into which the LRH
at w will faithfully embed.
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Here we have Huggett’s solution to the selection problem ((Belot [2011], 43)). The selection problem concerns the fact that, for any given Leibnizian relational history,
there are many different spatial geometries into which that history will faithfully
embed. The task, then, is to select that embedding space which represents the spatial shape of physical space. Huggett’s solution is, of course, modeled off of the
regularity account of natural law. As mentioned above, one faces a selection problem when trying to develop a regularity account of natural laws too. In this case,
the problem is that for any given spatiotemporal history of local matters of particular fact, there are many different ways to axiomatize. Here, one solves the selection
problem by constraining one’s language and by making an appeal to strength and
simplicity. According to Huggett, a similar approach will work to solve the relationalist’s own selection problem. Here, though, the task is simplified. First, there
are no worries about non-natural predicates. Huggett’s theory is a modification
of Leibnizian relationalism, and so his only fundamental relations are t(x, y) and
r(x, y). Second, there are no worries about strength insofar as Huggett requires,
for any given Leibnizian relational history, a complete embedding of that history.
That leaves simplicity, which, Huggett claims, is the only tool needed to solve the
relationalist’s selection problem.
My chief claim in this final section is that our judgments concerning which of a
set of candidate geometries is simplest are too indeterminate to amount to much.
But before taking up the issue of simplicity (in section 5.7.2), I want to comment
first (in section 5.7.1) on the fact that thesis 2, which is a supervenience thesis, will
strike some as implausible on its face.

4.6.1

Supervenience

To disprove a claim of the form ‘X supervenes on Y’, it suffices to show that
there are possible worlds that agree on Y but disagree on X. Thus, to disprove
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the claim that the spatial shape of a world supervenes on its Leibnizian relational
history, it suffices to show that there are possible worlds that agree on their Leibnizian relational history but disgree on the shape of space. And this seems easy to
do. Thus, consider a world in which there exist just three material bodies. Suppose
that those bodies instantiate Euclidean distance relations. Then, since three points
determine a plane, the simplest Riemannian geometry into which the history of
the world will embed is a two-dimensional space. But it seems that these three
particles could just as well exist in a three-dimensional space. If this is right, then
we have a counterexample to the claim that spatial-geometric facts supervene on
relational histories.
Critics of the regularity account of natural law have similarly argued that laws
fail to supervene on spatiotemporal distributions of natural properties. Tim Maudlin
([2007]), for example, has pointed out that there are models of Newtonian mechanics in which all stars are binary, coming in pairs that orbit about their common
center of mass. In such a world, plausibly, “all stars are binary” will be part of the
world’s best true theory. But, Maudlin argues, it is plain to everyone that this is a
not a law of nature. Were it a law of nature, it would follow that, necessarily, all
stars are binary. But this is clearly too strong. Rather, the existence of binary stars
in models of Newtonian mechanics are the result of special initial conditions.
How should a defender of the regularity account of laws respond? He should
respond that the examples beg the question (Lewis [1994], 478). Examples that
purport to tell against the regularity account typically assume a conception of the
laws of nature according to which the laws govern. This is a view that the regularity
theorist does not share. And perhaps for good reason—the governing conception
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of laws, one might argue, is rooted in an outmoded picture of the world according
to which God dictates the nomic facts.18
A similar response is available to the regularity relationalist. The regularity
relationalist should respond that the example described in the first paragraph of
this section simply begs the question; that it assumes a conception of space that
he does not share, a conception rooted in an outmoded picture of the world—a
picture promulgated by Newton—according to which space is a stage upon which
relational histories unfold.
Two comments. First, at this point, the debate has devolved into a debate over
modal intuitions. Those who reject Huggett’s supervenience thesis will claim that
it is possible for three particles to exist in a three-dimensional space; those who
endorse it will claim that it is impossible for three particles to exist in a threedimensional space. In general, such debates are not very interesting—it would be
preferrable to have recourse to something other than competing modal intuitions.
Second, it is worth mentioning that not all relationalists endorse Huggett’s supervenience thesis. Belot calls relationalists who reject the supervenience of spatial
structure on Leibnizian relational facts ambitious, and he counts himself among
the ambitious. The ambitious relationalist is one who refuses to solve the selection problem: he think that each and every embedding space represents a possible
structure for physical space. The task facing the ambitious relationalist, then, is to
explain, without assuming substantivalism, how these different possibilities differ from one another. Relationalists who go this way tend to endorse some kind
of primitivism with respect to the geometry of the world. See (Belot [2011]) for
extensive discussion.
18

Schaffer references an argument like this in (Schaffer [2007], 16). And it is one of the main
reasons that van Fraassen gives in his ([1989]) for rejecting the notion of a law of nature all together.
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4.6.2

Simplicity

Huggett claims that an appeal to simplicity will suffice to solve the selection
problem. Consequently, simplicity and the notion of one geometry being simpler
than another plays a central role in Huggett’s account of spatiotemporal structure.
But despite its centrality, Huggett has surprisingly little to say about simplicity. In
a single parenthetical remark, Huggett writes,
(Quickly, I propose that ‘simplest’ means in order of decreasing importance, lowest dimension, most regular, flattest and smoothest). (Huggett
[2006], 54)
In this section, I want to argue that our judgments concerning which geometry is
simplest are too indeterminate to amount to much.
In his ([2011]), Gordon Belot provides a comprehensive criticism of thesis 2,
supported, in part, by a battery of interesting examples. To an extent, my plan is to
follow Belot’s lead, with two notable differences. First, Belot intends his criticisms
of thesis 2 to function simultaneously as criticisms of the regularity account of
natural law. In contrast, my discussion will focus just on thesis 2. Second, I plan
on emphasizing different examples than those emphasized by Belot.
Discrete Space vs. Continuous Space. Consider a world w in which there exists
a finite number of point particles. Suppose that all relative distance relations are
Euclidean. And suppose that the world is static. That is to say, suppose that relative
distance relations among bodies are fixed for all time. Here are two competing
proposals for the geometry of this world: (i) w has the shape of a three-dimensional
Euclidean space; (ii) w has the shape of a discrete metric space consisting of just a
finite number of points.
Which of these is the simpler embedding space? It seems to me that a compelling case can be made for the claim that discrete space has the simpler geometry. First, it is simpler in ontology insofar as it contains just finite number of points.
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And second, it is simpler in axiomatization. Our discrete space is a metric space,
which means that its points are related by a distance function d satisfying the following axioms:
M1. d(x, y) = d(y, x)
M2. d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y
M3. d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z)
Since M1-3 completely characterize the structure of a metric space, there is nothing
more to say about the geometry of this world. Of course, Euclidean space is also
a metric space. But a full characterization of its structure will require several more
axioms in addition to M1-3.
Despite this, Huggett is committed to the claim that three-dimensional Euclidean space is the simpler space. This is because the only candidate embedding
spaces that Huggett allows are Riemannian spaces. No discrete space is a Riemannian space. So our discrete space is not even a candidate for representing the
structure of a possible world. Surely, this is too strong.

Dynamic Spatial Geometries. Consider a world in which there exist just four
non-coplanar point particles. Suppose that these embed into three-dimensional
Euclidean space (E 3 ). In a case such as this, the same four-tuple will embed into
a two-dimensional spherical space (S 2 ). Now, which is the simpler embedding
space? E 3 and S 2 are equally smooth and equally regular. S 2 has the lower dimension. But E 3 is flatter. One has the sense that the question is not very interesting
and that any argument that one might give will be rather weak.
That said, here is an argument for the claim that E 3 is the simpler geometry. Let
r(t) measure the radius of S 2 at time t. Now, if the relational history is interesting,
then distance relations among the four bodies will change over time. And if that
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happens, then an embedding into S 2 will require that r(t) take different values
over time. In this case, the geometry of the world will change from time to time.
Surely, this renders the geometry less simple compared to E 3 .
But even here the intuition is rather weak. Moreover, Huggett’s simplicity metric does not support the intuition—it says nothing about how to judge a case where
the geometry changes over time.
The Nash Embeddability Theorem. The Nash embeddability theorem states that
for any n-dimensional Riemannian manifold M , M can be isometrically embeded
into an m-dimensional Euclidean space, where an isometric embedding is one that
preserves path length (and so preserves intrinsic shape).
Nash’s theorem puts further stress on Huggett’s simplicity metric. Consider a
relational history that embeds into some wildly curved, three-dimensional space
G. Moreover, suppose that the relational history is sufficiently complex that G is a
good candidate for being the simplest embedding; in particular, suppose that G is
the lowest dimension embedding space, and suppose that among other candidate
spaces of the same dimension, it is the most regular, the flattest, and the smoothest.
According to Huggett’s simplicity metric, the geometry of the world is G. But
the Nash embeddabilty theorem ensures us that G embeds into a Euclidean space
E. If G is sufficiently complex, then the dimension of E will be comparatively
high. In fact, assuming that G is a compact manifold, the dimension of E may
be as high as thirty. Given Huggett’s simplicity metric, this will count against E
qualifying as the geometry of the space. But E will come out ahead of G on all
other measures: E will be more regular than G, flatter than G, and smoother than
G. Indeed, Euclidean spaces are maximally regular, maximally flat, and maximally
smooth. Perhaps this will tip the balance away from G and in E’s favor.
You might even have the intuition that a Euclidean space of whatever dimension will be almost always simpler than any rival. Famously, Poincaré advocated a
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view like this, arguing that we would always prefer Euclidean space to any rival
precisely because Euclidean space is simplest. Here is Poincaré:
Euclidean geometry is, and will remain, the most convenient: 1st,
because it is the simplest, and it is not so only because of our mental
habits or because of the kind of direction intuition we have of Euclidean
space; it is the simplest in itself, just as a polynomial of the first degree
is simpler than a polynomial of the second degree. . . (Poincare [1905],
50)
In an earlier work, he expands upon what he means by ‘simplest’:
Let it not be said that the reason why we deem the group of Euclid
[i.e. the group of isometric mappings of Euclidean space onto itself] the
simplest is because it conforms best to some pre-existing ideal which
has already a geometric character; it is simpler because certain of its displacements are interchangeable with one another, which is not true of
the corresponding displacements of the group of Lobachevsky [i.e. the
group of isometric mappings of hyperbolic space onto itself]. (Poincare
[1898], 42-43)
Would Poicaré have maintained that a thirty-dimensional Euclidean space is simpler than a wildly curved but three-dimensional space? As above, it is difficult to
see that the question is very interesting. But it is worth noting that the reason that
Poincaré gives in this second quote has to do with the symmetries of Euclidean
space, and those symmetries are preserved when the dimensionality of the space
is increased. So perhaps the answer is ‘yes’.
Maybe the thing to say about the conflict between S 2 and E 3 is that they are
equally simple—that what we have here is a tie. What should we say in a case like
this?
Consider the analogous problem in the case of laws. Suppose that, in the competition for best true theory we come up with a tie. What, then, are the laws of
nature? In his earliest writings on laws, Lewis claimed that in a case of a tie,
the laws are those propositions in common among the tied theories (Lewis [1983],
367). But as van Fraassen has pointed out, it may be that there is very little overlap
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among the best true theories, and what overlap there is may be uninformative.19 In
this case, the content of the laws would turn out to be exceptionally weak. Consequently, in his later writings Lewis came to prefer the idea that “in this unfortunate
case there would be no very good deservers of the name of laws” (Lewis [1994],
479).
It seems to me that the claim that there would be “no very good deservers of
the name of laws” can be read in either one of two different ways. Suppose that Sw1
and Sw2 are deductive systems that are tied for best. Suppose that p is a regularity of
Sw1 . If we emphasize the word no, then the claim seems to be that p is determinately
not a law. But if we emphasize the word good, then the claim seems to be that it is
indeterminate whether p is a law or not. In the geometric case, Huggett goes for
this second option: in any case in which a Leibnizian relational history embeds into
two or more equally simple geometries, we should say that the shape of space is
indeterminate (Huggett [2006], 55-56). In the present case, this would mean saying
that it is indeterminate whether space has the structure of a two-sphere or Euclidean
three-space.
Note that in this case the indeterminacy is not epistemic: it is not that the available evidence underdetermines whether space has the structure of S 2 or E 3 , so
that one could never know the shape of space. Nor is the indeterminacy in our
language. That is to say, there is no indeterminacy in what it means to say that
space has the shape of a two-sphere; and it’s not as if we could get ourselves into
a conversational context in which it would be possible to resolve whether of not
space has the shape of a two-sphere. Rather, in this case, the indeterminacy is in
how the world is structured.
19

(Van Fraassen [1989]). For example, all deductive systems closed under strict implication will
include tautologies, and if the systems are very disimilar, then tautologies may be the only propositions shared in common.

104

I do not have an argument against the possibility of geometric indeterminacy
except to say that as a realist about spatiotemporal structure I do not know how
to think about a world in which it is indeterminate whether, for example, space is
finite or infinite. Such indeterminacy is at odds with what I regard as a basic assumption—namely, the assumption that possible worlds are determinately structured objects; an assumption which I was careful to flag back in the introduction
(see page 2).
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CHAPTER 5
DYNAMIC FOUNDATIONALISM

Dynamic foundationalism is the thesis that the geometry of spacetime is grounded
in the laws of nature—or, at least, that some important aspects of the geometry of
spacetime are grounded in the laws of nature. In chapter 4, we discussed one version of the thesis in Nick Huggett’s claim that the inertial structure of Galilean
spacetime is grounded in the truth of Newton’s laws. In this chapter, we discuss
another version of the thesis in Harvey Brown’s claim that the metric structure of
Minkowski spacetime is grounded in the Lorentz covariance of the laws ((Brown
[2005]), (Brown & Pooley [2006]), (Brown & Pooley [2000])). In Brown’s words,
. . . in special relativity, the Minkowskian metric is no more than a
codification of the behavior of rods and clocks, or equivalently, it is no
more than the Kleinian geometry associated with the symmetry group
of the quantum physics of the non-gravitational interactions in the theory of matter (Brown [2005], 9).
I have framed Brown’s thesis as the claim that the Minkowski metric is grounded
in the Lorentz covariance of the laws. But Brown himself doesn’t frame things this
way. Instead, he usually speaks in terms of explanation, saying things like,
From our perspective. . . the direction of explanation goes the other
way around. It is the Lorentz covariance of the laws that underwrites
the fact that the geometry of space-time is Minkowskian [rather than
the geometry of Minkowski spacetime that underwrites the Lorentz covariance of the laws] (Brown & Pooley [2006], 14).
But to my mind, this is just a roundabout way of talking about grounding. First,
observe that explanatory relations are never basic. When they hold, they hold in
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virtue of the instantiation of some other, more fundamental relation. Denote that
other, more fundamental relation with the letter ‘R’. On some theories of scientific
explanation, R is the causal relation. On my own preferred theory, R is some member of a set of dependence relations. Included in this set is the relation of causal
dependence, but also the relation of metaphysical dependence or grounding. But
no matter the analysis, to probe intuitions about ‘what explains what’ is just a way
of zeroing in on these kinds of other, more basic relations. If that’s right, then
Brown’s decision to frame the debate in terms of ‘the arrow of explanation’ and
whether it runs from geometry to laws or vice versa can just as well be framed in
terms of ‘the arrow of dependence’ and whether it runs from geometry to laws or
vice versa. I prefer this second framing insofar as it puts on the emphasis more
squarely on the relation between geometry and dynamics and steers us away from
any detailed discussion of explanation.
I have two goals in this chapter. The first is just to clarify Brown’s claim that
the Minkowski metric is “no more than a codification of the behavior of rods and
clocks.” My aim will be to do this with an eye toward clarifying the ontological
implications of the view.
My second goal is to raise a problem. We can think of Brown as adopting an
“ontologically robust” attitude with respect to matter and an “ontologically deflated” attitude with respect to spacetime. Some of his arguments for doing so will
be discussed in section 5.4. But, I will argue, one can respond to those arguments
by deflating in the opposite direction, by taking matter to be nothing more than
a region of spacetime. To deflate in this direction would be to adopt an ontology
along the lines of John A. Wheeler’s program in geometrodynamics, a version of
what is sometimes called supersubstantivalism. I will argue that deflating in this
direction not only disarms Brown’s arguments, but that it also solves an otherwise
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intractable problem concerning the coordination of the symmetry properties of the
laws of the standard model.
The chapter concludes with a lengthy appendix on scientific explanation where
I defend the claim that scientific explanations work by uncovering relations of dependence. The appendix is largely independent of the main body of the chapter;
no claim argued for in the main body of the chapter will depend upon the details
of the theory sketched in the appendix.

5.1

The Dynamical Approach

On the geometric approach to special relativity, one starts with the fact that
spacetime is a structure of the form (M, ηab ), where M is a differentiable manifold
and ηab is a flat, pseudo-Riemannian metric tensor field of Lorentz signature. One
then goes on to show how, given such a structure, all of the familiar facts about the
special theory follow. In particular, starting with such a geometry, it is possible to
derive the Lorentz transformation equations, the relativity of simultaneity, and the
formulas for the Lorentz contraction and time dilation.
I say that one ‘starts’ with the fact that spacetime has such-and-such a geometry
and then ‘derives’ all of the familiar facts about the special theory of relativity. In
the first instance, this is a statement about the mathematics of special relativity:
starting with the mathematical structure (M, ηab ), one can mathematically derive
the familiar theory. But it can also be interpreted physically (or metaphysically) as
a claim about the proper ontological order of things; that is, as a claim about what
is ontologically fundamental and what is ontologically derivative. So interpreted,
the geometry represented by the model (M, ηab ) is claimed to be ontologically basic
while the relativistic behavior of rods and clocks is claimed to be derivative.
It is this physical (or metaphysical) statement about ontological order that Brown
disputes. Instead of a ‘geometric approach’, his aim is to argue for a ‘dynamical ap-
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proach’ to the special theory. Reversing the geometric order, Brown means to start
with, to take as ontologically basic, certain facts about the relativistic behavior of
composite matter and the dynamical laws governing such objects. The geometric
structure (M, ηab ) is then claimed to be ontologically derivative.1 Thus, Brown has
argued—somewhat programmatically—that the “origin” of the Minkowski metric
is in the Lorentz covariance of the laws, suggesting a theory according to which
metric structure is non-fundamental.
The differences between the geometric and dynamical approaches comes through
clearest in their different treatments of the Lorentz contraction. On the geometric
approach, the Lorentz contraction of a rod in the direction of its motion is a kinematic effect. This implies that explanation of the Lorentz contraction is to go by
way of the geometry of spacetime. In terms of the arrow of ontological dependence: facts about the Lorentz contraction of a rod in the direction of its motion are
grounded in facts about the geometry of Minkowski spacetime. The rough idea
for how such an explanation will go is familiar. Here is one way to go at it. In
Minkowski spacetime, different inertial observers (represented geometrically by
different timelike geodesics) pick out different hyperplanes of simultaneity. Thus,
we can say that for any timelike geodesic γ and point p along γ, the tangent vector
a
ξ|p
determines a three-dimensional vector space S|ξ via the condition that, for any

µb ∈ S|ξ , ηab ξ a µb = 0. The vectors in the space S|ξ will be one and all spacelike
and one and all orthogonal to ξ a (which is just what ηab ξ a µb = 0 says). This threedimensional vector space is our observer’s hyperplane of simultaneity. Thinking
1
If real at all. There are plenty of places where Brown seems to endorse an extremely deflated
notion of spacetime geometry. At one point, he describes Minkowski spacetime as a “glorious nonentity” (Brown & Pooley, [2006]). At another, he asks whether the use of spacetime geometry in
mechanics is any different than the use of configuration space in Lagrangian mechanics, projective
Hilbert space in quantum mechanics, or thermodynamic phase space in thermodynamics (Brown
[2005], 134-39). Even the claim that the Minkowski metric is nothing more than a codification, “in
elegant mathematical language” (Brown [2005], 23-24), of the behavior of rods and clocks can be
read as endorsing a kind of instrumentalism with respect to spacetime geometry.
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in terms of points instead of vectors, S|ξ constitues an equivalence class of points
under the simultaneity relation, so that for any two points in the space, our observer will judge that those two points are simultaneous. (And so, consequently,
for any two points in the space our observer will assign the same coordinate time
to those points). Now, it is possible to show that for any two timelike vectors ξ a and
ξ 0a pointing in different directions, S|ξ 6= S|ξ0 . Thus, observers in relative motion
in Minkowski spacetime will disagree over matters concerning simultaneity. And
this disagree over simultaneity will entail a disagreement over matters concerning
spatial length, insofar as to measure the spatial length of an object is to measure
the spatial distance between its end points at some fixed time.
Brown’s treatment of the Lorentz contraction is rather different. On the dynamical approach, the Lorentz contraction is treated not as a kinematic effect but as a
dynamical effect. On this approach, “the explanation of length contraction is ultimately to be sought in terms of the dynamics of the microstructure of the contracting rod” (Brown [2005], 133), which, Brown likes to emphasize, is itself a “moving
atomic configuration” (Brown [2005], 4). To get a feel for how such an explanation
might go, one can look at John Bell’s [1976] paper on the special theory relativity. In that paper, Bell derives the Lorentz contraction from Maxwell’s equations,
showing how those equations imply that the orbit of an electron around its nucleus
will change shape from circular to ellipitical under a velocity boost. That such a
derivation is possible isn’t surprising: Maxwell’s equations are Lorentz covariant.
But what is important here is just the fact that on this approach the dynamical
laws are explanatorily primary. On Bell’s analysis of the Lorentz contraction, there
is no whiff of Minkowski’s geometry. Rather, everything is done in terms of the
dynamical laws governing the parts of the rod.2
2

Though Bell’s use of electromagnetism gives a sense for how the dynamical approach to length
contraction will go, Bell’s analysis does not represent the complete dynamical story on relativistic
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One of my main aims in this chapter is to assess the ontological implications of
the dynamical approach. Toward this end, we will need a more detailed statement
of the view. As far as the underlying metaphysics goes, talk of the metric being
“no more than a codification of the behavior of rods and clocks” leaves too many
questions unsettled. With that in mind, one of the clearest statements of the view
that I know of comes from a recent review written by Oliver Pooley. (Pooley is not
just a reviewer, he is also a collaborator; see (Brown & Pooley [2000], [2006])). One
thing that is nice about the passage that I am about to quote is that in it Pooley
gives us a toy example to work with. It will be useful to quote Pooley at length.
The advocate of the dynamical approach need not be understood
as eschewing all primitive spatiotemporal notions (pace Norton [2008]).
In particular, one might take as basic the “topological” extendedness of
the material world in four dimensions. Imagine such a world whose
only material dynamical entity has pointlike parts whose degrees of
freedom can be modelled by the real numbers. One obtains a coordinate description of such an entity by associating, in a way that respects
its local topology, each of its pointlike parts with distinct elements of
R4 , and associating with each of these a real number representing the
dynamical state of the corresponding part. In other words, we directly
map the parts of the material field postulated to be the sole entity in
the world into R4 and choose a way to represent its dynamical state so
as to obtain a scalar field on R4 . Different choices of coordinate system
will yield different mathematical descriptions. Suppose, now, that for
some special choice of coordinate system the description one obtains
is the solution of a very simple equation. Moreover, suppose that (i)
the descriptions one obtains relative to coordinate systems related to
this first coordinate system by Lorentz transformations yield (distinct)
descriptions that are solutions of the very same equation but that (ii) descriptions with respect to other coordinate systems, if they can be represented as solutions of equations at all, are solutions of more complicated equations. If all this were the case, the simplest equation might be
considered one of the Humean laws of this world. The Lorentz group’s
being their dynamical symmetry group is constituted by its being the

length contraction. The reason why is that electromagnetism cannot explain the possibility of stable
matter, and so cannot explain the possibilty of a rigid, extended rod. For that you need quantum
mechanics. Thus, as Brown emphasizes, on the dynamical approach “relativistic phenomena like
length contraction and time dilation are in the last analysis the result of structural properties of the
quantum theory of matter” (Brown [2005], vii-viii).
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group that maps between the coordinate systems with respect to which
descriptions of the material world satisfy the simple equation. And finally, the spatiotemporal geometry of the world is defined in terms of
the invariants of the symmetry group so identified. In particular, for
the spatiotemporal interval between two parts of the material world
p, q to be I just is for (tp − tq ) − |~xp − ~xq |2 = ±I(p, q)2 with respect to
the privileged coordinate systems. Spacetime geometry is reduced to
a notion of dynamical symmetry that does not presuppose it. (Pooley
[2013], 55-56)
This passage is helpful insofar as it clarifies what the basic ontology of the view
might be. Two points are worth flagging. First, Pooley’s construction assumes
a certain minimal amount of geometry. In particular, the example assumes, in
Pooley’s phrase, “the topological extendedness of the material world in four dimensions.” In the next section, I will work to clarify precisely what this entails.
For now, just notice that what are not being assumed are any facts about the metric structure of spacetime. Rather, on this view metric facts are emergent insofar
as the Minkowski interval is grounded in the Lorentz covariance of the laws in
the manner suggested by Pooley’s toy example. In this respect, Brown’s dynamic
foundationalism is a more far reaching program than Huggett’s regularity relationalism, which assumes basic temporal and spatial metric facts.
Second, the passage expresses some degree of allegiance to the Humean conception of laws. The Humean conception of laws is a reductive account of laws
according to which (on one version of the theory) the laws of nature are those regularities entailed by that set of propositions which most effectively summarizes
the fundamental facts, where an effective summary is one achieving an optimal
balance of strength and simplicity. Despite their insistence on the ontological primacy of laws, this it the first time that I know of where either Brown or Pooley has
said anything about the metaphysics of laws. This is surprising insofar as you get
rather different worldviews depending on whether you couple their thesis about
the origin of the Minkowski metric with a Humean or non-Humean conception of
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laws.3 Only the Humean aims for a grounding of nomic facts in occurent facts.
Thus, combing dynamic foundationalism with a Humean conception of laws entails, via a chain of grounding, that the Minkowski metric is ultimately grounded
in occurent facts.4

5.2

Submetric Structure and the Laws

There is a tendency to want to ascribe to Brown a thesis which is quite a bit
stronger than the one that he actually claims to hold. According to this strong
thesis, the full geometry of Minkowski spacetime, from topology to metric, is
grounded in the laws. The thesis is ‘strong’ insofar as it claims a dyamical foundation for the submetric structure of spacetime in addition to the metric structure
of spacetime. This contrasts with Brown’s claim that it is, specifically, the metric
structure of Minkowski spacetime that has a dynamical origin.
The tendency to want to saddle Brown the strong thesis is rooted in the fact
that there are passages in Brown’s work where he argues against the view that
the spacetime manifold is a fundamental beable. For example, when discussing
the invariance of models of the general theory of relativity under the group of
diffeomorphisms and the indeterminism that such invariance seems to entail (see
chapter 6 of this dissertation), Brown writes:
One thing seems obvious: if the bare, differential space-time manifold is a real entity, then different solutions of Einstein’s field equations
that are related by diffeomorphisms correspond to different physical
states of affairs. The theory is incapable of predicting which of the different possible worlds is realized, but all of them are, as we have seen,
3

Compare (Huggett [2009], 418).

4

The chief advocate of the Humean conception of laws has been David Lewis. See especially
(Lewis [1983]). Lewis himself credits Ramsey and Mill with the basic idea. In Lewis’s hands,
Humeanism about laws is a supervenience thesis. But supervenience does not entail reduction,
and reduction of the nomic to the occurent is what the Humean is after (Hall [2015]). One way to
strengthen the thesis, then, is to frame it in terms of ground, or ontological dependence, as I have
here.
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empirically indistinguishable. The simplest (and to my mind the best)
conclusion, and one which tallies with our usual intuitions concerning
the gauge freedom in electrodynamics, is that the space-time manifold
is a non-entity’ ([2005], 156)).
Here, we are told that the spacetime manifold is a non-entity. But if the manifold
is a non-entity, then one wonders about the status of the structure housed by the
manifold. If the manifold is a non-entity, then how is the topological and differential structure of the world physically instantiated? Since Brown asserts the primacy of dynamics over geometry, one might wonder whether he means to assert
that manifold structure too is grounded in the dynamical laws.
But if this were Brown’s position then he would run up against the following
problem (Norton [2008]). Consider physical theories T1 and T2 , each containing
physical laws written in terms of parameters (t1 , x1 , y1 , z1 ) and (t2 , x2 , y2 , z2 ). Now,
since we are imagining a view with no prior geometry, including no prior topology, the parameters t, x, y, and z are to be interpreted as “bare” parameters, having
been divested of their usual spatiotemporal interpretation. In particular, such parameters do not refer to points of an underlying manifold. But then, as Norton
emphasizes, there is no reason to think that the parameters (t1 , x1 , y1 , z1 ) appearing in the laws of T1 have anything to do with the parameters (t2 , x2 , y2 , z2 ) appearing in the laws of T2 . Consequently, there is nothing to prevent us from viewing
the fields described by our two theories as inhabiting distinct spacetimes; alternatively, it becomes difficult to see how the laws of our two theories could couple
with one another. Of course, the substantivalist avoids the problem because the
substantivalist assumes the prior existence of a manifold of spacetime points. On
this approach, coordinates are assigned to the manifold providing a single set of
coordinate parameters for any number of theories to draw from.
However, the passage from Pooley above assures us that the strong thesis is too
strong. As emphasized above, Brown’s dynamic foundationalism is an account of
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the metric structure of spacetime. It is not an account of the full geometry of spacetime. And in particular, as Pooley’s example makes clear, the dynamic foundationalist will want to help himself to certain amounts of submetric structure. Thus,
Pooley writes:
The advocate of the dynamical approach need not be understood
as eschewing all primitive spatiotemporal notions (pace Norton [2008]).
In particular, one might take as basic the “topological” extendedness of
the material world in four dimensions. (Pooley [2013], 55)
The remainder of this section aims to simply get clear on what it means to “take
as basic the ‘topological’ extendedness of the material world in four dimensions.”5
Toward this end, the first thing to note is that the toy example that Pooley constructs in the long quote in section 5.1 undersells the amount of submetric structure
needed. In the example, Pooley assumes that the dynamical states of the points of
his hypothetical material object can be represented mathematically with real numbers. Consequently, the full description of the object in the model requires nothing
more than a scalar field, which, in turn, requires nothing more of the structure of
spacetime than “the topological extendedness of the material world.” But more
interesting examples will require more structure than this. More complex physical
states will require representation by either vectors or higher rank tensors. Consequently, in a more interesting example, the submetric requirements on the structure of spacetime will have to be such that vectors and tensors are well-defined objects. This requires that spacetime have tangent space structure, and a space with
tangent space structure will be structurally more complex than a simple topological space.
So we need manifold structure insofar as we need vectors and tensors to characterize the dynamical states of physical systems. But to insist that vectors and
tensors be well-defined is just to insist that spacetime carry a certain amount of
5

I do not know why Pooley puts scare quotes around ‘topological’.
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local structure, vectors and tensors being defined locally from point to point. One
question, then, is whether this kind of local structure is enough. Or must we also
make assumptions about the global, large-scale structure of spacetime as well?
One thought is that any manifold will do. The thought here is that all differentiable manifolds contain the kind of local structure needed so that the kinds of
physical properties that we might want to invoke in the laws are well-defined.
Since all manifolds come equipped with tangent space structure, the idea would
be that one can just pick a manifold at random and get on with the business of
describing physical systems. The laws will be those equations which best balance
strength and simplicity, and the metric structure of spacetime will be determined
by the symmetry group associated with those laws.
The problem with this approach is that choice of a global structure will have
an influence on the laws, so that it is at least misleading to say that any manifold
for will do, as if the choice is of no physical consequence. For example, we know
that if one were to start with S 4 , then one would never get anything like Lorentz
covariant laws insofar as it is a theorem that S 4 fails to admit a smooth metric field
of Lorentz signature.
A second thought is to start with the local structure of R4 , allow the laws to
determine the metric structure of spacetime, and then allow the metric structure
of spacetime to determine the large-scale, global structure of spacetime. The idea
here would be to make as minimal of an assumption as possible about the submetric structure of spacetime—minimal enough to write down some laws—and then
allow the emerging metric structure to determine the global structure of spacetime.
The problem with this approach is that a metric field puts very weak constraints
on the underlying manifold. Grant yourself a set of laws and grant that the symmetries of those laws determine a flat metric of Lorentz signature. Unfortunately,
nothing much follows regarding the global structure of spacetime. In the two-

116

dimensional case, spacetime can have the structure of “plane” Minkowski spacetime (which is topologically R2 ) or “rolled-up” Minkowski spacetime (which is
topologically R1 × S 1 ). Both admit a globally defined, flat metric tensor field of
Lorentz signature. In the four-dimensional case, spacetime could have the structure of R4 . But it could also, surprisingly, have the structure of R1 × S 3 , which is
temporally an open line but spatially a three-dimensional sphere.6
The general problem is that most physical laws are purely local, describing how
the physical state of a relatively small region of spacetime is related to the states
of nearby regions of spacetime. Such laws are always going to leave the global
structure of spacetime underdetermined. Consequently, the global structure of
spacetime is going to be especially resistant to a dynamic foundation.
Other considerations seem to point towoard the same conclusion. First, most
of the methods that we have for studying the global structure of spacetime simply
make no assumptions concerning the laws. Indeed, most results concerning the
global structure of spacetime are regarded as constraining dynamics. Thus, there
is, second, a rough intuition that results concerning the global structure of spacetime are simply more basic than anything having to do with the laws, so that such
results will likely outlast any future changes in our understanding of the laws. The
sentiment is expressed by (Geroch & Horowitz [1979]):
There is a sense [one has when studying the global structure of
spacetime] that one is isolating features which are not only more qualitative, but perhaps also more ‘fundamental’. Imagine compiling a list
of the structural ingredients of general relativity, with an estimate for
each of a probability that it will be regarded as an essential part of our
understanding of space, time, and gravitation fifty years from now. Perhaps ‘Einstein’s equation’ would be assigned a rather small probability
compared with, say, ‘manifold and metric’. And yet one could easily
6

See (Geroch & Horowitz [1979]), who mention (p. 221) that it is possible to cover R1 × S 3 with
a flat metric of Lorentz signature insofar as R1 × S 3 is topologically equivalent (homeomorphic) to
Minkowski spacetime with a point removed.
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imagine that both of these could have disappeared, while some remnant of ‘causal structure’ remains.
The upshot, then, is that the dynamic foundationalist must assume at least
some spatiotemporal structure as ontologically prior to the laws, and, moreover,
that the structural assumptions needed are fairly substantial. We need a single set
of points lest the parameters of any one matter theory come unhitched from the parameters of any other matter theory. We need the local structure of a differentiable
manifold lest the kinds of physical properties that we need in order to charactize
the states of physical systems lack ontological support. And we need global structure insofar as (1) there is, in general, no way to recover global structure from local
laws and (2) global structure in some instances is going to put restrictions on the
laws.

5.3

Ontological Implications

It is clear that Brown has anti-substantivalist sympathies. He describes Minkowski
spacetime as a “glorious non-entity” and he raises explicit problems for views that
treat spacetime as if it were a “self-standing, autonomous element” (Brown [2005],
143). Pooley is explict about reading Brown as an anti-substantivalist; in fact, he
classifies the program described above as a kind of relationalism:
The dynamical approach seeks to offer a reductive account of the
Minkowski spacetime interval in terms of the dynamical symmetries of
the laws governing matter. It therefore qualifies as a type of relationalism, although this is not something that Brown himself emphasises.
But given the above observations concerning the kind of local and global structure
that must be in place in order to even begin the project of formulating laws, it is
far from clear that Brown has succeeded in crafting an antisubstantivalist account
of spacetime. The chief argument in favor of a substantival theory of spacetime
is that substantival spacetime is needed in order to provide truth conditions for
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propositions concerning the structure of spacetime. Even if we grant that a dynamic foundation can be provided for the Minkowski metric, if we are to take
seriously the manifold structure of spacetime then we have still not avoided the
need for substantival spacetime.

5.4

Coordinating Dynamical Symmetries

So far, my aim has been largely expository. I have presented Brown’s dynamic
approach to relativity, I have explained how it contrasts with the more familiar
geometric approach, and I have clarifed Brown’s claim that the Minkowski metric
is nothing more than a codification of the behavior of rods and clocks. In this
section, I want to look more closely at the philosophical arguments in support of
the dynamical approach.
Much of Brown’s work on this topic has had an historical focus. He has aimed
to present the dynamical approach as a viable alternative to the geometric approach and to establish its historical pedigree, finding support for the idea in Weyl,
Pauli, Eddington, Bell, and Einstein. But Brown also offers a number of philosophical arguments in favor of the dynamical approach. Some of these offer indirect
support for the view by aiming to undermine the geometric approach to special
relativity. These will be the arguments that I focus on in this section.
One such argument concerns the existence of theories in which the symmetry
group associated with the structure of spacetime and the symmetry group associated with the dynamical laws come apart. Here, the most familiar example is classical Newtonian mechanics in Newtonian spacetime. Newtonian spacetime is the
structure (M, ta , hab , ∇, λa ), where λa is a unit timelike vector field whose integral
curves are geodesics with respect to ∇. The function of λa is to pick out a preferred
rest frame. It does so by introducing a notion of ‘sameness of place over time’: an
object is at absolute rest, occupying the same point of space over time, just in case
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its worldline is an integral curve of the vector field λa . This is the spacetime structure which most closely corresponds to the structure described by Newton in the
Principia. Newton thought that he needed absolute space because he thought that
there could be no absolute distinction between inertial motion and non-inertial
motion without it. As we have seen in previous chapters, he was wrong about
this; all that is needed is the affine structure induced by ∇. But more to the point,
the symmetries of Newtonian spacetime do not line of up with the symmetries of
Newton’s laws. Newton’s laws are invariant under the group of Galilean transformations. Included in this group is a transformation cooresponding to a uniform
boost in velocity. But Newtonian spacetime is not so invariant: boost the geometry
and you spoil the rest frame λa . So the combination of Newton’s laws with Newtonian spacetime results in a theory in which the geometry does not line up with
the laws.
Here, Brown thinks that we are in the presence of a puzzle. In particular, he
considers this case problematic for anyone espousing the idea that the geometry
of spacetime could account for the symmetries of the laws. He stresses that such a
case shows, at least as a matter of logic, that the symmetries of the laws needn’t be
constrained by the symmetries of spacetime. And he thinks that this renders the
claim that the geometry of spacetime can explain the symmetry properties of the
laws mysterious.
This show that, as a matter of logic along, if one postulates spacetime structure as a self-standing, autonmous element in one’s theory, it
need have no constraining role on the form of the laws governing the
rest of the content of the theory’s models. So how is its influence on
these laws supposed to work? ([2005], 143)
What exactly is the argument here supposed to be? That rhetorical question
at the end of the quote makes it difficult to formalize the argument in a way that
still accurately represents the tone of the passage. (Is Brown arguing for a claim?

120

Is he presenting a puzzle?) But I think that the following comes close. Call it the
argument from unconstrained symmetries.
1. If a theory postulates spacetime as a self-standing, autonmous structure, then the structure of spacetime needn’t constrain the form of the
dynamical laws.
2. If the structure of spacetime needn’t constrain the form of the dynamical
laws, then it needn’t influence the form of the dynamical laws.
3. If it needn’t influence the form of the dynamical laws, then it cannot
explain the form of the dynamical laws.
4. Therefore, if a theory postulates spacetime as a self-standing, autonmous structure, then it cannot explain the form of the dynamical laws.
Since the special theory of relativity is supposed to be a theory that postulates
Minkowski spacetime as a self-standing, autonmous structure, it follows that the
structure of Minkowski spacetime cannot explain the Lorentz covariance of the
dynamical laws.
As written, I think that the argument from unconstrained symmetries is a pretty
accurate reconstruction of the passage I have quoted from Brown. But as written, I
also think that the argument is obviously unsound. Premise 3 is false: from the fact
that spacetime structure need not influence the form of the laws, it does not follow
that it cannot influence the form of the laws.7 But I do not want to lean too heavily
on this. First, I am not certain that Brown would accept premise 3. The passage
that I am trying to pull the argument from is most unclear precisely at this point.
Second, there are other places in Brown’s work where he suggests that there are
contexts in which Minkowski spacetime can explain the Lorentz contraction of a
7

Compare (Skow [2006], paragraph 14).
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rod (Brown & Pooley, [2006], 9). So perhaps he might want to say that there are
contexts in which Minkowski spacetime can explain the Lorentz covariance of the
laws. (Though no one who thinks that Minkowski spacetime is a mere codification
of the behavior of rods and clocks and think that such an explanation is very deep).
In any case, it will be worth seeing whether the argument from unconstrained
symmetries fails elsewhere.
There is a second argument that Brown offers which can be seen as building
upon the first. In a theory like the special theory of relativity, spacetime is causally
inert. More precisely the metric tensor field does not dynamical couple with matter
fields. More colorfully, material objects have no “spacetime feelers.” For Brown,
this enhances the mystery of how the geometry of Minkowski spacetime could be
at all explanatorily relevant with respect to the physics of matter.
Indeed, if it is the structure of the background spacetime that accounts for the phenomenon, by what mechanism is the rod or clock
informed as to what this structure is? How does this material object get
to know which type of space-time—Galilean or Minkowskian, say—it
is immersed in? (Brown [2005], 8)
Again, it is tricky business to extract the argument, but I think that the following comes close. Call it the no spacetime feelers argument.
1. If Minkowski spacetime explains (or is explanatorily relevant with respect to) the behavior of rods and clocks, then there must exist some
mechanism (perhaps some causal mechanism, perhaps just ‘being dynamically coupled’) connecting Minkoski spacetime with the rods and
clocks that occupy it.
2. There exists no mechanism connecting Minkowski spacetime with the
rods and clocks that occupy it.
3. Therefore, Minkowski spacetime cannot explain the behavior of the rods
and clocks that occupy it.
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In both arguments, the deep source of the problem for Brown is that in a theory
like the special theory of relativity, spacetime appears as “a self-standing, autonmous element’.’ Because of this, the question naturally arises: How do spacetime
and matter interact with one another? It is because Brown sees no interaction that
he questions the explanatory value of spacetime.
Of course, Brown’s solution to the problem is just to deny that spacetime is a
self-standing, autonmous element. Thus, Brown resolves the problem by adopting a “deflationist” attitude with respect to spacetime, an attitude according to
which Minkowski spacetime is just a codification “in elegant mathematical language” (Brown [2005], 23-4) of the behavior of rods and clocks. Thus Minkowski’s
geometrical reformulation of Einstein’s 1905 theory is considered merely elegant
and simplifying, not as providing some deep ontological insight into the nature of
reality.
But one can respond to each of the above arguments by deflating in the other
direction; that is, by deflating the ontological status of matter. The default position for the substantivalist is a two-sorted ontology according to which matter and
spacetime are categorically different things. Brown doesn’t speak in these terms,
but the default position is clearly the one he has in mind; I take it that this is at
least part of what he has in mind when he refers to theories that treat spacetime
as if it were an “autonmous, self-standing element.”8 The alternative, however, is
a single-sorted ontology that denies the existence of matter as distinct from spacetime. To go this way is to adopt an ontology along the lines of J. A. Wheeler’s program in geometrodynamics, in which matter is identified with spacetime. Among
philosophers, the view is known as supersubstantivalism. According to the super8

Some other things that he may have in mind: (1) that the Minkowski metric is an absolute object
in the sense of (Anderson [1967]) and (Friedman [1983]), (2) that the Minkowski metric does not dynamically couple with matter fields, or (3) that the special theory is not a background independent
theory in the sense of (Smolin [2008]).
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substantivalist, what we ordinarily refer to as “matter” is really just a region of
spacetime: matter is identical to spacetime.
If supersubstantivalism is true, then neither of the above arguments is sound.
For both arguments, the deep source of the problem is supposed to lie in the fact
that it is mysterious how Minkowski spacetime is connected with the matter that
occupies it. But if matter is identical to spacetime, then the mystery is removed:
there is no mystery concerning how a thing is connected with itself. Thus, the
supersubstantivalist can reject premise 2 of the no spacetime feelers argument.
Premise 2 asserts that “There exists no mechanism connecting Minkowski spacetime with the rods and clocks that occupy it.” If supersubstantivalism is true, the
“connecting mechanism” is just the identity relation.
More interesting, perhaps, with respect to the argument from unconstrained
symmetries, the supersubstantivalist can reject premise 1. Presmise 1 says that
“If a theory postulates spacetime as a self-standing, autonmous structure, then
the structure of spacetime needn’t constrain the form of the dynamical laws.”
But now suppose that supersubstantivalism is true. If supersubstantivalism is
true, then matter is identical to spacetime. It follows, then, that the spatiotemporal properties of physical objects like rods and clocks are completely determined
by the spatiotemporal properties of the regions of spacetime they “occupy,” for
they are, strickly speaking, identical to those regions. Suppose now, in addition,
that Humeanism about laws is true and that the laws of nature are—let us suppose—effective summaries of the behavior of rods and clocks. Then, very plausibly, the symmetries of the laws will reflect the symmetries of spacetime, for ultimately the laws will be nothing more than effective summaries of the properties of regions of spacetime. Given our assumptions—supersubstantivalism and
Humeanism about laws—it is difficult to see how the symmetry group associated

124

with the structure of spacetime can come apart from the symmetry group associated with the laws.
If what I have said so far is right, then we have arrived at an impasse. The problems raised by the argument from unconstrained symmetries and the no spacetime
feelers argument are problems for the dualist who takes spacetime and matter be
to categorically distinct. And the problems can be solved by deflating in either
direction: by taking spacetime to be nothing more than a codification in elegant
mathematical language of the behavior of matter or by taking matter to be nothing
more than a region of spacetime.
But there is, I think, a decisive consideration in favor of the supersubstantivalist. To see it, consider the fact that all of the laws of the standard model are Lorentz
covariant. On its face, this is remarkable. Why should the laws describing the
electromagnetic force be invariant under the exact same set of transformations as
the laws describing the strong nuclear force? Now, ordinarily, when two distinct
physical systems are coordinated, we expect that the coordination can be traced to
some third factor, a common cause. But for the dynamic foundationalist, there can
be no common cause. Instead, the fact that the laws of the standard model are all
Lorentz covariant is just a brute, inexplicable fact.
In the dynamical approach to length contraction and time dilation. . . the
Lorentz covariance of all the fundamental laws of physics is an unexplained brute fact. This, in and of itself, does not count against the
approach: all explanation must stop somewhere. What is required if
the so-called [geometric] interpretation is to win out over this dynamical approach is that it offer a genuine explanation of universal Lorentz
covariance. This is what is disputed. Talk of Lorentz covariance ‘reflecting the structure of space-time posited by the theory’ and of ‘tracing the
invariance to a common origin’ needs to be fleshed out if we are to be
given a genuine explanation here, something akin to the explanation of
inertia in general relativity. ([2005], 143)
As Brown mentions, unlike the dynamic foundationalist, the substantivalist has
an explanation of the Lorentz covariance of the laws: the laws are Lorentz covari125

ant because spacetime has a Minkowskian geometry. Thus, (Janssen, [2002]) and
(Balashov & Janssen, [2003]) have argued that the structure of spacetime provides
a ‘common origin’ explanation the Lorentz covariance of the laws of the standard
model. But Brown denies that the explanation is genuine. He thinks it seems to
work only because it is vague at the most crucial points. In his words, talk of the
laws ‘reflecting the structure of spacetime’ needs to be fleshed out. But the vagueness is there only if one assumes that matter is something distinct from spacetime.
If matter is identical to spacetime, then there is no need for fleshing out. Indeed,
if matter is identical to spacetime, and if the laws are Humean regularities, then it
would be surprising if the laws didn’t reflect the structure of spacetime!
To my mind, this settles the impasse. Not only can the supersubstantivalist
respond to some of Brown’s most central arguments, but he can also solve an otherwise intractable problem: he can explain the Lorentz covariance of the laws of
the standard model.

5.5

Conclusion

The focus in this chapter has been Harvey Brown’s recent work developing a
dynamics-first approach to relativity. On Brown’s approach, the dynamical laws
are fundamental and the geometry of spacetime is grounded in the laws. In the
case of the special theory, which has been our focus, the Minkowski geometry of
spacetime is claimed to be grounded in the Lorentz covariance of the laws.
Against this approach, I have done two things. First, I have emphasized the
importance of the topological structure of spacetime, both local and global, and
I have argued that only the substantivalist has a plausible account of such structure as physically instantiated. Second, I have argued that the substantivalist can
respond to some of Brown’s most central arguments by adopting the thesis that

126

matter is a region spacetime. And as a bonus: the supersubstantivalist can explain
the Lorentz covariance of the laws of the standard model.

5.6

Appendix: Explanation and Dependence

This is a long appendix. In it, I defend a dependence theory of explanation
according to which explanatorily relevant information is information about dependencies. In brief, my theory says that X is explanatorily relevant with respect
to Y just in case Y depends upon X.
In the final analysis, my theory is a disjunctive theory insofar as I take ‘dependence’ to name a set of relations. As far as physics goes, the dependencies that
matter most are causal, nomic, and metaphysical.
In order to motivate the theory, we might start with the observation that a scientific explanation is an elucidation of why things are the way they are. Very often
the elucidation will be causal—we explain why things are the way they are by figuring out what caused them to be so. But if our goal is a general theory of scientific
explanation, then the causal framework is too narrow insofar as it fails to capture
a host of cases that a theory of scientific explanation ought to capture.
There are at least three problem cases for the causal model—three explanation
types that are common in the sciences but which fall outside of the scope of the
causal model.
1. Regularities. We often explain higher-level regularities in terms of lowerlevel regularities—regularities that we take to be more fundamental. For example, we explain Kepler’s laws of planetary motion in terms of Newton’s
more fundamental laws, which concern motion in general. But Newton’s
laws do not relate to Kepler’s laws as cause to effect.
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2. Levels. We often explain the higher-level properties of physical systems in
terms of the lower-level, more fundamental properties of those systems. For
example, we explain the ability of an enzyme to facilitate the reactions that
it facilitates in terms of the enzyme’s lower-level molecular structure. But
lower-level properties do not relate to the higher-level properties they realize
as cause to effect.
A third type of explanation that is equally troublesome for the causal model is
geometric explanation.
3. Geometry. For a certain class of physical phenomena, the explanation of
those phenomena will go by way of the geometric properties of spacetime.
For example, the standard explanation of the Lorentz contraction of a rod
goes by way of the geometry of Minkowski spacetime. But the geometry of
Minkowski spacetime does not relate to the physical events and processes
that unfold within it as cause to effect.
What we would like is a unified theory of scientific explanation: a theory that
can accommodate not only causal explanation but also explanation types 1–3. Toward this end, I introduce and defend a dependence theory of scientific explanation. The main thesis argued for is that explanatory information is information
about dependencies. Sometimes the dependence will be causal. But there are other
kinds of dependence relations that are equally important—for example, the dependence of Kepler’s laws on the more fundamental laws of Newton, the dependence
of the higher-level properties of an enzyme on its underlying molecular structure,
and the dependence of the phenomenon of Lorentz contraction on the geometry
of Minkowski spacetime. All of these are non-causal dependencies. But they are
nonetheless explanatorily informative.
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5.6.1

Observations

In science, it is often useful to work with simplified models. So too in philosophy. Let’s assume, then, that a scientific explanation has the simple form
X explains Y
where X is that which is explained (the explanandum), Y is that which does the
explaining (the explanans), and ‘explains’ is a two-place relation.9 Call it the explanatory relation.10
What kinds of things are X and Y ? I do not have a firm position on this question
except that X and Y ought to be constituents of the physical world. One option,
then, is to say that X and Y are immanent facts. That would allow us to say that
the fact that X explains the fact that Y , which sounds right. But a better option
might be to say that X and Y are category neutral.
The explanatory relation is not a basic relation. Rather, when it holds, it holds in
virtue of the fact that X and Y are related in some other, more basic way. Call this
other, more basic relation the backing relation and denote it with the letter ‘R’. The
backing relation is that relation which holds between X and Y in virtue of which
it is correct to say that X explains Y (or, better: that X is explanatorily relevant
with respect to Y ). The chief task of a theory of scientific explanation, then, is to
identify the backing relation. Of course, we may learn upon analysis that there is
no single relation backing up all reputable instantiations of the scheme ‘X explains
Y ’. But in this case, we expect that there might at least be some unity to the backing
relations, so that they compose a reasonably unified family of relations.
9
Here is one respect in which the model is overly simple: ultimately, the account that I have to
offer is more accurately an account of explanatory information; it is an account of what it means
for X to be explanatorily relevant with respect to Y .
10
A contrastive account of explanation will reject the claim that the explanatory relation is a twoplace relation. See, for example, (Lipton [1990]).
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Any proposal concerning the backing relation ought to be guided by and judged
according to our observations concerning the explanatory relation. A successful
theory of scientific explanation will be one that picks out a backing relation (or
family of relations) that makes sense of those observations. Thus, for example, if
we decide that the explanatory relation is a transitive relation, then we ought to
reject any proposal concerning the backing relation that is at odds with this. (Of
course, the most natural way to this is would be to require that the backing relation
itself be a transitive relation). With this in mind, our first task will be to register a
number of observations concerning the explanatory relation. We start with three
formal properties.
A. The explanatory relation is an irreflexive relation: nothing explains itself. Note
that this does not rule out the possibility of an unexplained explainer. Many
philosophers have the intuition that explanatory chains cannot run-on ad infinitum; there must exist explanatory end points. The irreflexivity of the explanatory relation allows the possibility of such end points. What it disallows
is the claim that such end points are somehow self-explanatory.
B. The explanatory relation is an asymmetric relation: if X explains Y , then Y
cannot explain X. Consider some examples. When we observe that the light
from a distant galaxy is shifted to the red, we infer that the distant galaxy
is moving away from us, and then cite that as the explanation of the observed shift: the distant galaxy’s recession explains the observed shift in
wave length. To reverse the order of explanation would be to get things
wrong. Along the same lines, when we observe that energy in the form of
light is emitted from an atom, we infer that the atom’s electrons are jumping orbit, and then cite that as the explanation of the observed emission: the
jumping of the atom’s electrons explains the emission of light. Again, to reverse the order of explanation would be to get things wrong.
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C. The explanatory relation is a non-monotonic relation: the inclusion of irrelevant information in the explanans does damage to the explanation.11 Consider again the first example cited under B: if the explanation of an observed
red shift is that the distant source is moving away from us, then we damage the explanation if we add that the distant source lies in some particular
quadrant of the sky. We do damage to the explanation because the fact that
the distant source lies in some particular quadrant of the sky has nothing to
do with the wavelength of the light emitted from the source. In the context
of this example, such information is explanatorily irrelevant, and an explanation including explanatorily irrelevant information is weaker than one that
does not.
It is useful to note that Hempel’s deductive-nomological (DN), the starting
point for all philosophical work on scientific explanation, is at odds with all three
of our observations. Recall that, according to the DN account, an explanation is a
sound deductive argument in which a law of nature is used as an essential premise.
If we like, we can fit this to our scheme by relaxing some of our requirements.
First, according to the DN model, the relata of the explanatory relation are not
constituents of the world (perhaps immanent facts) but sets of propositions, the
explanans being divisible into subsets Γ and Λ, where Γ contains statements of initial conditions and Λ contains statements of laws of nature. Second, according to
the DN model, the backing relation is not a relation between constituents of the
world, but a relation between sets of propositions—namely, the relation of logical
entailment. Schematically, then, a DN explanation takes the form
11

The obvious comparison here is to monotonic functions. A function is monotonically increasing
just in case if x2 > x1 then f (x2 ) ≥ f (x1 ). Such functions never ‘change direction’. Explanations
are non-monotonic insofar as they do sometimes ‘change direction’ in the sense that the inclusion
of more information in the explanans of an explanation could make the explanation worse.

131

Γ∪Λ⇒Y
where the double arrow signifies logical entailment, and the DN account asserts
that
Γ ∪ Λ explains Y just in case Γ ∪ Λ ⇒ Y.
The failings of the DN account are familiar. For one, most now reject the
claim that explanations are arguments—what Wesley Salmon has called “the third
dogma of empiricism.” For another, it is rather doubtful that laws are required
in the way that Hempel thought. But put these worries to the side. The more serious problem is that the entailment relation has the wrong formal features. The
explanatory relation is an irreflexive, asymmetric, non-monotonic relation. But the
entailment relation is a reflexive, monotonic relation that, as numerous examples
have shown, cannot capture the asymmetries of explanation. For example, consider one of the asymmetry cases raised by Bromberger in (Bromberger, [1966]).
The relation between the length L of a pendulum’s arm and the period T at which
it swings is given by the equation
T = 2π

p

L/g

where g is the local gravitational constant. Taking this as a law, and L as an initial
condition, we can deduce (and so DN-explain) the period at which a pendulum
swings. But, of course, we could just as well take T as our initial condition and
deduce (and so DN-explain) the length of the pendulum’s arm. But only the first
of these is a genuine explanation—the period at which a pendulum swings does
not explain the length of the pendulum’s arm.
In addition to A-C, the explanatory relation is also characterized by a number
of non-formal properties. Here are two.
D. The explanatory relation is an objective relation: if X explains Y , then this is
because X and Y are related in some objective, mind-independent way. This
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excludes theories of explanation according to which, for example, to explain
some phenomenon is to “reduce it to the familiar.” The problem with such
an account is that it is materially inadequate. In science, many of our best
explanations do quite the opposite, explaining what is familiar in terms of
entities and processes that are quite unfamiliar.
E. The explanatory relation is connected with understanding: roughly, to be in
possession of a scientific explanation is to be in a position to increase your understanding of some aspect of the natural world. Though vague, the connection with understanding has been a platitude of explanation since Hempel’s
earliest work on the subject. An adequate theory of scientific explanation
should provide some insight into the relation between explanation and understanding.
As above, it’s worth seeing how the DN model fairs with respect to properties
D and E. It does well with respect to property D: entailment is an objective relation.
But it fails with respect to property E. To cite a familiar case: pre-Newtonians were
aware of the regular connection between the moon and the tides. Taking this as a
law, they were in a position to construct a successful DN explanation of the tides.
But for all that, they did not understand why the tides behave as they do. It wasn’t
until Newton spelled out the nature of the connection that some understanding
was had.
Our initial observations lead us to believe that the explanatory relation is an
irreflexive, asymmetric, non-monotonic relation that holds in an objective, mindindependent manner and that provides grounds for increased understanding of
the natural world. If it is to be materially adequate, a theory of scientific explanation ought to pick out a backing relation that helps us to make sense of these
properties.
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5.6.2

Dependence

Problems with the DN account have taught us that a successful treatment of
scientific explanation will require a foray into metaphysics insofar as it will require
us to talk about the connections that exist between the worldly constituents of
our explanations. This lesson is reflected in the approach taken above, where the
backing relation is described as a relation between worldly things.
There is evidence that Hempel himself was sensitive to the importance of worldly
connections. Though his official position on explanation was that explanation is
deductive-nomological explanation, his unofficial remarks tell a different story.
Thus, Hempel writes:
What scientific explanation, especially theoretical explanation, aims
at is not [an] intuitive and highly subjective kind of understanding, but
an objective kind of insight that is achieved by a systematic unification,
by exhibiting the phenomena as manifestations of common, underlying
structures and processes that conform to specific, testable, basic principles ([1966], 83).
Here, the emphasis is on underlying structures and processes—these are what
make for, or back-up, a successful scientific explanation. But what sort of structure? What sort of processes? For Hempel, the relevant structure was nomic structure. Thus, Hempel tells us that “all scientific explanation involves, explicitly or by
implication, a subsumption of its subject matter under general regularities; that it
seeks to provide a systematic understanding of empirical phenomena by showing
that they fit into a nomic nexus.” ([1965], 488) Of course, given the status of metaphysics among the logical empiricists, Hempel’s insight was promptly translated
into a formal, logico-linguistic model, so that nomic subsumption was to be understood as the derivation of a sentence describing the phenomenon-to-be-explained
from a set of sentences, at least one of which described a law of nature. It is this
formal model that is subject to so many counterexamples. But we can reject the
formal model and keep the philosophical insight that motivated it—keep, that is,
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the idea that explanation is a matter of fitting the phenomenon to be explained
within the structure of the world.
Advocates of the thesis that explanation is causal explanation follow Hempel
in the idea that explanation is a matter of fitting the phenomenon to be explained
within the structure of the world. Where they break with Hempel is over the claim
that the relevant structure is nomic structure. Their claim is that the relevant structure is causal structure. Or, in terms of the scheme laid out in 5.6.1, their claim is
that the backing relation is the causal relation.
There is much to be said for the thesis that the backing relation is the causal relation. Unlike entailment, causation is irreflexive, asymmetric, and non-monotonic.
Moreover, causal relations are objective and provide grounds for increasing our
understanding of the natural world. But as explanation types 1–3 indicate, causation cannot be the whole story on explanation. Explanation types 1–3 are all bona
fide scientific explanations. But each is non-causal.
Why aren’t these causal explanations? Why not say, for example, that Newton’s
laws cause Kepler’s laws? In part, the answer will depend upon how you think
about causation. For example, according to the process theory defended by (Dowe
[1995]), causal processes are marked by the transmission of a conserved quantity.
However, no such quantity is transmitted between Newton’s law and Kepler’s
law. So such a theory will imply that our explanation is noncausal. But even in
the absence of a specific theory of causation, most philosophers will agree that
causation is a diachronic relation between events. Contrast this with types 1–3,
where in each case the relation is a synchronic relation between relata that can
only misleadingly be described as events (e.g. the event of Newton’s laws being
true, or the event of spacetime having a relativistic geometry). At the very least,
this should prompt us to ask whether it is some other relation that is doing the
work backing up our explanations.
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What we need is a bit of reverse engineering. Observations in section 5.6.1 indicate that what we want is an irreflexive, asymmetric, non-monotonic relation. We
want it to be an objective relation, one that holds among constituents of the world,
and one that puts us in a position to increase our understanding of the natural
world. Finally, we want a relation of sufficient generality that it can be seen to fit
paradigmatic cases of causal and non-causal explanation alike. If there is no such
relation, then so be it—there can be no unified theory of scientific explanation. But
there is a natural candidate that deserves consideration—namely, a generalized
notion of dependence.
To motivate the idea, consider again types 1–3. With respect to the laws of
Newton and Kepler, it is commonplace to describe Newton’s as the more fundamental of the two. And this seems to suggest that the laws of Kepler are in some
way dependent upon the laws of Newton. Similarly, it is commonplace to say
that an enzyme performs as it does in virtue of being molecularly structured in
such-and-such a way. And this seems to imply that an enzyme’s functional profile
is in some way dependent upon its molecular structure. Finally, it is natural to
think that facts about the geometry of spacetime are more fundamental than the
spatiotemporal properties of physical systems. And this seems to imply that the
spatiotemporal properties of physical systems are in some way dependent upon
the geometry of spacetime. Thus, there is some initial promise for the thesis that
explanations in science are backed up by relations of dependence.
To make the thesis precise, we’ll need to spell out what kind of dependence
relations we have in mind.
First, I do not take ‘dependence’ to name any single relation. Rather, I intend
for ‘dependence’ to name a set of relations. Denote that set with the script letter
‘D’. Consequently, my theory is a disjunctive theory: X is explanatorily relevant
with respect to Y just in case either R1 (X, Y ) or R2 (X, Y ) or. . . , where each R is a
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member of the set D. Members include the sort of dependence relation that holds
between fundamental and non-fundamental laws, the sort of dependence relation
that holds between lower-level and higher-level properties, and the sort of dependence relation that holds between the geometry of spacetime and the properties of
certain physical systems. Included as well are also relations of nomic and causal
dependence.12 Thus, there is a straightforward sense in which the dependence theory of scientific explanation subsumes both Hempel’s unofficial theory as well as
the causal theory.
Second, the members of D are one and all relations among constituents of the
physical world. Thus, I mean to exclude, for example, relations of logical dependence and relations of conceptual dependence. Among the members of the set
D are diachronic relations—for example, causal relations—as well as synchronic
relations—for example, relations of metaphysical dependence (i.e. grounding relations). With respect to the question whether the members of D hold contigently
or with necessity, we can remain largely neutral. For example, I mean to remain
neutral between metaphysical theories of causation—as we might expect a theory of scientific explanation to do. Thus, I mean to remain neutral on the question
whether causal relations hold with necessity (so says the causal essentialist) or contingently (so says the Humean). We can remain similarly agnostic with respect to
other members of the set.
There are some good questions that deserve answers. Why a set of relations?
Can we not instead get by with a single dependence relation? It seems not. Some
scientific explanations (e.g. explanations of the higher-level properties of physical
systems in terms of the lower-level properties of those systems) are backed by a
synchronic dependence relation, others (e.g. causal explanations) by a diachronic
12

Indeed, we may want to classify some of the dependencies that are operative in explanation
types 1–3 as relations of nomic dependence.
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dependence relation. Likewise, some scientific explanations (e.g. causal explanations) are backed by dependence relations that relate events, others (e.g. explanations of the higher-level properties of physical systems in terms of the lower-level
properties of those systems) by dependence relations that relate properties.
What unifies the members of the family? Here I am inclined to say that all members are dependence relations holding among constituents of the physical world
and leave it at that. But more can be said. All members share the same formal
structure—all are irreflexive, asymmetric, and non-monotonic. All members hold
objectively. And all members provide grounds for increasing our understanding of
the natural world. These are, of course, just the properties that make the members
of D relevant to explanation.
Other questions we need not answer. Are these dependence relations internal
relations or external relations, or perhaps even a mixed bag with some internal
and some external?13 We needn’t say. Compare how things stand with the causal
theory of explanation. There is no need for an advocate of the causal theory to take
a stand on the question whether causal relations are internal (so says the causal
essentialist) or external (so says the Humean). Internalists and externalists alike
can get behind the claim that causation is relevant to explanation. Likewise, we
should be free to investigate the relation between explanation and dependence
without having to take a stand on the question whether dependence relations are
internal or external.

5.6.3

Evidence

We can strengthen the case for the dependence model by comparing it against
some other popular theories of explanation. In this section I make some quick com13

Following (Lewis [1986], 62-3), an internal relation is one that supervenes on the intrinsic properties of the relata: duplicate the relata and you duplicate the relation. An external relation is a
relation that is not an internal relation.
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parisons with two other models, Phillip Kitcher’s unificationist model and James
Woodward’s manipulationist model.
Those who, in their thinking about explanation, tend to focus on explanation
types 1–3 typically favor something like Phillip Kitcher’s unificationist account of
explanation. According to the unificationist account, to explain some Y is to derive Y using an argument pattern belonging to the set E(K) of argument patterns
that best systematizes the total set K of scientifically accepted sentences (Kitcher
[1981]). The game, then, is to figure out how the unificationist model and causal
model are supposed to fit together (e.g. Strevens [2004]). And here I see a point in
favor of the dependence model. The causal and unificationist models differ over
fundamental points, so that a unification, if not impossible, will at least require serious adjustments. It is a point in favor of the dependence model that it avoids this
whole affair, fitting a broad range of paradigmatic scientific explanations under a
single theory.
As further evidence that we are on the right track, it is worth noting that those
causal theories of explanation that do best are precisely those that employ a broad
notion of causation. Why is this? Because theories that employ a broad notion of
causation end up approaching the dependence model.
For example, consider Woodward’s manipulationist theory of causal explanation (Woodward [2003]). According to Woodward, “any explanation that proceeds
by showing how an outcome depends (where the dependence in question is not
logical or conceptual) on other variables or factors counts as causal.” ([2003], 6)
This is pretty broad notion of causal explanation. For example, it allows Woodward to count as causal an explanation of the higher-level properties of a physical
system in terms of the lower-level properties of that system. The notion of causation with which Woodward is working is a notion according to which causation is a
matter of counterfactual dependence, though counterfactual dependence of a spe-
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cial sort. As Woodward explains, explanations in science “provide understanding
by exhibiting a pattern of counterfactual dependence between explanans and explanandum—a pattern of counterfactual dependence of the special sort associated
with relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation
and control” ([2003], 13).
Theories of causation that link causation with counterfactual dependence are
theories that understand causation in a broad sense—much broader than, for example, the process theories of (Salmon [1984]) and (Dowe [1995]). But we should
be cautious of any theory that leans so heavily on counterfactual dependencies,
for counterfactual dependencies are fragile. The story is familiar: Billy throws a
rock and thereby causes the window to break. We would like to say that the window’s breaking depends counterfactually on Billy’s throw. But it doesn’t, for Mary
was nearby, rock in hand, ready to throw had Billy missed. Thus, the counterfactual ‘Had Billy not thrown, the window would have remained intact’ is false; as a
back-up preemptor, Mary spoils the counterfactual dependence.
But Mary does not spoil the fact that the breaking depends on Billy’s throwing. Dependence relations are more robust than relations of counterfactual dependence, and this is one reason why they are good backing relations. Learning that
Y depends counterfactually on X may lead us to conclude that Y depends on X,
but we should be clear that it is the dependence relation that we are interested in
and not the relation of counterfactual dependence.
One final piece of evidence in favor of the dependence model. A standard complaint against the regularity account of natural laws is that it renders laws explanatorily bankrupt (e.g. Van Fraassen [1989], 48-51). The complaint arises as follows.
According to Lewis, the laws at a world are determined by the spatiotemporal
distribution of perfectly natural properties at that world. But if the laws are so
determined, then they cannot explain why the world is the way that it is. Instead,
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the explanatory arrow runs the other way: it is the world being the way that it is
that explains why the laws are as they are.
The dependence model of explanation puts this complaint on firm ground. The
dependence model implies that the explanatory arrow is fixed by the arrow of
dependence. In the case of the regularity account of laws, the arrow of dependence runs from the distribution of perfectly natural properties to the laws. Consequently, so runs the explanatory arrow. It then follows that MRL laws are explanatorily bankrupt (at least with respect to the distribution of perfectly natural
properties).
Finally, to close things out, let’s consider two quick objections to the dependence model, each of which can be just as quickly disarmed. First, one may object:
dependence is mysterious. To this I respond: no more so than causation. In both
cases we lack an adequate analysis. But, in both cases, we seem to know how to
apply the concept. In both cases, we have an intuitive grasp of the concept as well
as paradigmatic cases to point to. Finally, in both cases, the concept is serviceable. I
conclude that, to whatever extent one is comfortable with causal theories of explanation, one ought to be comfortable with the dependence theory of explanation.
Second, one may object: dependence is uninformative. More exactly, the worry
is that dependence names such a large family of relations that the resulting thesis is no longer an interesting one. I am sensitive to the worry, though I do not
think that the theory has not strayed so far as to say something uninformative.
We have identified a family of relations with the right properties, both formal and
informal. Moreover, the results are intuitively attractive and make good sense of
paradigmatic cases of scientific explanation. Far from being uninformative, all this
suggests that we are moving in the right direction.
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CHAPTER 6
FIELDS

6.1

Introduction

One important task for the philosophy of physics is the interpretation of physical theories. The task arises insofar as physical theories deal simultaneously in two
different domains. On the one hand, physical theories are written in the language
of mathematics; on the other hand, they aim to talk about the physical world. In
order to link the two—that is, in order to link the equations and abstract mathematical structures which constitute the immediate content of a physical theory
with the concrete, physical world which is the ultimate target of inquiry—one requires an interpretation.
What is it to provide an interpretation of a physical theory? Roughly, it is to
provide an account of what the world is like according to that theory. First and
foremost, this will involve spelling out an ontology for the theory, an account of
what exists according to the theory. Absent an ontology, little can be said about
the physical implications of the theory in general, and little can be said in particular about which parts of the math have representational content and which parts
ought to count as “mere gauge.”
This paper concerns the proper interpretation of the general theory of relativity. In particular, it deals with how to understand a formal property of that theory,
namely the invariance of its models under the group of diffeomorphisms. The issue is whether general relativistic models related by a diffeomorphism represent
the same physical possibility or not. The standard assumption is that different
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spacetime ontologies get to say different things; that (1) those subscribing to a
substantival theory of spacetime must say that diffeomorphic models represent
distinct physical possibilities while (2) those subscribing to a relational theory of
spacetime get to say that diffeomorphic models represent the same physical possibility.
For the most part, discussion of the issue has focused on (1). In contrast, my focus will be with (2). My claim is that (2) is false; that once the relationalist moves to
include fields as part of his ontology, he is thereby committed (to whatever degree
the substantivalist is committed) to denying that diffeomorphic models represent
the same physical possibility.

6.2

Field Theories

Let’s start with the question: what is a classical field? Given what was said
above concerning the ‘two domains’ of a physical theory, the question can be understood as either a request for a mathematical description or as a request for a
physical description. Since there is no dispute over the math, we’ll start there.
The kinds of theories that I want to focus on are spacetime theories. These are
theories whose models are tuples of the form (M, O1 , . . . , On ), where M is a differentiable manifold and the Oi are classical fields. The special and general theories of
relativity are spacetime theories in this sense. But so are four-dimensional versions
of Newtonian mechanics and Newtonian gravity. Mathematically, the fields in a
spacetime theory are functions on M ; in the most familiar kinds of cases, they are
assignments of scalars, vectors, or higher-rank tensors. For example, if the model
is one that includes classical Newtonian gravity, then among the fields will be a
function φ that assigns to each point p of M a scalar representing the strength of
the gravitational potential field at that point. If the model is one that includes electromagnetism, then among the fields will be a function Fab that assigns to each
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point p of M a two-index tensor representing the character of the electromagnetic
field at that point.
Now be a realist about fields. That is to say, suppose that fields exist, that they
are part of the furniture of the physical universe. Then having a mathematical
answer to the question ‘What is a classical field’ won’t be enough. You’ll also want
a physical answer. In other words, what you’ll want is a physical interpretation of
the math.
According to one interpretation, a field is an assignment of field-strength properties to points of spacetime. Call this the property distribution interpretation. The
property distribution interpretation adheres pretty closely to the math. The thought
is that if an electromagnetic field (for example) is the kind of thing best represented
mathematically as a functional assignment of tensors to points of M , and if the purpose of an assigned tensor is to represent the character of the field at the assigned
point, then the most natural interpretation is one according to which electromagnetic fields are distributions of properties over points of spacetime. The resulting
picture is one according to which a field is a condition or state of the spacetime
manifold. In this respect, the property distribution interpretation seems to represent a modernization of the classical, nineteenth century picture of a field:
When relativity theory banished the ether, the space-time manifold
M began to function as a kind of dematerialized ether needed to support the fields. In the nineteenth century the electromagnetic field was
construed as the state of a material medium, the luminiferous ether; in
postrelativity theory it seems that the electromagnetic field, and indeed
all physical fields, must be construed as states of M . In a modern, pure
field-theoretic physics, M functions as the basic substance, that is, the
basic object of predication (Earman [1989], 155).
Of course, not everyone can subscribe to the property interpretation. In particular, the property interpretation is the starting point for a quick argument against
a relational theory of spacetime. A relational theory of spacetime is one according
to which spacetime is an emergent object, an object whose existence is grounded in
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facts about how material objects are spatiotemporally related to one another. Part
and parcel of such a view is a denial of the claim that there exist spacetime points.
But then it is impossible to see how a relational theory of spacetime can accomodate an ontology of fields, for if a field is an assignment of properties to points,
then there must be points. Call this the argument from fields. The chief advocate
of the argument from fields has been Hartry Field, who has used it to argue that
relationalists must thereby commit to a program of replacing field theories with
action-at-a-distance theories (Field [1980], [1985]). Of course, if this is right, then
to whatever degree we suspect that field theories are the way to go, we have equal
reason to reject a relational theory of spacetime.
As far as I know, no relationalist has embraced Field’s conclusion. Instead,
the standard response to the argument from fields has been to reject the property
distribution interpretation. In its place, it has been argued that we ought to adopt
the view that a field is something more like an extended material object. Thus,
Gordon Belot tells us that,
. . . relationalists—and others—can treat fields as they would, say,
rigid bodies—as extended objects whose parts stand in determinate
spatial relations to one another, and to which differing properties can
be attributed ([2000], 224).
Oliver Pooley says much the same:
According to the relationist, φ does not represent an assignment of
properties to space; it is an extended, material thing ([2001], 4).
Call this the material object interpretation. In addition to offering the relationalist a
response to the argument from fields, the material object interpretation is independently plausible. Electromagnetic fields, for example, carry mass and energy, have
momentum, and exert pressure; all signs, one can argue, of a material object.
I won’t try to say which of these two interpretations is the right interpretation.
Instead, my plan is to grant the relationalist the material object interpretation of a
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field. The main goal of the paper is just to clarify the consequences of this. The
chief consequence, I will argue, is that it commits the relationalist to a denial of
what Earman and Norton ([1987]) have called ‘Leibniz equivalence’. In the next
section, I will explain what Leibniz equivalence is and why rejecting it is supposed
to be worrisome. For now, I’ll simply note that the overall structure of the paper
can be thought of as posing a dilemma for the relationalist: reject the material
object interpretation and suffer the argument from fields; accept the material object
interpretation and suffer a denial of Leibniz equivalence.

6.3

Interpreting GR

Instead of working with the class of spacetime theories in general, from here
on my focus will be with the general theory of relativity (GR). General relativistic
models are models of the form (M, gab , Tab ), where M is a differentiable manifold,
gab is a pseudo-Riemannian metric tensor field of Lorentz signature, and Tab is the
stress-energy tensor field. The stress-energy tensor field admits of a straightforward physical interpretation: since it plays the same role in GR as the mass density field in Newtonian gravity, one can think of it as encoding the distribution of
mass-energy in spacetime—in other words, all of the stuff capable of sourcing a
gravitational field.
Interpretation of the metric tensor field is a more contentious affair. On the standard interpretation, gab represents the geometry of spacetime, encoding, in particular, information about the curvature of spacetime. But since in GR spacetime
curvature functions as a replacement for the gravitational field, the door is open to
an interpretation of gab along the lines suggested by (Brown [2005]) as ‘just another
physical field.’ Since the ‘just another physical field’ interpretation squares most
easily with the idea that fields are like extended material objects, that is how I plan
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on thinking about the metric tensor field in this paper. We’ll return to the issue in
the next section.
Both sides of the spacetime ontology debate, relationalists as well as substantivalists, agree over the mathematics of GR. Neither, I will assume, demands a
revision in the formal structure of the theory. Where they disagree is simply over
how to interpret the math. The project, then, is to propose an ontology and to explain how the mathematics of GR and the structures represented by the elements
of the theory’s models are instantiated in the physical world.
What are these two ontologies? To a first approximation, substantivalists construe spacetime as a fundamental “beable.” They claim that spacetime exists and
that its existence is fundamental, being independent of all other facts, including
facts about material objects. With respect to the model (M, gab , Tab ), the standard
assumption is that physical spacetime is represented by the mathematical object
M and that gab and Tab represent distributions of properties over spacetime. Relationalists, on the other hand, deny that spacetime is a fundamental “beable.”
They claim that what exists, fundamentally, is just matter; spacetime, to whatever extent it does exist, is an emergent object, being grounded in spatiotemporal
relations among material objects. Since relationalists deny the fundamental existence of spacetime, the standard assumption is that they deny the existence of an
object in the world corresponding to the M in the model (M, gab , Tab ). What exists fundamentally, according to this understanding of things, are just the metric
and stress-energy tensor fields, each understood to be an extended material object.
Facts about the geometry of spacetime, then, are taken to be grounded in the pattern of instantiation of fundamental spatiotemporal relations among parts of these
fields.
There is a worry that once we shift from particle theories to field theories the
debate between substantivalists and relationalists is either ill-posed or is otherwise
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without substance. The worry is this. If fields are material objects, then spacetime
is filled with a plenum of materialized field-parts, and whatever work we require
of the substantivalist’s manifold can just as well be assigned to this plenum of
parts. In particular, geometric structures, which the substantivalist sees as inhereing in the spacetime manifold, can just as well inhere in the relationalist’s plenum
of parts. But then one has the impression that the debate has collapsed. Where the
substantivalist sees a manifold of spacetime points instantiating geometric structure and supporting fields, the relationalist sees a plenum of field parts doing the
same. But now the debate has devolved into a debate over whether to call the
members of the base set ‘points’ or ‘parts’. And that’s not a very interesting debate.
However, there is a somewhat standard story about how even in the context
of fields, there may yet be a non-trivial difference between these two positions
(e.g. Belot [2000], section 5.4). The difference will be a modal difference. For if
spacetime is substantival, then there will be many different ways to position a field
in spacetime. Choose a placement at random—if spacetime is substantival, then it
will be possible to smoothly reposition the field with respect to the underlying
spacetime manifold. The original and repositioned fields will represent distinct
possibilities for the substantivalist, differing over where things are located. Relationalists, on the other hand, will identify such repositioned possibilities, so that
where the substantivalist sees many possibilities, the relationalist sees just one.
There is a way to make this rigorous. It is formal property of the general theory
of relativity that its models are invariant under the group of diffeomorphisms, a
diffeomorphism being a smooth map φ : M → M with smooth inverse. Thus, we
have the following theorem.
Theorem. Let (M, gab , Tab ) be a model of GR. Let φ : M → M be a
diffeomorphism. Then (M, φ∗ gab , φ∗ Tab ) is also a model of GR, where φ∗
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is a function on the fields (a ‘push forward’) induced by the point map
φ.
Our theorem is a model closure theorem in that it entails that the class of spacetime models of GR is closed under the operation of a diffeomorphism. But there is
more. It is a formal property of the induced function φ∗ that (φ∗ gab )|φ(p) (η a ξ b )|φ(p) =
(gab )|p (φ∗ η a φ∗ ξ b )|p and likewise for Tab , so that for any pair of models related by a
diffeomorphism, those models will differ only over how the fields are positioned
with respect to the manifold M .1 To connect back up to what we said in the previous paragraph concerning repositioned fields: if substantivalists are committed
to counting repositioned field placements as ontologically distinct ways for the
world to be, and if we wanted to represent one of these pairs of repositioned possibilities with a pair of spacetime models, then these would be models (M, gab , Tab )
and (M, φ∗ gab , φ∗ Tab ) for some appropriately chosen φ. Relationalists, on the other
hand, will want to count these two mathematical models as equivalent representations of the same physically possible state of affairs. And more generally, they
will want to interpret the above theorem as capturing a kind of ‘descriptive freedom’ in the theory analogous to the freedom that accompanies the choice of where
to center a coordinate system. A fancier way to say it is to say that the relationalist will regard the freedom represented by the invariance of the theory under a
diffeomorphism as ‘mere gauge’.
So the more rigorous way of capturing the difference between our two ontologies is to say that they disagree over how to understand a formal property of the
general theory of relativity, namely the invariance of its models under the group
1

This says that the pushed-forward metric φ∗ gab at the image point φ(p) acts on vectors η a and
ξ at φ(p) in the same way that the original metric gab at the point p acts on vectors φ∗ η a and φ∗ ξ b ,
which are η a and ξ b pulled back from φ(p) to p. In the restricted case where φ is a smooth map from
M to M but not a diffeomorphism, the pull-back map φ∗ acts on co-vectors, not vectors. But in the
special case where φ is a diffeomorphism (as we have here), we can take φ∗ = (φ−1 )∗ . The map
(φ−1 )∗ is well-defined on vectors. For discussion, see either (Wald [1984], 437-439) or (Malament
[2012], 35-42).
b
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of diffeomorphisms. Following Earman and Norton, we have the following interpretive principle:
Leibniz Equivalence. Diffeomorphic models represent the same
physical possibility.
Then our two ontologies differ with respect to Leibniz equivalence. Substantivalists reject it; relationalists accept it.
This difference in attitude concerning diffeomorphic models is supposed to be
of some physical significance. First, it has been argued that one’s attitude concerning diffeomorphic models will line one up more or less naturally with different
programs in canonical quantum gravity (Earman & Belot [2001]). Since substantivalists and relationalists are supposed to disagree over how to count possibilities,
they are supposed to disagree in their choice of phase space, phase space being
a theory’s space of dynamically possible states. These differences in phase space,
it’s then observed, suggest different programs in quantum gravity. There is some
hope that this will open up a new chapter in the spacetime ontology debate. For
what we have here is the possibility of a new argument for either a substantival or
relational ontology, the success of some approach in quantum gravity providing
us with an indirect reason for preferring one ontology over the other.
Second, it has been argued that denial of Leibniz equivalence has consequences
for determinism. This is the famous hole argument. The problem arises as follows.
Start with a model (M, gab , Tab ). Act on the model with a diffeomorphism (call it a
‘hole diffeomorphism’) that is identity everywhere except for some small region h.
By our theorem, both the original model and the transformed model are models of
the theory—each represents a physical possibility. Moreover, by denial of Leibniz
equivalence, the substantivalist is committed to saying that the original and transformed models represent distinct physical possibilities. But by construction, these
will be physical possibilities which are identical outside of h but that differ inside
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of h. And now the substantivalist is in trouble: he is committed to saying that the
physical state of the world outside of h fails to determine the state of the world
inside of h. Hence, a failure of determinism.
Relationalists, on the other hand, are assumed to avoid the hole argument precisely because they are in a position to accept Leibniz equivalence. They block the
argument at the second step; they say that models related by a hole diffeomorphism represent the same physical possibility. Here is Earman and Belot:
Thus in order to avoid the indeterminism of the hole argument, we
have to accept that diffeomorphic models always represent the same
physically possible situation (this proposition is known as Leibniz equivalence in the literature on the hole argument). And this, of course, is just
to deny that there could be two possible worlds with the same geometry which differ only in virtue of the way that this geometry is shared
out over existent spacetime points. Thus, modulo the existence of an
attractive form of sophisticated substantivalism, one must be a relationalist in order to give a deterministic interpretation of general relativity
(Earman & Belot [2001], 17-18).
In addition to being a relationalist, Earman and Norton mention ‘sophisticated
substantivalism’ as a possible response to the hole argument. Sophisticated substantivalists block the argument in the same way relationalists do, by endorsing
Leibniz equivalence. The idea is that substantivalism is a thesis about what exists; it is the thesis that spacetime is fundamental, existing over and above the
material content of the world. Leibniz equivalence, on the other hand, makes
a claim about the physical possibilities represented by some set of mathematical
models. Moreover, what Leibniz equivalence has to say about the physical possibilities represented by these models rests upon certain assumptions concerning
modality and trans-world identity. Sophisticated substantivalists make the point
that these two can come apart; that you can endorse the ontological thesis that
spacetime is something that exists over and above the material content of a world
without also endorsing what amount to contentious modal-metaphysical theses
about trans-world identity.
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While sophisticated substantivalists have contested the claim that substantivalism entails a denial of Leibniz equivalence, to my knowledge, there has been no
serious examination of the claim that relationalists are in a good position to accept
Leibniz equivalence. The remainder of the paper aims to show that they are not.
How should such an argument go? Well, consider the argument for the claim
that substantivalists are committed to rejecting Leibniz equivalence. That argument has two main steps. First, it is argued that there exists some object in the
world which is represented by the M in the model (M, gab , Tab ). Second, it is argued that smooth transformations with respect to this object represent physically
distinct ways for the world to be. Both steps are stressed, for example, in (Earman & Norton [1987]), the classic paper on the hole argument. With respect to
the first step, they devote a whole subsection to arguing that M represents substantival spacetime; with respect to the second step, they refer to this as an ‘acid
test’ for substantivalism. Having argued for both steps, it remains only to point
out that diffeomorphisms are the right mathematical functions for representing
smooth transformations.
My aim, then, will be to mimic the argument for the claim that substantivalists are committed to rejecting Leibniz equivalence. In the next section, I argue
that relationalists are committed to the existence of some object in the world corresponding to the differentiable manifold M in the model (M, gab , Tab ). In the section
after, I argue that relationalists are committed to viewing smooth transformations
with respect to this object as representing physically distinct possibilities.

6.4

Physical Geometry

The material object interpretation of a field offers the relationalist a response to
the argument from fields. But it also offers a response to a second argument. This is
the argument from physical geometry. The argument from physical geometry is a plea
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for ontological foundations. It begins with the assumption that physical spacetime
is a geometrically structured object. Taking our cues from GR, the assumption
would be that physical spacetime is structured in roughly the same sort of way as
the mathematical object (M, gab ), that the latter constitutes a faithful representation
of the geometric structure of the former. More precisely, the assumption would be
that physical spacetime has the structure of a connected, boundaryless, paracompact, Hausdorf, differentiable manifold. Additionally, we ought to assume that
physical spacetime has some kind of metric structure and that that metric structure is faithfully represented mathematically by a variable, pseudo-Riemannian
metric tensor field of Lorentz signature. The argument then goes on to demand
that one provide an account of how such structure is instantiated in the physical
world; in other words, that one provide ontological foundations for the kinds of
geometric structures that we take to be physically real.
Substantivalists are in the position of being able to offer a straightforward account of the geometry of physical spacetime. Since for them spacetime is a fundamental beable, they have access in their ontology to an object which is capable of
straightforwardly instantiating the kinds of structures represented by the model
(M, gab ). Relationalists, on the other hand, are typically faulted for endorsing an
ontology that is “too thin” to support such structures. Specific versions of this
more general problem are well-known. Thus, relationalists are often faulted for
failing to endorse, in the context of point-particle theory, an ontology capable of
supporting the inertial structure needed in order that absolute quantities of motion are well-defined. In this case, the emphasis is on inertial structure. But other
kinds of structure are both equally important and equally problematic. In particular, it is especially difficult to see how the relationalist can account for the topological and differential structure represented by the manifold M . Earman makes the
point in his ([1989]). After reviewing Hartry Field’s argument from fields, which
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emphasizes the need for subjects of predication, Earman goes on to offer his own
argument from fields, which emphasizes the need for the structure housed in the
manifold. Earman’s idea is that the manifold houses structure which is necessary in order that the kinds of properties that we require for the laws—properties
which mathematically have the character of tensors—are well-defined. Thus, after
surveying the standard recipe for how to build a spacetime by putting down layers
of structure on top of a point set, Earman concludes:
It is clear that the standard characterization of fields uses the full
manifold structure: the points, the topology, and the differential structure (Earman [1989], 159).
I read this as an argument from physical geometry. The idea is that, yes, a substantival manifold of spacetime points is needed in order that we have subjects
of predication for field-strength properties, but more importantly it is needed in
order to support the submetric structure that is required in order that fields are
well-defined objects in the first place.
But relationalists who adopt the material object interpretation of a field have
a straightforward response to the argument from physical geometry. For if fields
are material objects, then relationalists have access in their ontology to a plenum
of materialized field parts, and a plenum of field parts can instantiate a geometry
in precisely the same way that a manifold of substantival points can. As far as the
mathematics is concerned, no restrictions are put on nature of the objects belonging
to the underlying base set. The standard assumption is that the elements of the
base set are points. But materialized field parts will do just as well.
The idea that fields can be used to support, or instantiate, spacetime structure
can be found in different places throughout the literature. Paul Teller expresses
some support for the idea when he observes that fields qua extended material objects can be used to support the inertial structure of spacetime.
In such a circumstance, and interpreting fields substantivally, we
would have a plenum which could do the work of supporting the iner154

tial structure without our needing to appeal either to space-time points
or to merely possible relative locations (Teller [1991], 382).
This also seems to be the most straightforward way of understanding Einstein’s
remark that “Space-time does not claim existence on its own, but only as a structural quality of the field” (Einstein [1961], 155-6). And Carlo Rovelli seems to have
the same idea in mind when he remarks that “spacetime geometry is nothing but
the manifestation of the gravitational field” (Rovelli [1997], 183-4). I read these
remarks as endorsing a view according to which (1) what exists, fundamentally,
are just fields, and (2) spacetime structure, rather than inhering in something that
exists over and above these fields, is something inhering in the fields themselves.
I am ready now to make my argument. My chief claim in this section is that a
relationalist adopting this view is thereby committed to being a realist about the M
in (M, gab , Tab ). More precisely: anyone claiming that fields are extended material
objects whose parts are spatiotemporally related, and whose parts thereby instantiate the geometry of spacetime, ought to think that the M in the model (M, gab , Tab )
has representational content. That is to say, they ought to think that there exists
some object in the world which is properly construed as the object represented by
the M in the model (M, gab , Tab ).
Here is the argument for the claim. Start with the model (M, gab , Tab ) and construe gab and Tab each as representing something in the concrete, physical world,
namely fields construed as extended material objects. Suppose now that fields
are what instantiate the geometry of spacetime; to borrow Einstein’s phrase, that
“spacetime is a structural property of the field.” Now ask: which field instantiates
the geometry? There are three possible answers. Either (A) each field separately
instantiates a geometry, (B) both fields together instantiate a geometry, or (C) one
field but not the other instantiates a geometry. We’ll look at each in turn.
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Start with (A), the hypothesis that each field separately instantiates a geometry.
More precisely, let X denote the set of atomic, point-sized parts of the metric field
and let Y denote the set of atomic, point-sized parts of the stress-energy tensor
field, each of which is by hypothesis is an extended material object. The idea is
that the elements of X are spatiotemporally related to one another in such a way
that X instantiates a spacetime geometry and that, separately, the elements of Y
are spatiotemporally related to one another in such a way that Y instantiates a
spacetime geometry. But now we run into the following problem. Since physical
spacetime has a single geometry, we expect that the geometries defined over our
fields will be coordinated. Thus, if some subset of elements of X instantiate some
set of relations, then we expect that the corresponding subset of elements of Y will
instantiate the same relations. But now one wants to know: what explains the
coordination? Usually, when two systems are coordinated like this we expect to
find some third factor, a common cause, that will explain the coordination. But in
this case, there is no third factor—by hypothesis, all that exists are our two fields.
Call this the problem of geometric coordination.
If spacetime is substantival, then there is no problem of coordination. If substantivalism is true, then the geometry of spacetime is instantiated by a manifold
of substantival spacetime points and the spatiotemporal relations holding among
some n-tuple of events are determined by the spatiotemporal relations holding
among the regions of spacetime those events occupy. It follows that if two n-tuples
occupy the same regions of spacetime, then they will instantiate the same set of
spatiotemporal relations. Relationalists who go for (A) have no access to such an
explanation.
One response to the problem would be to give up the assumption that spacetime has a single geometry and simply let each field instantiate its own geometry.
But if what we are looking for is an interpretation of GR then this won’t work.
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General relativistic models suggest a physical world with a single geometry. We
need a response that will preserve this feature of the theory.
So give up (A): it founders on the problem of geometric coordination. Next, try
(B), the hypothesis that both fields together instantiate the geometry of spacetime.
The idea here would be to take as your base set the union X ∪ Y and then put a
single structure on the union. But again we run into problems. Since our two fields
occupy the same spacetime, they overlap one another: for every p ∈ X there exists
a q ∈ Y such that p and q are coincident, and vice versa. Because of this, X ∪ Y
cannot instantiate many of the standard structures of GR. For example, physical
spacetime cannot be Hausdorff. A space is Hausdorff if for all p and q in the base
set, there exist open sets U and V such that p ∈ U , q ∈ V , and U ∩ V is empty. It’s
easy to see that no open set structure on the base set X∪Y can satisfy this condition.
But to surrender the Hausdorff condition is to surrender a great deal. As Earman
points out in a different context, the Hausdorff condition ‘is implicitly assumed in
so many standard results in GTR that dropping it would require a major rewriting
of textbooks’ (Earman [2008], 199).
Nor can physical space have the structure of a metric space. Consider a model
of GR admitting a global time function so that it makes sense to talk about space at
a time. The spacetime metric field of such a model will induce a metric structure
on space. But if the structure of physical spacetime is instantiated by X ∪Y then no
such structure is possible. Metric spaces are such that for all p and q in the space,
dist(p, q) = 0 iff p = q. Again, it is easy to see that the base set X ∪Y will violate this
condition. But as with the Hausdorff condition, one should be loathe to surrender
the metric structure of space. Indeed, Belot ([2011]) goes so far as to assume (at
least as a working hypothesis) that all metaphysically possible spaces are metric.
Now, there is an obvious and natural solution to these problems. The solution
is to form equivalence classes of coincident field parts, gather these into a set Z,
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and then let Z instantiate the geometry of physical spacetime. On this approach,
all spatiotemporal relations will be relations first and foremost among classes of
coincident field parts with the parts themselves entering into such relations in a
derivative way in virtue of membership in a class. However, this will violate a central tenet of relationalism, namely, the tenet that spatiotemporal relations among
material objects are direct. This is the proposition that Earman codifies as R2 in
(Earman [1989], 12). Consequently, any relationalist adopting this strategy will
have to give up R2. But if there is an ‘acid test’ for relationalism, then R2 has a
strong claim to being it.
So give up (B): it can’t support standard structures of GR. Finally, let’s try (C),
the hypothesis that one field and not the other instantiates the geometry of spacetime. Here, the obvious candidate is the gravitational field. Thus, in the quote
above Rovelli asserts that “spacetime geometry is nothing but the manifestation
of the gravitational field” (Rovelli [1997], 183-4). One worry about this option is
that parts of the stress-energy tensor field will enter into spatiotemporal relations
in a derivative way in virtue of their relations to parts of the gravitational field,
which are the primary subject of such relations. But put that problem to the side.
The more important point to be made is that this option commits one to realism
about the M in the model (M, gab , Tab ). The picture, I take it, is this. Assuming
the material object interpretation of a field, there exists in the concrete, physical
world an extended material object—the gravitational field—whose parts instantiate various different geometric relations. In virtue of those parts instantiating the
relations they do, physical spacetime has the structure it has. In particular, such
a relationalist is able to make sense of claims concerning the submetric structure
of spacetime—claims such as that physical spacetime has the structure of a connected, boundaryless, paracompact, Hausdorf, differentiable manifold. It’s just
that these claims will be understood in terms of how the parts of the gravitational
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field are related to one another instead of in terms of how substantival spacetime
points are related to one another. But then the relationalist ought to think that
there exists some object in the world—the gravitational field—whose structure is
represented, at least in part, by the M in the mathematical model (M, gab , Tab ). On
this approach, M represents the topological and differential structure of the gravitational field while gab represents its metric structure. But this is just to say that our
relationalist, no less than a substantivalist, is properly speaking a realist about M .
There are some other moves that one can make, but none which avoid the basic
conclusion. For example, one can say, instead, that what exists is just the stressenergy tensor field. Then the mathematical object Tab represents the character of its
different parts while gab represents the spatiotemporal relations among its parts.2
But if this is the ontology, then (once again) the relationalist ought to be a realist
about the M in the model (M, g, T ). In this case, M represents the topological
and differential structure of the stress-energy tensor field—again, construed as an
extended material object.

6.5

The Modified Shift Argument

So far, I have argued that the relationalist who countenances fields ought to be
a realist about the M in the model (M, gab , Tab ); more precisely, that he ought to say
that there exists an object in the world which is faithfully represented by the M in
the model (M, gab , Tab ). Depending on the details of the view, the most likely object
is probably the gravitational field, here construed as an extended material object.
One thing that is nice about this is that it gives the relationalist a response to the
argument from physical geometry insofar as it gives him access to a straightfor2

If this is the ontology, then equations like the Einstein Field Equations will have to be interpreted accordingly. Instead of seeing the equation a mutually constraining relationship between
two fields, we’ll have to see the stress-energy properties of the one field constraining the spatiotemporal relations among its parts.
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ward account of the instantiation of standard geometric structures in the physical
world.
But this comes at a price. The price is that relationalists must reject Leibniz
equivalence. Or more precisely: the price is that to whatever degree the substantivalist is committed to rejecting Leibniz equivalence, so is the relationalist. The
upshot is that to whatever degree the substantivalist is committed to counting diffeomorphic spacetime models as representing distinct physical possibilities, so is
the relationalist.
To make the argument, forget about diffeomorphisms for a minute and consider a simpler operation: a spatial shift one foot to the right. I noted above that
substantivalists are committed to counting smoothly repositioned placements—including
shifts one foot to the right—as ontologically distinct ways for the world to be. Traditionally, relationalists have regarded this as a problem. For the result of such
a shift will be an ontologically distinct though qualitatively indiscernible state of
affairs—a state of affairs differing only in some non-qualitative respect. But, it is
assumed, it is impossible for things to differ in some merely non-qualitative respect. So, relationalists argue, spacetime cannot be substantival.
The standard assumption is that relationalists, including those who include
fields in their ontology, avoid the shift argument because they refuse to reify spatiotemporal locations. But relationalists who countenance fields construed as extended material objects are subject to a very similar argument. Here it is. Suppose
that fields are extended material objects, each part of which instantiates some set
of qualitative properties. Then it is possible to shift each collection of properties
one foot to the right, so that that set of properties comes to be instantiated by some
other part of the field. But then things would be just as they are, qualitatively, differing only in some non-qualitative respect. Since this is not possible, fields cannot
be material objects.
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In the original shift argument, shifting results in a systematic reconfiguring of
location relations. In the original spacetime, material object x is located at spacetime point p, while in the shifted copy x is located at p0 , where p0 is one foot to the
right of p. In our modification of the standard argument, shifting results in a systematic reconfiguring of instantiation relations. In the original spacetime, property
F is instantiated by field part a, while in the shifted copy F is instantiated by a0 ,
where a0 is one foot to the right of a.
Taken at face value, our modified shift argument purports to show that a field
cannot be an extended material object. A quick survey of possible responses will
make the point that the modified shift argument is just as troublesome for the relationalist as the original shift argument is for the substantivalist.

First response: reject anti-haecceitism. A key premise in modified shift argument is
the claim that it is impossible for things to differ in some merely non-qualitative
respect. To accept the premise is to endorse anti-haecceitism. So, one can disarm
the revised shift argument by rejecting anti-haecceitism. The problem, of course, is
that any relationalist availing himself of this option will similarly disarm the original shift argument.

Second response: reject the possibility of a shift. Another premise in the argument is
the claim that if fields were extended material objects, then it would be possible
to shift properties one foot to the right. So, one can respond to the argument by
rejecting the possibility of a shift. Here, two options come to mind. The first is
to invoke an essentialist thesis: relationalists can reject the possibility of a shift by
maintaining that field parts have their field-strength values essentially.3 The prob3

Compare (Maudlin ]1988], [1990]) in response to the hole argument.
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lem is that this thesis is straightforwardly false. Consider an electric field sourced
by some charged body Q. Consider some part a of the electric field. Suppose that a
measures some number of dynes/esu. Suppose now that we double the charge on
Q. It then follows, by Coulomb’s law, that a will come to measure twice as many
dynes/esu. So it cannot be the case that a has it field-strength values essentially.
The second option is to invoke counterpart theory in the sense of (Lewis [1986]).
The revised shift argument requires, for each part a of our field, that we be able to
identify a in some counterfactual situation—in some other possible world. But, one
can argue, these kind of cross-world comparisons are best done via a qualitative
counterpart relation. So suppose it’s the case that the right counterpart relation
is one that relates field parts according to their field-strength values and consider
now worlds w1 and w2 differing only by a shift. Then for any part a in w1 with
field-strength value F , a’s counterpart will be whatever part a0 in w2 has F . But
then the proposition ‘possibly, each property is shifted one foot to the right’ is false.
There are two worries about this option. First, counterpart relations are heavily
context dependent (e.g. Lewis [1986], 252). Consequently, it is not enough to simply
invoke counterpart theory. One must also make an argument to the effect that, in
the context of evaluating a shift counterfactual, the proper counterpart relation is
one that rules out the possibility of a shift.4 Second, and more to the point, if an appeal to counterpart theory will work for the relationalist, then it will work equally
well for the substantivalist. Sophisticated substantivalists have responded to the
standard shift argument in precisely this way, pointing out that the right coun4
I have serious worries that this can be done. Counterpart theory is sometimes wielded as if it
were a tool for figuring out which modal claims are true and which are false. But this is a misleading
way to think of the theory. Counterpart theory provides a semantics for modal discourse. Such
discourse is extremely context dependent. And so, fittingly, counterpart relations are extremely
context dependent. Get your partner in the right frame of mind and you can get just about any
counterfactual to come out true. But then counterpart theory doesn’t strike me as much of an aid
to those hoping to find firm ground on which to dismiss shift counterfactuals.
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terpart relation will lead us to conclude that shifted models represent the same
physically world (Butterfield [1989], Brighouse [1994], [1997]). So relationalists
who wish to invoke counterpart theory will have to explain why substantivalists
cannot do the same.

Third response: reject substance-property dualism. The first and second responses were
modeled off of substantivalist responses to the original shift argument. This third
response is modeled off of the relationalist response to the original shift argument.
With respect to the original shift argument, the troublemaker is region-object dualism. Relationalists avoid that argument because they deny that regions are ontologically autonomous things. Similarly, with respect to the modified shift argument, the troublemaker is substance-property dualism. A natural response then
would be to get rid of substances as ontologically autonomous things.
The usual way to do this is to adopt the bundle theory. According to the bundle
theory, objects are just bundles of properties. Contrast this with the more familiar substratum theory, according to which objects and properties are ontologically
distinct, objects being thin particulars which combine with properties to produce
states of affairs. The bundle theorist attempts to do without thin particulars, arguing that properties can directly combine, or bundle, with one another to produce
states of affairs. Let us use angled brackets to distinguish a mere list of properties F1 , F2 , . . . , Fn from a bundle of properties hF1 , F2 , . . . , Fn i. Then whereas on
a substance-property metaphysic the world is ultimately describeable in terms of
facts of the form F a and Rab, the bundle theorist says that the world is ultimately
describeable in terms of facts of the form h. . . , F, . . .i and R h. . . , F, . . .i h. . . , G, . . .i.
Suppose a bundle-theoretic account of objects. How is this supposed to help
the relationalist? The idea is this. If we drop the ontological distinction between
substance and property, then it will no longer be possible to shift field-strength

163

properties with respect to the field parts that instantiate those properties. Toward
this end, let us adopt the following description of a field. Let us say that each pointsized field part is a bundle of properties hF1 , F2 , . . . , Fn i. Among the Fi will be the
part’s field-strength property. But there will be other properties in the bundle as
well. For example, in the case of an electromagnetic field, there will be the property
‘having such and such a value of mass-energy’ and the property ‘exerting such and
such a pressure’. A field, then, will be a set or sum of point-sized field parts.
What are these bundled properties? Are they tropes or universals? We had
better say tropes. If they are universals, then any two field parts with all the same
properties are numerically identical. This just follows from the nature of universals, which are supposed to be wholly present wherever they are instantiated. But
this will create problems in the case of any field having certain nice symmetries.
For example, since electric fields are spherically symmetric, we would get that any
two parts some fixed distance d from Q are identical. Thus, instead of there being
an infinite number of field parts d units from Q, strictly speaking there would be
just one.5 But if the bundled properties are tropes, then the numerical distinctness
of each part is maintained, even if those parts happen to instantiate all of the same
properties.
Having gotten rid of substances as ontologically distinct from properties, have
we thereby made fields immune from our modified shift argument? The first thing
to notice is that our bundle theory, no less than a substantival theory of spacetime,
is committed to ontologically distinct though qualitatively indiscernibles states of
affairs. For simplicity, suppose that space is two-dimensional, and consider the
electric field of a point charge Q. Suppose that our charge and the parts of the
field that it sources are bundles of tropes. Consider two such parts a = h. . . F . . .i
5

See (Hawthorne [1995]) for a possible solution to this problem and (Binkoski [MS]) for a response to Hawthorne.
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and b = h. . . F 0 . . .i equidistant from Q. Given the spherical symmetry of the field,
the field-strength property F of a is the same as the field-strength property F 0 of
b. But given that properties are tropes, F and F 0 are ontologically distinct. Now
consider the operation that takes F out of its bundle and exchanges it with F 0 . The
result of such an operation is an ontologically distinct though qualitatively indiscernible state of affairs. So even fields construed bundle theoretically are subject
to a kind of shift, for there are continuous operations that exploit symmetries to
produce ontologically distinct though qualitatively indiscernible states of affairs.6
If relationalists are supposed to be committed to anti-haecceitism—and certainly
any relationalist who brandishes the shift argument is—then they cannot endorse
a trope-bundle theoretic conception of a field.

h. . . F . . .i

Q

h. . . F 0 . . .i

h. . . F 0 . . .i

Q

h. . . F . . .i

Another worry is that a trope-bundle theoretic formulation of the gravitational
field may not yield a relational ontology. In fact, this view has been defended by
(Parsons & McGriven [2001]) as providing the substantivalist with a response to the
hole argument. Here are two reasons to think that the view is more substantival
than relational. First, this is an ontology that has no trouble making sense of vacuum solutions of the Einstein Field Equations—that is, solutions in which Tab is everywhere zero. If you thought that it was a kind of litmus test of a relational theory
of spacetime that it deny that such models represent bona fide physical possibilities, then you might deny that the view presently under consideration constitutes
6

This is a case of ‘swapping,’ a well-known problem in the literature on tropes. See (Armstrong
[1989], 131-2).
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a relational theory of spacetime. Second, on the present view, parts of Tab enter into
spatiotemporal relations in only a derivative way. If you thought that it was a kind
of litmus test of a relational theory of spacetime that material objects are directly
spatiotemporally related to one another, then again you might again deny that this
is a relational theory of spacetime.
I will leave it to others to debate whether the view under consideration is relational or substantival (or neither or both). It is not a question that I find particularly interesting. Rather, the only point that I want to register here is that denial
of substance-property dualism does not offer a tidy response to the modified shift
argument. I will return to the issue in the next section.

Fourth response: stress the difference between instantiation and location. Perhaps there is
something about location relations such that shifting them (as in the original shift
argument) is problematic, whereas shifting instantiation relations (as in the modified shift argument) is not. Certainly, there are differences between instantiation
and location. In fact, many will deny, on pain of a regress, that the instantiation
relation is a relation at all (Lewis [1983], 353-354). But this fourth response won’t
get us very far. Substantivalists tend to endorse the property distribution interpretation of a field according to which a field is a distribution of properties over
points of spacetime. But in this case, the relation between a spacetime point and
its field-strength property is not the location relation, but more nearly the instantiation relation. So if there is something about instantiation such that it upsets the
possibility of a shift, then the original shift argument against substantival spacetime is likewise upset.

Each response surveyed either fails as a response to the modified shift argument, violates some central tenet of relationalism, or if it will work for the rela-
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tionalist in response to the modified shift argument, then it ought to work for the
substantivalist in response to the original shift argument. So my conclusion is that
the modified shift argument is as troublesome for the relationalist as the original
shift argument is for the substantivalist.
I do not say that the modified shift argument establishes the conclusion that it
purports to establish. In fact, I think that what we have here is a bad company objection against the original shift argument. In this respect, I consider the modified
shift argument as an argument along the lines of Horwich’s “electron switching”
argument (Horwich [1978], 409). That argument, which is also intended to mimic
the original shift argument, begins by supposing that there exist electrons A and B
instantiating property profiles F and F 0 , respectively. The argument then asks us
to consider an alternative possibility in which the property profiles are switched
so that A instantiates F 0 and B instantiates F . Such a possibility would be ontologically distinct though qualitatively indiscernible from the original. But now what
conclusion is supposed to follow? That electrons do not exist? Surely, no one ought
to be presuaded by an argument such as this that electrons do not exist. Similarly,
no one ought to be persuaded by the modified shift argument that fields do not
exist, or that the extended object interpretation is fundamentally misguided. But
then, likewise, no one ought to be persuaded by the original shift argument that
substantivalism is false. If this is right, then shift arguments are simply uninteresting arguments, telling us more about one’s modal metaphysics than anything
about the ontology of spacetime.
But at this stage, I am just trying to establish parity between the substantivalist
and the relationalist. My ultimate goal is elsewhere: I want to argue that to whatever degree the substantivalist is committed to rejecting Leibniz equivalence, so is
the relationalists. That’s a more specific objective, having to do with the interpretation of the mathematics of GR.
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6.6

Leibniz Equivalence

So far, I have argued for two claims. First, I have argued that relationalists who
adopt the material object interpretation of a field ought to be realists about the
M in the mathematical model (M, gab , Tab ). More specifically, they ought to think
that there exists an object in the world—maybe the gravitational field—which is
represented, at least in part, by M . In this case, relationalists ought to say that M
represents the topological and differential structure of the gravitational field while
gab represents its metric structure. Second, I have argued that relationalists who
adopt the material object interpretation of a field are subject to a shift argument no
different than the original shift argument against substantivalism. Let’s turn back,
now, to the question of how to understand the invariance of a relativistic model
under a diffeomorphism.
It is useful to divide the argument into two steps, depending upon whether
objects and properties are ontologically distinct or not. So, step one: suppose that
objects and properties are ontologically distinct. In this case, given the above results, it is pretty clear I think that the relationalist is committed to rejecting Leibniz
equivalence. I have argued that if fields are extended material objects, then we
ought to regard the atomic, point-sized parts of such objects as instantiating the
manifold structure of physical spacetime, and so we ought to regard the M in
the model (M, gab , Tab ) as having representational content. I have also argued that
if fields are extended material objects, then it is possible to shift properties one
foot to the right. But more generally, it will be possible to smoothly reposition a
field’s properties over its substantive base of field parts, and to do so in such a
way that the resulting arrangement is ontologically distinct though qualitatively
indiscernible from the original. But now there is really no substantive difference
between this ontology of ‘material’ field parts and the substantivalist’s ontology of
‘substantival’ spacetime points. In particular, the modal differences between the

168

views have been removed. And so there are no longer principled grounds upon
which the relationalist can accept Leibniz equivalence. To whatever degree the
substantivalist is committed to rejecting that proposition, so is the relationalist.
Now part two: suppose that objects and properties are of the same ontological
category. In particular, suppose that objects are just bundles of tropes. On this
assumption, things are much less clear and it may be that relationalists are not
committed to denying Leibniz equivalence. But my main claim is that there is
total parity between the substantivalist and relationalist—that to whatever degree
the one is committed to denying Leibniz equivalence, so it the other. And what
is clear, I think, is that if the bundle theory will help the relationalist maintain a
commitment to Leibniz equivalence in the face of the modified shift argument,
then so too will it help the substantivalist in the face of the original shift argument.

6.7

Conclusion

I have argued that in the context of a field ontology, there is total parity between
the relationalist and substantivalist. In particular, I have argued that to whatever
degree the substantivalist is committed to a denial of Leibniz equivalence, so is the
relationalist.
One consequence of special interest is that if the above arguments are sound,
then the relationalist is subject to the hole argument no less than the substantivalist: a total specification of which field parts instantiate which properties outside of
some spacetime region h will fail to determine which parts instantiate which properties inside of h. As above, I am inclined to regard this as a bad company objection
against the hole argument. No one ought to conclude on the basis of this argument
that fields are not extended material objects. But then no one ought to conclude on
the basis of the original hole argument that spacetime is not substantival.
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In a sense, this is a skeptical conclusion in that it undermines a standard way
of keeping the substantival-relational debate alive, namely, by stressing modal differences. In this respect, I am in agreement with (Rynasiewicz [1996]), who has
argued that given developments in modern physics the debate between substantivalists and relationalists is an outmoded debate. The arguments in this paper
arrive at a similar conclusion, though in a rather different way.
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